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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
 
“Ants and bees can also work together in huge numbers, but they do so in a very
rigid manner and only with close relatives. Wolves and chimpanzees cooperate
far more flexibly than ants, but they can do so only with small numbers of other
individuals that they know intimately. Sapiens can cooperate in extremely flexible
ways with countless numbers of strangers. That’s why Sapiens rule the world,
whereas ants eat our leftovers and chimps are locked up in zoos and research
laboratories.” Harari (2015)
Even though it is difficult to prove that it has been large-scale cooperation1 that actually
cleared our path, and its primary role for our development as the dominant species might
be denied, there should be no argument about its relevance for our today’s living. We all
constantly engage in cooperative behavior in business as well as private interactions, placing
trust in others or simply engaging in voluntary actions that reduce our monetary earnings while
increasing payoffs for others (Burnham, Hare, 2007). Whether on a small scale like within
families or working teams or on a larger scale such as within organizations or nations, we
are all continuously confronted with dilemma situations where it might be individually more
profitable to defect or cheat rather than cooperate. However, with our inability to make perfect
contracts, we all depend and rely to some degree on others’ willingness to cooperate.
According to Darwin (2006), humans, like all animals, strive for the survival of the fittest.
Accordingly, why should we ever engage in cooperation with potential competitors when
being a nice guy merely implies ”an individual that assists other members of its species, at
its own expense, to pass their genes on to the next generation.” (Dawkins, 2006)? In the
literature, a variety of theories exist concerning why cooperation is generally sustainable,
even in a competitive environment: e.g. inclusive fitness theory, which is also known as
kin selection (Hamilton, 1964; Foster et al., 2006); reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971; Fehr
et al., 2002; Bowles, Gintis, 2003); or the evolution of social norms (Pillutla, Chen, 1999;
Fehr, Fischbacher, 2004; Burnham, Hare, 2007). While also being quite interesting, I do
not primarily seek to answer the question of why humans engage in cooperative behavior
generally in this book, but rather focus on what influences whether and to what degree humans
cooperate in a given situation. While these two questions cannot be clearly separated from each
other, knowing more about the triggers and blockers of cooperation in given situations allows
outlining more efficient conditions for e.g. policy-makers or companies to foster cooperation.
Humans are complex creatures and our decisions to cooperate or defect depend on a magnitude
of relevant factors. I will classify these factors as being either internal or external. As internal
1By cooperation, I will stick to the notion of Bowles, Gintis (2003) and understand it as an individual’s
willingness to incur personal costs or renounce additional profits to enable a joint activity from which another
individual or a group as a whole benefits.
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factors, I will describe all influences that originate from within an individual’s organism, e.g.
emotions, affiliation, gender, moral values or identities. By contrast, I define factors as external
that are imposed on an individual, e.g. situation-related context, institutions or others’ behavior.
I am aware that determining something’s origin as internal, e.g. like moral values, might rather
be determined by external factors like culture or nurture. For simplification, I will rely my
classification on the moment when an individual actually makes a decision and consequently
whether or not a factor is externally imposed at this very moment. Of course, all presented
factors should not be taken as independent but as more or less interacting (Sakamoto et al.,
2013).
Internal Factors for Human Cooperation
In economic standard theory, it is commonly accepted that individuals choose an action when
its expected benefits exceed its expected costs. Furthermore, it is assumed that the act of lying
per se is without any costs and only monetary factors are taken into considerations (Gneezy,
2005). This would imply that when faced with the decision of being dishonest, individuals
simply weight the pecuniary advantages and disadvantages, subsequently make a conclusion
and act accordingly (Gravert, 2013). However, experimental evidence contradicts this pure
focus on monetary incentives, given that individuals also recognize non-pecuniary incentives
such as feelings, complying with norms and their own self-image.
Individuals derive utility from a positive self-image, which they try to maintain at a satisfactory
level (Akerlof, Kranton, 2000; Loewenstein, 2000; McLeish, Oxoby, 2007; Gino et al., 2011;
Ploner, Regner, 2013). Such self-image, or rather an individual’s sense of oneself, can be
defined as an one’s own identity. Through memberships in groups, individuals adapt behavioral
traits that are somehow consistent with their ideals and try to live up to them (Benjamin
et al., 2007; Akerlof, Kranton, 2008; Chen, Li, 2009). Konrath, Cheung (2013) and Cappelen
et al. (2013) show that individuals’ utilities from their self-image depend on such internalized
norms because the willingness to cheat and whether such an act is perceived as a transgression
depends on it (Pascual-Ezama et al., 2013). In general, individuals have the urge to conform to
their social environment and act in accordance with its prescriptions (Thaler, Sunstein, 2009).
Several experiments reveal the existence of such conformity pressure. In his famous setup, Asch
(1955) show that people are willing to adapt obviously false opinions when confronted with the
preceding wrong answers of others. The existence of self-fulfilling prophesies by confirmatory
behavior is confirmed by Salganik, Watts (2008). In simulated music download portals, they
reveal that individuals tend to prefer songs that are already most popular. Another example
is the study of Milgram (1963) on obedience, showing that people are willing to cross their
own moral boundaries by obeying instructions that they considered as important and socially
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acknowledged.
In case people deviate in any direction from their optimal level of self-image, they engage in
moral cleansing or moral licensing to reestablish it (Sachdeva et al., 2009; Brañas-Garza et al.,
2013). Moral licensing occurs when an individual carries out good deeds, which gives her a
superior self-image. Since individuals try to maintain their self-image at an optimal level rather
than maximizing it, they tend to behave badly after they have boosted their self-image, having
licensed themselves to disregard norms or codes of conduct. This argumentation is turned
around for moral cleansing: assuming an individual violates social norms and experience a
reduction in her self-image, to re-establish her self-image, she will engage in moral cleansing
by behaving more morally she would otherwise do so (Ploner, Regner, 2013). Baumeister
et al. (1994) determine guilt as the driving force behind moral balancing, resulting from the
failure to live up to one’s own and others’ expectations or by violating social norms (Erat,
Gneezy, 2012). Since moral balancing takes place even when nobody else is present, it is not a
mere self-representational strategy (Merritt et al., 2010). Thereby, the whole process of moral
balancing appears to be short-lived. Individuals forget about their good and bad deeds very
quickly. If balancing does not take place in a contemporary way, it will not happen regardless
(Brañas-Garza et al., 2013). Moreover, it appears that the costs of lying can be outsourced
by delegation. Erat (2013) shows experimentally that subjects are significantly more likely to
employ a third person for their ’dirty work’ if deception would cause relatively greater harm.
Experiments show that some individuals have a strict lying averse attitude (Erat, Gneezy, 2012;
Cappelen et al., 2013; Gneezy et al., 2013). They abstain strictly from deceiving another person,
cheating in an interaction (Gneezy, 2005; Erat, 2013; Fosgaard et al., 2013; Gino et al., 2013;
Gravert, 2013; Pascual-Ezama et al., 2013) or violating social norms (Servátka, 2010; Dreber
et al., 2013; Herne et al., 2013), even when there is no risk of being caught or punished. This also
accounts for Pareto white lies2 and cannot be attached to egoistic motives per se. Consequently,
some individuals perceive the act of lying as something strictly immoral and associate higher
costs with it, which might even outbalance any pecuniary incentive.
Individuals’ willingness to behave dishonestly is also influenced by their demographics. Here,
the literature documents significant differences between men and women. For example, men
are more likely to engage in deception that benefits themselves at the expense of others (Gneezy
et al., 2013). Additionally, Erat, Gneezy (2012) show that women are on average significantly
more likely to tell an altruistic white lie3 but are more reluctant towards Pareto white lies.
Moreover, Erat (2013) finds that women are more likely to use an agent to delegate the act of
dishonesty which might reveal a greater sensitivity to the underlying costs. However, Cappelen
et al. (2013) are unable to confirm these results in their experiment.
2A white lie is an action that violates a social norm but that enhances the overall welfare, while not making any
involved individual worse off.
3An altruistic white lie reduces one’s own payoff while enhancing another person’s payoff.
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Furthermore, physiological conditions influence the willingness or rather the capability to
act honestly. Motivational conflicts seem to consume specific mental resources, identified as
the moral muscle (Gino et al., 2011). The experiments of Gino et al. (2011) and Mead et al.
(2009) suggest that the process of moral balancing depends on whether these mental resources
have been used recently. In line with this, Fosgaard et al. (2013) conclude that the degree
of intelligence is correlated with the likelihood that a person engages in dishonest actions.
However, Cappelen et al. (2013) are unable to verify this relation as they do not find any
significant differences to cognitive abilities.
External Factors for Human Cooperation
The social psychology literature reveals that the behavior of surrounding people crucially affects
the honesty of individuals who generally tend to behave according to their group members’
preceding actions (Fosgaard et al., 2013). Additionally, Gino et al. (2013) show that the group
size as well as the possibility to interact with its members have a significantly positive effect
on individuals’ willingness to cheat. As communication increases the focus of prevalent norms
and preceding actions within a group, this confirms the former statement that individuals adjust
their behavior towards the most meaningful norms within a group (Dreber et al., 2013). By
contrast, an increasing group size reduces the costs of deception because it reduces the personal
accountability. Servátka (2010) verifies the general assumption that individuals tend to be nicer
to nice people, which is confirmed by experimental studies showing that participants engage in
strong reciprocal behavior (Fehr, Fischbacher, 2004; Herne et al., 2013).
Moreover, the decision concerning whether to behave dishonestly depends on the context
and its associated expectations. Battigalli et al. (2013) use poker players as an illustration,
given that they usually lie and bluff while playing. Within this context, nobody expects an
opponent to tell the truth, but simultaneously nobody condemns anybody else for such a usually
norm-violating behavior. Additionally, process satisfaction influences individuals’ willingness
to punish dishonest behavior. Brandts, Charness (2003) show that immoral acts are significantly
less tolerated when deception have preceded: individuals are interested and sensitive towards
potential first movers’ choices, their foregone alternatives and whether an action was intended.
Besides the described non-monetary incentives, individuals also react to changing pecuniary
incentives. In his experiment, Gneezy (2005) shows that the decision to deceive is influenced by
relative gains and relative costs, although individuals take the payoff of all involved parties into
consideration. This is confirmed by another experiment of Gneezy et al. (2013), concluding
that lying increases with higher monetary gains.
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Dishonest Behavior and Moral Cleansing
The first approach to investigate human cooperative behavior in general adds to the moral
balancing theory and focuses on individuals’ self-image, i.e. the identity that they derive
from living up to expectations while minimizing group-level awareness. In ”The Victim
Matters - Experimental Evidence on Lying, Moral Costs and Moral Cleansing”, we investigate
experimentally moral cleansing, i.e. the tendency to behave more morally after bad deeds, in
a setting with endogenous manipulation of subjects’ moral self-image. We thus analyze the
context dependence of moral cleansing by showing that the opportunity to cheat on individuals
in different roles incurs different moral costs and leads to different degrees of cheating and moral
cleansing. To investigate the impact of different addressees of an immoral action on moral
cleansing, our experimental design builds closely on Ploner, Regner (2013). We investigate
the extent of cheating and subsequent moral cleansing, whereby in two distinct treatments
subjects know that cheating is conducted at the expense of either the experimenter or another
subject. To enable an endogenous manipulation of their self-image, subjects’ initial endowment
is determined by self-reported hidden rolls of a fair die. False numbers can be reported to gain a
higher payoff. Subsequently, subjects play a standard dictator game which gives the possibility
to engage in moral cleansing by sharing their endowment with another subject.
We find that cheating the experimenter is widespread yet incurs little moral costs and apparently
no reduction of the moral self-image; consequently, there is no substantial moral cleansing.
Furthermore, no ’Robin-Hood-Effect’ occurs, as cheating the experimenter is not associated
with increased donations. By contrast, cheating at the expense of another subject halves the
number of cheaters; obviously, a substantial share of subjects anticipates the moral costs and
thus chooses not to cheat in the first place. Subjects who claim high endowments at the expense
of another subject in turn donate significantly more, which should be interpreted as moral
cleansing. Both reactions can be asserted through the moral self-image: as the moral costs
of cheating on another subject are dealt with by either avoiding them ex ante or cleansing them
ex post, the moral self-image is necessarily equal to that of our control group.
More generally, it can be stated that once moral costs are high, e.g. when an opportunity to
cheat on another person is taken, both avoiding the immoral action and moral cleansing are
likely to occur. By contrast, frequent rational cheating and little ensuing moral cleansing will
occur when the addressee is a faceless organization only evoking minor social concerns, as
is conceivable e.g. for large corporations or the state. Our results suggest that cheating the
taxman would be considered morally acceptable to many more people and would not lead to
the desire to share the profit to feel better rather than cheating a real person. Our results thus
emphasize that moral balancing should not be seen as a stand-alone effect, but rather that its
occurrence crucially depends on the addressee of immoral behavior. This could be crucial for
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the design of organizations that are characterized by a set of rules prone to cheating. Once
individuals are given the opportunity to make profits by not adhering to (unenforced) rules,
they will be more likely to engage in immoral behavior without feeling guilty when the victim
is perceived to be an anonymous organization. Instead, if the organization credibly assigns the
blame and punishment for losses incurred from cheating to a single person, rational cheating
will be associated with substantially higher moral costs and will thus lead to the avoidance or –
at least – compensation of immoral actions.
The Effect of Competition and Group Identity on Cooperation
In the first approach to investigate cooperative behavior, the focus lies on individual
decision-making by excluding influences at the group level, i.e. subjects’ decisions only
affected their own payoff in the first stage and the matched subject’s payoff in the dictator
game: with the common anonymity protocol in economic experiments, subjects’ awareness of
their membership in groups is minimized. The second approach ”Cooperation in public goods
games: Enhancing effects of group identity and competition” explores individuals’ identity from
a different angle, investigating how group identity and competition within and between different
groups affect cooperation.
Conflicts within and between groups are omnipresent in everyday life (Chowdhury et al.,
2016) However, groups cannot be modeled as independent unitary actors, since sub-groups’
and individuals’ interests do not necessarily coincide. Consequently, individuals might be
confronted with contradictory incentives for either defecting, i.e. maximizing their own
payoff, or cooperating, i.e. maximizing the group’s payoff. This becomes evident in public
goods games with individuals’ investments in public goods usually falling short of optimal
amounts. Such intra-group conflicts rarely appear as isolated incidents because they are usually
accompanied by inter-group competition, e.g. a team or company as an in-group competes
for an exogenous prize with other teams or companies as out-groups. Like with intra-group
competition, conflicting interests arise with inter-group competition, since individuals want to
win the competed exogenous prize from the inter-group competition while they might also want
to invest minimal resources and prefer to free-ride (Camerer et al., 2011; Fischbacher, Gächter,
2010).
We explore experimentally how increased group identity and varying distributive mechanisms
for the exogenous prize affect individuals’ willingness to cooperate in a setting with intra-group
and inter-group competition. To model intra-group competition, we play a public goods game.
The exogenous prize that we use to model inter-group competition, is distributed among the
wining team’s members with the size of a group’s generated public good determining the
probability of winning the prize. We use a standard 2x2 design by varying the level of
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group identity and the prize distribution mechanism. To increase group identity, we apply the
procedure from Eckel, Grossman (2005) by letting subjects solve a puzzle task in face-to-face
interactions with their team members. To investigate how different monetary incentives
influence individuals’ cooperative behavior in our setting we either distribute the exogenous
prize proportionally to an individual’s investments in the public good or egalitarian among all
members of the winning group.
Our results show that investments in public goods increase with higher levels of group
identity. Moreover, subjects invest significantly more in the public good under the egalitarian
profit-sharing rule with high group identity. This is surprising because it contradicts previous
findings indicating stronger effects of the proportional profit-sharing rule. We explain this
through subjects’ inequity aversion (Fehr, Schmidt, 1999). Finally, the number of subjects
who fully cooperate, i.e. invest their full endowment in the public good, is significantly higher
when group identity is increased.
Summing up the results, it is shown that cooperative behavior can be described by three main
factors: (i) increasing group identity and perceived in-group attachments positively affect the
willingness to cooperate; (ii) contest situations (e.g. external monetary incentives) increase
cooperation; and (iii) history matters, i.e. when group members experience a positive event
within their group such as winning the prize or high investment by their peers, this subsequently
increases individuals’ willingness to cooperate.
To sum up the first part of this book, it becomes evident that human cooperation and cheating
behavior is a complex mechanism depending on multiple internal and external factors. The
authors show experimentally that individuals strongly care about how they perceive themselves,
as well as how others judge them. Individuals constantly try to maintain a comfortable
self-image. They increase cooperation due to moral balancing, if they behaved badly in the
past, to recreate their optimal point of self-image. The same accounts for the case whereby their
awareness of being a group member is enhanced. Moreover, being in competition with another
group or being more involved in the expected profits also increases the willingness to cooperate.
Cooperation in Credence Goods Markets
I have presented literature and investigations about human cooperative behavior in general.
The underlying studies are primarily based on classic economic games like the dictator game,
the prisoner’s dilemma or public goods games, for example. Despite being useful to derive
general predictions about human behavior, they are often too stylized to enable implementable
policy recommendations. Many economic interactions are based on more complex structures,
meaning that more sophisticated models and experiments are necessary. An example of such a
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more complex interaction is markets for credence goods, which will be the focus of the second
half of this book.
Markets for credence goods - commonly referred to as markets for expert services - are
characterized by information asymmetries between consumers and experts. Consumers are
only aware of having a problem but cannot determine the exact kind and service that would
be optimal for a solution. They have to contact experts for advice, who are typically better
informed and can both diagnose consumer problems and carry out necessary services. The most
common examples are given by markets for health care, automobile repair, legal and financial
services, as well as home improvements. The exception for credence goods - in contrast to
search and experience goods - is given by information asymmetries even persisting after trade
has taken place, thus implying that consumers cannot determine whether the received service
was optimal even if their problem has been solved (Darby, Karni, 1973). These information
asymmetries lead to incentive problems which can result in welfare losses and potential market
breakdowns (Akerlof, 1970). Altogether, consumers are neither able to determine ex ante
the best solution for their difficulties, i.e. which maximizes their payoff, nor identify ex
post the exact treatment that relieved them. Consequently, experts might use their superior
knowledge to cheat on consumers by overtreating, overcharging or undertreating them (Dulleck
and Kerschbamer, 2006, 2009; Dulleck et al., 2011).
In general, consumer makes decisions based on formerly-acquired information from an
expert. Here, I identify two critical factors in reference to the Judge-Advisor-System (JAS)
literature: (1) what affects consumers’ decisions to follow advice or trust experts; and (2)
what affects experts’ degree of cooperation of rather sincerity in their communication. It
seems that consumers adjust their willingness to follow advice to the source and its identifiable
characteristics (Bonaccio, Dalal, 2006; Eckerd, Hill, 2012; Mortimer, Pressey, 2013; Schotter,
2003; White, 2005). Consumers discount advice to different degrees, which is influenced by
whether the advice has been liable to costs and when it was paid (Angelova, Regner, 2013;
Gino, 2008). Thereby, discounting rates increase when experts’ interests are divergent from
consumers’ interest and if advice is imposed. The way in which advice is transmitted also
matters, with most following in face-to-face situations (Bonaccio, Dalal, 2006). However,
consumers are not only more willing to follow advice in face-to-face situations, but experts
are also more sincere in their communication, pointing to increased costs for lying in personal
interactions. Regarding experts’ willingness for sincere communication, Crawford, Sobel
(1982) argue that until interests perfectly coincide signals will be noisy.
The term credence goods has been introduced by Darby, Karni (1973) in addition to search and
experience goods. ”Generally speaking, credence goods have the characteristic that though
consumers can observe the utility they derive from the good ex post, they cannot judge
whether the type or quality they have received is the ex ante needed one.” (Dulleck et al.,
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2011). In the literature, it is usually assumed that consumers are homogenous and have
only vague information about their problem at hand, but know that they suffer from either a
minor or a serious problem with a commonly-known probability and need either a cheap or
an expensive treatment (Wolinsky, 1993; Emons, 2001; Dulleck, Kerschbamer, 2006, 2009;
Angelova, Regner, 2013; Bonroy et al., 2013; Mimra et al., 2016a,b). To solve the credence
dilemma, institutions to protect consumers from being exploited might be a solution.
Dulleck et al. (2011) investigate how economic outcomes are affected by liability, verifiability
and competition. They show that liability leads to a significant increase in trade volume and
efficiency. By contrast, verifiability does not seem to have any significant influence which
they ascribe to the coexistence of individuals’ with heterogeneous distributional preferences.
Another solution to solve the dilemma might be the implementation of price competition
between experts. Huck et al. (2012) show experimentally that competition increases trust and
market efficiency. Dulleck et al. (2011) conclude that competition drives down overall prices
and increases the volume of trade which is confirmed by Mimra et al. (2016a). Additionally,
they show that price competition significantly drives down experts’ profits by shifting surplus
to consumers. However, with price competition, experts seem to show higher rates of
undertreatment and overcharging. To solve the credence dilemma second opinions or multiple
visits of different experts are another approach. Wolinsky (1993) shows that the costs for
visiting multiple experts determine whether this leads to an overall welfare increase. Mimra
et al. (2016b) add to this by concluding that the rate of overtreatment significantly decreases
with the possibility of second opinions and absolute market efficiency increases depending on
additional search costs. In a more complicate theoretical model, Pesendorfer, Wolinsky (2003)
show that the possibility for second opinions leads neither to Pareto optimal outcomes, as they
are not incentive compatible, nor second best outcomes, since experts’ effort levels remain too
low, although this needs additional institutions like fixed prices.
The credence dilemma might also be solved by repuation building. Akerlof (1970) conjecture
that brand-naming goods would lead to higher market efficiency as consumers curtail future
expenditures if the quality does not fulfill their expectations. Darby, Karni (1973) support
this assumption, suggesting that a good reputation allows experts to raise their prices without
losing customers in future transactions. Furthermore,Wolinsky (1993) show that reputation
can mitigate experts incentives to cheat. Roe, Sheldon (2007) confirm this for continuous or
voluntary governmental labels that enable an outcome like under perfect information. However,
corresponding experiments reveal ambiguous evidence. Dulleck et al. (2011) show that
reputation increases trade volume and reduces overcharging, although this influence is driven
to non-significance in markets with liability, verifiability or competition. Nevertheless, through
reputation sellers are able to modestly increase their prices of high quality goods. In line with
this, Mimra et al. (2016a) conclude that reputation and price competition have counteracting
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effects, as experts with a bad reputation lower prices to compensate for it. By contrast, with
fixed prices, consumers seem to take reputation much more into consideration. Grosskopf,
Sarin (2010) confirm this by showing that additional information about experts past behavior
with fixed prices leads to higher market efficiency. However, in comparing the concepts of
private and public history, Mimra et al. (2016a) indicate that in markets with price competition
the level of overcharging is significantly lower with revealed private history than with public
history. They explain this counter-intuitive result, i.e. that more information about experts’ past
behavior lead to inferior market outcomes, by experts trying to compensate for declining prices
due to fiercer price competition through higher overcharging rates.
The main problem in a market for expert services remains information asymmetry between
experts and consumers. While formerly-mentioned mechanisms are primarily based on
additional institutions, there might also be the possibility to solve the credence dilemma
in reducing the information asymmetry. By introducing different states of knowledge for
consumers, Darby, Karni (1973) show that experts’ optimal level of fraud depends and
decreases with better consumer knowledge. In line with this, Hadfield et al. (1998) and Howells
(2005) argue that with additional information consumers can better protect themselves against
bad deals while forcing experts to cooperate with their recommendations. This corresponds
to the common-sense intuition that informed consumers are less likely to be exploited as they
tend to accept fraudulent offers less often. However, Hyndman, Ozerturk (2011) conclude
that experts’ behavior depends on consumer information types rather than whether these are
better informed. In line with this, Lee, Soberon-Ferrer (1997) as well as Fong (2005) argue
that experts tend to cheat selectively based on consumers’ identifiable characteristics. Bonroy
et al. (2013) confirm this, as in a market with otherwise-homogeneous consumers who are
committed to liable experts after diagnosis, they are less likely to invest in costly diagnosis
the higher the risk aversion of consumers. In addition, Balafoutas et al. (2013) show that
observable and audible characteristics of consumers, i.e. prosperity and country/city of origin,
have a crucial influence on experts’ fraudulent behavior.
Credence Goods Markets: The Influence of Additional Consumer Information
In ”Consumer Information in a Market for Expert Services: Experimental Evidence”, we
investigate theoretically and experimentally the behavior in credence goods markets, in terms
of how better-informed consumers might improve the outcome. In the literature, there is plenty
of research about markets for expert services, although ex-ante consumer information has not
gained much attention. However, providing additional consumer information is among the most
prominent proposals to overcome the inefficiencies due to asymmetric information in credence
goods markets. We investigate how consumers receiving an informative yet noisy signal before
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visiting an expert influences experts’ cheating behavior, consumers’ acceptance probabilities
and overall welfare. In our theoretical model, we introduce three different treatments in which
consumers receive either (1) an uninformative signal, (2) an informative signal observed by
experts or (3) an informative signal hidden to experts.
We find that experts’ likelihood of fraudulent behavior - i.e. recommending an expensive
treatment when a cheap one would be sufficient to solve a consumer’s problem - is influenced
by ex-ante consumer information observed by experts. Our novel lab results thus confirm the
findings of Lee, Soberon-Ferrer (1997), Fong (2005), Schneider (2012) as well as Balafoutas
et al. (2013) drives that experts tend to cheat consumers conditional on their identifiable
characteristics, which is given by the risk type in our setting determined by received signals.
Our data shows that experts cheat high-risk consumers significantly more often than low-risk
consumers, which supports the hypothesis by Hyndman, Ozerturk (2011) that hiding bad signals
might be beneficial to consumers. Our results thus indicate that - in contrast to common sense
- uninformed consumers are not the most likely victims of fraudulent behavior; rather, it is the
informed high-risk type. In contrast to our theoretical predictions, we do not find any influence
on experts’ fraudulent behavior by hiding consumers’ signals compared to the case of no ex-ante
consumer information.
Moreover, our results show a significant influence of consumers’ information on their
acceptance probability - i.e. their likelihood of market entry - for expensive treatments. Without
additional information, consumers show substantially lower rates of acceptance than suggested
by theory. This might be due to consumers hoping for a minor problem, in which case the
outside option doubles their income in comparison to accepting an expensive treatment. In
the worst case, they fall back on the outside option and suffer from a serious problem, which
only reduces their income by 20%. Accordingly, the risk in monetary terms of an untreated
serious problem compared to a treated one is quite small. Based on this consideration, it is quite
surprising that consumers substantially change their behavior and show very high acceptance
probabilities when receiving bad signals. Since consumers condition their behavior on the
signals received, more serious problems are treated appropriately with informative signals.
However, there is no evidence that consumers account for experts’ ability to observe their
signals, as they behave similarly in terms of accepting probabilities in case of hidden and open
signals.
Aggregate income increases when there is additional consumer information. This stems from
consumers’ tendency to reject expensive treatment recommendation if they do not distinctively
receive a bad signal. In case of open signals, low cheating probabilities associated with good
signals meet low acceptance rates of expensive treatments, whereas bad signals are associated
with high cheating probabilities and high acceptance rates. This results in more realized
contracts and more consumer problems are solved appropriately. In case of hidden signals,
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experts tend to cheat as if there was no consumer information, while consumers with bad signals
show higher acceptance rates of expensive treatments. Again, there are more contracts realized
and especially more serious problems solved.
In sum, markets for expert services generate superior levels of overall welfare when there
is additional ex-ante consumer information. This is driven by experts benefiting from more
frequently-accepted expensive treatment recommendations, implying more realized contracts
and fewer outside option payments. Whether consumers benefit or not crucially depends on
risk types, whereby low-risk consumers are better off and high-risk consumers are worse off
when introducing additional consumer information.
Credence Goods Markets: The Effect of Qualifying Experts I
In ”Effects of Qualification in Expert Markets with Price Competition and Endogenous
Verifiability”, we investigate theoretically how the introduction of heterogeneous experts
regarding their ability to diagnose consumer problems affects the behavior and outcome in
a market for credence goods. In such markets, consumers are neither able to observe effort
decisions nor whether an expert is high or low skilled, which results in a moral hazard problem.
We analyze expert and consumer behavior in a market where experts have a moral hazard
problem in providing truthful diagnosis, since they have to invest in costly but unobservable
diagnostic effort to send true signals to consumers. Rather than assuming a homogeneous level
of qualification, in reality there are considerable differences in skills among experts in any given
field. While Pesendorfer, Wolinsky (2003) assume that low-skilled experts always deliver an
incorrect diagnosis, we argue that this depends on their willingness to invest effort in their
diagnosis. Therefore, high-skilled experts’ advantage only comprises being able to carry out
diagnosis with less effort but not having monopoly power for correct diagnosis. For this reason,
we introduce heterogeneous experts into the model of Pesendorfer, Wolinsky (2003), where
consumers can visit multiple experts to verify recommendations. For simplification, we assume
that experts are either high or low skilled. We model this by high-skilled experts having some
probability of identifying consumer problems even with low effort, while low-skilled experts
always give a false recommendation in this case.
Our results show that second best equilibria are possible in the presence of high skilled experts,
even with flexible prices. However, such type of equilibrium being stable requires special
market circumstances, whereby transaction costs for consumers must lie under a specific
threshold. Additionally, the share of high-skilled experts needs to be relatively large and their
edge in qualification relatively low. If these conditions are not fulfilled, it might be worthwhile
for policy makers to intervene by fixing service prices to increase overall welfare. According to
our results, there might be an incentive for policy makers to regulate service prices in markets
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with only few or rather extremely heterogeneously-qualified experts. However, if one drops the
assumption that market composition cannot be influenced externally, there can be an incentive
to regulate the share of high-skilled experts. Given that not only the possibility of second best
equilibria but also any non-degenerate equilibrium depends on consumers’ transactions costs
not exceeding the determined threshold, market breakdowns might be prevented by reducing
consumers’ costs for visiting an expert. However, in any second best equilibrium, all welfare
surplus is accumulated completely by either consumers or experts, which might make welfare
maximization complicated in reality.
Credence Goods Markets: The Effect of Qualifying Experts II
In ”Expert Qualification in Markets for Expert Services: A Sisyphean Task?”, we build on
our theoretical model from ”Effects of Qualification in Expert Markets with Price Competition
and Endogenous Verifiability” and test them in a laboratory experiment. We implement a
classical 2x2 design by varying the share of high-skilled experts in the market and whether
price competition exist. To our best knowledge, we are the first to provide an experimental
design to investigate moral hazard in a market for credence goods. Besides looking at experts’
high effort choices and consumers’ search behavior, we investigate how markets react and use
four indicators for efficiency, i.e. the volume of trade, the share of a maximum realized welfare,
solved problems and the share of conducted wrong services.
We find that experts adapt their investment decisions to their individual skills but that
qualification is not necessarily a Sisyphean task. It appears that markets for credence goods
with experts having a moral hazard problem in providing truthful diagnoses are more efficient
than theory predicts. Experts invest on average more in their diagnosis, which increases the
probability of consumers having their problems identified correctly. As expected, high-skilled
experts invest significantly less in their diagnoses than low-skilled experts, while both types
invest more than their best response would be. However, consumers behave risk averse.
They seldom buy after a single diagnosis, frequently leave the market without any action and
predominately opt for confirming diagnoses with other diagnoses before buying a service.
While this causes higher transaction costs due to more visited experts and a welfare loss,
experts’ high effort investments and consumers’ frequent verification lead to a much smaller
proportion of wrong services than we expected. This overcompensates welfare losses from
higher transaction costs and leads to a significantly higher market efficiency than predicted.
By increasing the share of high-skilled experts in the market - to which we refer as expert
qualification - market efficiency increases with fixed prices but appears to remain unaffected or
even decline with price competition. In both cases, consumers act more rationally and leave
less often without any action, which might be an indication for increased trust. However,
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according to high-skilled experts investing comparable less effort, this only weakly increases
the probability of a correct diagnosis by expert qualification and only in a market without price
competition. Looking at the effect of price competition in a high- or low-qualified market -
i.e. with a high or low share of high-skilled experts - the influence seems to be positive in a
low-qualified market but rather negative in a high-qualified one. In a low-qualified market,
while experts invest less effort and the probability of a correct signals decreases, consumers
appear more trusting in terms of buying more often after only one diagnosis. This increases
the market efficiency, albeit not significantly. In a high-qualified market, the effect of price
competition reduces market efficiency with significantly fewer solved problems and more
wrong services, even while consumers appear to act less risk averse. Across all treatments,
consumers’ risk aversion as well as experts’ general overinvestments with fixed prices prevail.
By letting experts set prices on their own, we observe an increase in diagnosis prices and a
decrease in service prices compared with fixed prices but constantly declining prices over
periods. Again, experts do not act according to their best response, with high-skilled experts
investing too much and low-skilled experts investing too little effort. By contrast, consumers
would be expected not to participate in markets with average diagnosis prices above their
critical threshold for positive expected payoff, which is crossed with flexible prices. However,
as already mentioned, they appear to act less risk averse in such markets which we explain
through the perceived higher degrees of freedom that experts experience by setting prices
freely, thus increasing consumers’ trust as they might interpret this as higher attachments to
one’s duties.
Summing up the second part of this book, it becomes evident that markets for credence goods
are more complex than common economic games like the public goods game or the dictator
game. With information asymmetries between consumers and experts, markets suffer from
inefficiencies as consumers might be concerned about being cheated. Letting consumers be
better informed before visiting an expert and qualifying experts regarding their necessary effort
to provide correct diagnosis leads to more consumer trust and higher market efficiency. By
contrast, hiding consumers’ private information or introducing price competition in a market
with many high-skilled experts do not appear to have positive effects on efficiency.
The present book adds to the broad field of investigations concerning what affects and
determines human cooperation. It provides new insights into internal and external factors that
influence such decisions. Rather than presenting a closed and universal examination, this book
should be seen as an addition to an ongoing process. In particular, the theoretical model and
the experimental design to investigate moral hazard in credence goods markets provide a useful
basis for further research with strong potential for applicable policy and real-life implications.
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Abstract: In an experiment on moral cleansing with an endogenously manipulated 
moral self-image, we examine the role of the addressee of an immoral action. We find 
that cheating is highest and moral cleansing lowest when subjects cheat at the expense 
of the experimenter, while cheating is lowest and moral cleansing highest once cheating 
harms another participant. A subsequent measurement of subjects’ moral self-image 
supports our interpretation that the occurrence of moral cleansing crucially depends on 
the moral costs resulting from immoral actions directed at individuals in different roles. 
Our results can help to explain the different propensity to cheat and conduct moral 
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Dishonesty and immoral behavior are constant features in human interaction and affect 
economic interactions. The propensity to act dishonestly is driven e.g. by personal 
characteristics and the situational context
1
, but also the desire to maintain their moral 
self-image. Individuals derive utility from a favorable moral self-image, which is 
therefore kept at an individually optimal level (Bénabou and Tirole, 2011; Akerlof and 
Kranton 2000; Benjamin et al., 2010; Chen and Xin Li, 2009). Thus, the choice of 
engaging in immoral behavior exceeds the mere weighing of monetary costs and 
benefits and encompasses the individuals’ current self-image, which is influenced by 
past and future actions. Previous actions that negatively affected the self-image lead to 
morally favorable actions (moral cleansing) – and vice versa (moral licensing) – to even 
out the imbalanced self-image (Battigalli et al., 2013; Merritt et al., 2010; Baumeister et 
al., 1994). 
While previous experiments investigating moral balancing have relied on ex ante 
priming to induce a positive or negative self-image, Ploner and Regner (2013) have 
implemented an endogenous manipulation. A self-reported die roll enables lying to 
increase the individual payoff; in a subsequent dictator game, subjects can engage in 
moral cleansing by transferring money to another subject. However, while a substantial 
number of subjects cheated, little moral cleansing resulted. In this paper, we argue that 
the occurrence of moral cleansing crucially depends on the addressee of the preceding 
immoral action. It has been suggested that social concerns are activated to a different 
extent when cheating on individuals in different roles, such as fellow participants or the 
experimenter (Gneezy et al., 2013). We hypothesize that this notion extends to moral 
cleansing, whereby cheating on individuals in different roles incurs specific moral costs 
and a different inclination to balance the moral self-image. For an example of this 
argument, consider a street vendor falsely handing you too much change, compared to 
the taxman who falsely grants you the same amount of money at the cost of the state. 
While you have the opportunity to cheat an individual in both cases, your reactions may 
differ. We argue that the addressee of your decision determines the inclination to refrain 
from cheating and engage in subsequent moral cleansing. Consequently, the occurrence 
of moral cleansing could be explained by the decision context, particularly by the moral 
costs associated with cheating individuals in different roles. 
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
To investigate the impact of different roles on cheating and subsequent moral cleansing, 
our experimental design builds on Ploner and Regner (2013). Similar to their setting, 
subjects' moral self-image is endogenously manipulated, by enabling them to cheat in a 
die roll that determines their endowment. Afterwards, they can donate to another player 
                                                 
1
 In the discussion on determinants of immoral behavior, different complementary explanations have been 
presented, e.g. regarding personal characteristics (Cappelen et al. 2013; Fosgaard et al., 2013; Gino et al., 
2011; Gneezy, 2005; Pascual-Ezama et al, 2013; Shalvi and Leiser, 2013), situational circumstances as 
e.g. the anticipation of repercussions (Erat and Gneezy, 2012; Gneezy et al., 2013) or the individually 
ascribed importance of the individual moral identity (Gino et al., 2011). 
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in a standard dictator game as a means of moral cleansing. There is a benchmark 
treatment in which no cheating is possible (control), as well as two treatments in which 
cheating is conducted at the expense of either the experimenter (cheat experimenter) or 
another subject (cheat partner). The experiment comprises four parts.  
In the first part, subjects claim their endowment by reporting the number of a role of a 
fair six-sided die. In control, the self-reported numbers are verified through the direct 
supervision of the experimenter, whereby no cheating is possible. In the other two 
treatments, die rolls are conducted in private. Reporting even numbers earns 15 ECU, 
and odd numbers 5 ECU. Reported numbers also determine the payoff for a matched 
partner, whereby it is randomly chosen whose die roll actually determines the 
endowments. Table 1 gives the payoffs related to the reported die rolls for all 
treatments. Note that the core difference between the treatments is at whose expense 
subjects can cheat. For cheat experimenter, the other subject will receive 5 ECU 
regardless, meaning that the additional payoff is taken from the experimenter. By 
contrast, in control and cheat partner, the individual decision to claim 15 ECU 
automatically reduces the other subject’s payoff to 5 ECU. 
 
Table 1. Die roll and payoffs in ECU for control and cheat partner (cheat experimenter) 
 
In the second part, after having reported the die roll, all subjects take the role of 
dictators in a standard dictator game and decide how much of their previously claimed 
endowment they want to donate to their partner.  
In the third part, using a short, four-item questionnaire from Gino et al. (2013), we ask 
subjects for their current moral self-image, whereby they indicate their current feeling 
of guilt, remorse, regret and overall self-image (i.e. how good of a person do you feel 
you are?) on a Lickert scale from 1 to 7 (1= not at all, 7= to a great extent/very much). 
Finally, participants are matched to pairs and randomly assigned the roles of dictators 
and recipients. Subsequently, the endowment claims and donation choices of the 
dictators are executed and displayed to both players.  
For control / cheat experimenter / cheat partner, there were 4/3/3 sessions with 
68/50/44 subjects. Experiments were conducted with a standard subject pool across 
disciplines in the Laboratory of Behavioral Economics at the University of Goettingen, 
using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) and z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were 24 years 
old on average, and 57% were female. The average session duration was 20 minutes 
whereby participants earned 6 € on average, including show-up fees.2 
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 Instructions and screenshots are available from the authors upon request. 
reported die roll own payoff partner payoff 
2,4,6 15 (15) 5 (5) 





A subject’s endowment for the dictator game is determined by the reported role of the 
die. Figure 1 illustrates self-reported values and the resulting endowment claimed.  
As expected, there is an equal share of high and low endowments claimed for control 
(exact binomial test, p=0.904). By contrast, subjects in cheat experimenter and cheat 
partner claim high endowments significantly more often (exact binomial tests, 
p≤.0.005). Subjects are more willing to claim high endowments at the expense of the 
experimenter rather than the partner (Fisher's exact, p=.096). 
Figure 1. Claimed endowments by treatment 
 
Note: The numbers in the bars represent the different die rolls.  
To estimate the proportion of cheaters conditional on our treatment conditions, we apply 
the procedure introduced by Houser et al. (2012), giving us 56% of subjects reporting 
untruthfully in cheat experimenter and only 28% in cheat partner.
3
  
Result 1: Half of participants cheat on the experimenter, while only one quarter cheats 
on another participant.  
                                                 
3
 Assuming that the population exclusively comprises strictly dishonest and honest people, the shares of 
cheaters can be estimated by assuming that the proportion of cheater equals 2ph – 1, whereby pH is the 




Figure 2 gives the distribution of donations of subjects who previously claimed a high 
endowment, i.e. those who potentially cheated, whereby the numbers in boxes indicate 
the respective averages. 
Figure 2. Giving in the dictator game by treatment 
Overall, donations are in line with the typical results from dictator games (Camerer, 
2003). Compared to control, subjects who (potentially) cheated on the experimenter 
tend to donate less; subjects donate more after cheating on another player. Note that the 
share of subjects donating nothing is roughly equal across treatments (.35/.34/.36). 
Recall that there are about twice as many dishonest reports of die rolls in cheat 
experimenter. Accordingly, differences do not stem from the higher share of subjects 
donating, but rather from the actual amount donated. In absolute ECU terms, subjects 
who chose to donate in cheat partner (mean=5.89, sd=3.26) give about 43% more than 
in cheat experimenter (mean=4.12, sd=2.18). Subjects in cheat partner donate 
significantly more than in cheat experimenter (WRS-test, z=-1.864, p=.0623). 
Furthermore, the predominant choice of cheating yet giving less in cheat experimenter 
does not support the assumption of a “Robin-Hood-Effect”, i.e. cheating on the 
experimenter to give to other subjects. 
Result 2: Subjects who potentially cheated on the experimenter donate less than those 





Before seeing the game’s final result, subjects report their feeling of regret, guilt, 
remorse and their overall self-image, as given in Figure 3 for subjects claiming a high 
endowment, i.e. those who potentially cheated. 
Figure 3. Self-image (high endowment) by treatment  
 
The ratings are not substantially different across treatments, whereby the feelings of 
remorse/guilt/regret tend to be slightly stronger in cheat experimenter, where cheating is 
frequent and donations are small. This result can be interpreted such that cheating the 
experimenter incurs little moral costs, given that cheating subjects continue to hold a 
favorable self-image equal to subjects in control and thus do not require substantial 
donations in the dictator game as a means of moral cleansing. In cheat partner, fewer 
subjects decide to cheat in the first place, which does not affect their self-image 
negatively. The cheating subjects would then be the ones driving the higher donations in 
cheat partner, by compensating the moral costs of having cheated or the feeling that 
others may suspect them of cheating. Accordingly, as subjects either bypass or 
compensate moral costs, their self-image is not different from control. 
Result 3: The moral costs of cheating the experimenter are low; they are higher when 
cheating another participant. Consequently, cheating is avoided ex ante or 





We find that cheating the experimenter is widespread, incurring little moral costs and no 
reduction of the moral self-image; consequently, there is no substantial moral cleansing. 
Furthermore, no “Robin-Hood-Effect” occurs, as cheating the experimenter is not 
associated with substantial subsequent donations. By contrast, cheating at the expense 
of another participant halves the number of cheaters; obviously, a substantial share of 
subjects anticipates the moral costs and thus chooses not to cheat in the first place. 
Subjects who claim high endowments at the expense of another participant in turn 
donate significantly more, which can be interpreted as moral cleansing. Both reactions 
can be asserted through the moral self-image: as the moral costs of cheating another 
participant are dealt with by either avoiding them ex ante or cleansing them ex post, the 
moral self-image is equal to that of our control group.  
More generally, it can be stated that once moral costs are high, e.g. when an opportunity 
to cheat on another person is taken, both avoiding the immoral action and moral 
cleansing occur. By contrast, frequent rational cheating and little ensuing moral 
cleansing will occur when the addressee is a faceless organization only evoking minor 
social concerns, as is conceivable e.g. for large corporations or the state. Picking up the 
example mentioned above, in most cases, one would point out the vendor’s mistake to 
avoid the moral costs of cheating him. In fewer cases, one would proceed with taking 
the money, yet choose to do some good deed to ease one’s bad conscience. Cheating the 
taxman would be considered morally acceptable to far more people and would not lead 
to the desire of sharing the profit. Our results thus emphasize the occurrence of moral 
balancing crucially depends on the addressee of immoral behavior. This could be crucial 
for the design of organizations characterized by a set of rules prone to cheating. Once 
individuals are given the opportunity to make profits by not adhering to (unenforced) 
rules, they will be more likely to engage in immoral behavior without feeling guilty 
when the victim is perceived to be an anonymous organization. Instead, if the 
organization credibly assigns the blame and punishment for losses incurred from 
cheating to a single person, rational cheating will be associated with substantially higher 
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In and outside economics exists a broad number of situations which can be described as contests
in which agents need to use scarce resources like time, effort and money to affect the probability
of winning a prize e.g. in political (win an election), economic (patents) and social environments
(friends, university place) (Dechenaux et al., 2015). In this process individuals behavior plays
an important role. But, beside a strong focus on contests in the theoretical literature, the
empirical investigation of different contests is still limited (Dechenaux et al., 2015). On the
other hand, identity strongly influences the behavior of individuals (Akerlof, Kranton, 2000,
2010). In line with this, recent research indicates that group identity increases the amount of
how much weight is put on the welfare of other in-group members (Eckel, Grossman, 2005;
Chen, Li, 2009). Identity gained increasing attention on the micro as well as on the macro
level in the last years. Over the last decades countries are increasingly confronted with social
as well as ethnic diversity (Jivraj, Simpson, 2015). Various facets of identity, for example
discrimination tendencies have a huge impact on e.g. labor markets (Chen, Mengel, 2016).
In contrast, on a micro level organizations are confronted with diverse teams, which might be
a boosting factor for creativity and innovation, although diverse backgrounds might also be a
stifling factor. Conflicts within and competition between groups are ubiquitous in everyday life
(Chowdhury et al., 2016). Overall, a broad literature has emerged in recent years, studying the
social roots, underlying cognitive aspects, as well as the economic outcomes of identity (Chen,
Mengel, 2016).
To our best knowledge, it has not been investigated how identity affects contest situations.
In the present paper, we explore experimentally how (artificial) group identity influences the
willingness of individuals to cooperate in a standard public goods game extended by a contest
situation (multi-level interaction). Our public goods game with the contest situation is based on
Gunnthorsdottir, Rapoport (2006) and we complement it by introducing artificial group identity
according to Eckel, Grossman (2005). We use partners matching, with the game lasting 10
periods. We employ four treatments (low and high identity with egalitarian and proportional
profit sharing), each played 10 times, where we randomly assign subjects into two groups (à 4
persons). Within each group, individuals are engaged in a standard public goods game while
competing for an exogenous and commonly known prize3. Groups increase their probability
of winning the prize by investing more in their public goods. In the baseline experiment, the
groups engage in the game, although no information about the group composition is revealed.
In the high identity treatments, we use a puzzle task before the experiment starts and color tags
to create artificial group identity in the lab. Moreover, we vary the monetary incentives of the
contest (Gunnthorsdottir, Rapoport, 2006) by applying two prize-sharing mechanisms, either
equally or proportionally according to individuals’ contributions, among all members of the
winning group. The rules are communicated before the individual decisions start.
3In reality, intra-group conflicts rarely appear as isolated incidences but are mostly accompanied by inter-group
competition, i.e. a team or a company as in-group competes for an exogenous good with other teams or companies
as out-groups (contest).
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Our results indicate a significant and positive effect of increased group identity on individuals’
willingness to cooperate in a public goods game in a competitive setting. The proportional
profit sharing rule leads to higher investments in low identity treatments. 4 The results for the
prize-sharing mechanism are reverse in the high identity treatment, there the highest level of
cooperation can be observed under the egalitarian profit-sharing rule. Moreover, we find that
the number of full cooperators is significantly higher in the high identity treatment.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a short overview of
the literature background, section 3 introduces the theoretical framework, before section 4
describes the experimental design. Section 5 presents our results and the discussion and section
6 concludes.
2 Literature background
2.1 Determinants of contributions to a public good
Public goods games have a long tradition (e.g. Ledyard, 1995). Since the interests of sub-groups
and individuals do not necessarily coincide, groups cannot be modeled as unitary actors.
Individuals’ behavior in groups is characterized simultaneously by cooperation and competition.
They are confronted with contradictory incentives for either defecting to maximize their own
payoff or cooperating to maximize the group’s payoff. In economic standard theory individuals’
contributions to public goods fall short of optimal amounts, since free-riding is the dominant
strategy, especially in anonymous situations (Fischbacher et al., 2001). Players want to raise
their monetary outcome with preferably low risk and low uncertainty (Fischbacher, Gächter,
2010; Fischbacher et al., 2001).
Various studies show that individuals in fact do not behave according to the standard model
(Mullainathan, Thaler, 2000; Camerer, 2004; Chaudhuri, 2011), given that they do not regard
their decision in isolation but rather take social motives into consideration. It is shown that
contributions are influenced by various factors, such as group size (Isaac et al., 1994), marginal
per capita return (MPCR) (Ashley et al., 2010; Zelmer, 2003), gender (for an overview, see
e.g. Croson, Gneezy, 2009) or partners matching (Keser, Van Winden, 2000). Moreover, low
levels of fear and greed also positively influence the willingness to cooperate (Ahn et al., 2001).
Nonetheless, cooperation cannot be guaranteed, as most decisions are made under uncertainty
and individuals’ decisions and reactions are difficult to forecast. Cooperation is not based
on confusion or errors (Keser, 1996), but rather on kindness - e.g. altruism or warm-glow
(Andreoni, 1995) - strategic considerations such as conditional cooperation (Fischbacher et al.,
2001), as well as by in-group attachment (Chen, Li, 2009), self-centered inequity aversion
(Fehr, Schmidt, 1999), social preferences of positive reciprocity (Fehr, Fischbacher, 2002) or
fairness preferences (Fehr, Schmidt, 1999; Bolton, Ockenfels, 2000). Further explanations for
4Our findings in the no-identity treatment are consistent with those of Gunnthorsdottir, Rapoport (2006), who
show that the proportional prize-sharing rule outperforms the egalitarian one.
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within-group cooperation are e.g. the minimal group paradigm (Chen, Chen, 2011; Li et al.,
2011; Chen, Li, 2009; Tajfel et al., 1971) and common fate (Brewer, Kramer, 1986; Wiltermuth,
Heath, 2009). Recent research analyzes also the role of identity (Eckel, Grossman, 2005).
2.2 Identity
Previous research indicates that identity5, a person’s sense of self (Akerlof, Kranton, 2000), has
a strong impact on economic outcomes and affects individual behavior and decision-making
(Chen, Li, 2009; Akerlof, Kranton, 2010), which makes it a relevant factor in the provision of
public goods (Ashforth, Mael, 1989; Akerlof, 2002; Akerlof, Kranton, 2005; Ashforth et al.,
2011). A broad literature has emerged in recent years, studying the social roots, underlying
cognitive aspects, as well as the economic outcomes of identity (Chen, Mengel, 2016).
A positive effect of group identity on the level of cooperation is shown for single-level
interactions (Solow, Kirkwood, 2002; Eckel, Grossman, 2005; Chen, Li, 2009). For example,
Eckel, Grossman (2005) analyze how and whether identity mitigates shirking and free-riding
behavior in a team production setting, showing that actions designed to enhance team
identification significantly increase cooperative behavior. This is in line with early work.
Already Gaertner et al. (1993) show that it is possible to create a common group identity through
the simple manipulation of, prima facie, irrelevant variables, leading group members to perceive
themselves in their group as a we, resulting in the elimination of negative factors rooted in
in-group heterogeneity.
In recent years various studies analyzed identity showing that e.g. a ”real identity” reduces
free-riding (Chowdhury et al., 2016) and workers competition (Kato, Shu, 2016). Kato, Shu
(2016) analyze the interplay of social identity and worker competition in a Chinese textile firm,
with exogenously formed social groups and real productivity data in a real economic setting,
providing empirical evidence that social identity has a significant impact on competition and
affects the interaction of workers. Workers only compete against those with a different social
identity but not against their in-group co-workers, while identity also influences the incentives
promoting competition. Furthermore, holding different social identities reduces truth-telling
(Rong et al., 2016) and identity-homogeneous groups are more likely to reveal less negative
reciprocity in case of deviating behavior of group members (Bicskei et al., 2016), while a strong
identity increases cooperation in the absence of punishment (Weng, Carlsson, 2015). Further
studies e.g investigate discrimination, showing that this behavior varies depending on the type
of identity (for a meta-analysis, see, e.g. Lane, 2016).
5The concept itself has a long tradition and its roots in psychology. Individuals’ social identity is based on
categorization (Tajfel, 1974; Turner, 1975; Tajfel, 1978, 1982), identification (in-group; out-group) (Stets, Burke,
2000; Tajfel, 1974) and comparison (Tajfel, 1974, 1978).
35
2.3 Contests and multi-level interactions in public goods games
A broad literature about contests emerged in the last decades (Konrad, 2009) but the number
of articles investigating empirically individual behavior in different contest situations is still
limited and only emerged within the last decade (Dechenaux et al., 2015). Some studies focus
e.g. on group performance and communication in combination with egalitarian profit sharing
(Sheremeta, Zhang, 2010; Cason et al., 2012), rent-seeking contests (Katz et al., 1990; Ahn
et al., 2011) or the effects of proportional prize sharing (Kugler et al., 2010; Gunnthorsdottir,
Rapoport, 2006).
Focusing on public goods games shows that recent experiments started to extend the literature
about single-level interactions in public goods games by introducing multi-level interactions
(contests). The interaction between several groups for winning an exogenous prize changes
individuals’ incentive structure, as free-riding might no longer be the dominant strategy. In
a single-level dilemma, outperforming the others can be achieved by free-riding. But having
a between-group conflict (contest situation) forces the rational self-interested individual to
cooperate with her group members to win the conflict (Bornstein, Erev, 1994)6. Accordingly,
the willingness to cooperate within a group also depends on the nature of the higher-level
conflict (e.g. the contest as well as the incentive structure of the prize sharing mechanism).
The findings of recent experiments indicate a positive effect of intergroup competition (Tan,
Bolle, 2007; Burton-Chellew et al., 2010; Kugler et al., 2010) as well as pseudo-competition
(Burton-Chellew, West, 2012) on the willingness to cooperate within groups. Intragroup
conflicts embedded in an intergroup competition reduce free riding (Gunnthorsdottir, Rapoport,
2006).
3 Theoretical Framework
Following Gunnthorsdottir, Rapoport (2006), we introduce a market with n groups (n ≥ 2)
competing for an exogenous prize S > 0. Let mk be the number of symmetric players in group k
with k = {1, ...,n} and mk = {2, ...,K}. In sum, there are ∑
n
k=1 mk = N symmetric players in the
market. Each player i, with i = {1, ...,N}, receives an endowment e > 0, which can be invested
either in a public good or kept for oneself. We assume the strategy space to be continuous,
implying that individual i, can contribute any share of her endowment e to the public good. We
denote an individual’s contribution to her group’s public good by xik (0 ≤ xik ≤ e), the group’s
total contribution by Xk (Xk = ∑
mk
i=1 xik) and the overall contributions in the market of all N
players by X (X = ∑Ni=1 Xk).
Given the usual within-group conflict in standard public goods games between investing or
6Between-group competition and within-group cooperation is also broadly discussed in social-psychology.
Early work by (Sherif et al., 1961) indicates that an antagonistic relation between groups boost solidarity within
groups. Overall, with positive dependencies between groups, i.e. a goal can only be reached jointly, cooperative
forms of social interaction occur, while with negative dependencies between groups, i.e. the goal of one group can
only be reached at the cost of the other group, competitive forms of social interaction occur.
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keeping one’s endowment, individuals’ dominant strategy is to free-ride on other members,
which reduces overall equilibrium contributions to zero. However, by introducing an exogenous
prize, for which groups compete, individuals’ incentive structure changes. This stems from
the probability of winning being determined by group members’ ability to cooperate, i.e. to
generate a greater public good in comparison to other groups. Depending on prize value
and how it will be distributed, it is no longer a dominant strategy to restrain from investing
(Gunnthorsdottir, Rapoport, 2006).
Besides their pecuniary interests, individuals perceive themselves as parts of collectives i.e.
groups rather than solely as independent entities. We argue that individuals decision-making
for investing in public goods is crucially affected by their group identity, i.e. their attachment
to groups. Accordingly, we will extend our framework by incorporating individuals’ valuation
for cooperation with in-group members into their payoff welfare function.
The within-group conflict
In accordance with the public goods literature (Zelmer, 2003; Ledyard, 1995), let xik be the
share of endowment invested by player i of group k in the public good. The contributions
from all members constitute a group’s public good. The share of endowment not invested
converts directly to an individual’s payoff. Within each group, the investments in the public
good are uniformly multiplied by the factor t > 1 and equally distributed among all members.
We determine gk = te as the maximum payoff that each member can receive from the public
good in group k, if all of its members invest their full endowment, i.e. if Xk = mke.






payoff equals zero, if everybody restrains from investing, i.e. Xk = 0. Since t > 1, members’
full contribution would lead to the highest joint welfare. However, we exclude the trivial case
when it would be a dominant strategy for individuals to invest their full endowment and thus
we assume t < mk. In sum, an individual’s payoff from the within-group conflict is given by
π
in−group





Like Gunnthorsdottir, Rapoport (2006), we introduce an exogenous prize S for which all n
groups compete. This extends the standard public goods game by between-group competition.
The probability for a group of winning the prize, thereby, depends on the value of their own
public good relative to the values of all other groups’ public goods. By introducing a contest
success function, groups can never be sure to win the prize even if their contribution outperforms
all others’. This models real-life circumstances more appropriately, since there never appears
to be certainty to succeed in competition, even if one’s expenditures stand out (Gunnthorsdottir,






If group k wins the prize, it will be distributed among members according to the profit-sharing









with 0 ≤ c≤∞. Notice that parameter c determines the type of profit-sharing rule. For example,
if c = 0, all members of the winning group k receive an equal share of the prize, S
mk
, which
denotes a completely egalitarian profit-sharing. By contrast, if c = 1, each member of the




, which denotes a completely proportional profit-sharing. An individual’s payoff
from the between-group competition is given by
π
between−group
















An individual’s overall expected payoff depends on the outcome from both the within-group, as
well as the between-group conflict. By combining equation (1) and (4), we derive the expected
payoff for individual i as a member of group k, given by


















Equilibria without group identity
In our set-up, individuals are confronted with diverging investment motives. On the one hand,
they have an incentive to keep their endowment for themselves, since this has a higher expected
payoff than investing in the public good, given the within-group conflict. On the other hand,
investments increase their probability of winning the prize in the between-group conflict.
Lemma 1: In the unique Nash-equilibrium with symmetric players without group identity,








in their public good.















































7For detailed calculations see Appendix C.
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Remark: Due to symmetry in players, this strategy is the unique Nash-equilibrium. However,
this strategy is not a dominant one and depends on individuals’ expectations about other players’
investment strategies. Moreover, we exclude the case in which the expected payoff from
between-group conflict is excessively high, which would make it the dominant strategy for








As outlined by equation (7), individuals’ equilibrium investments increase with the value of c,















All terms in the bracket are strictly positive, since t > 1 and t
mk
< 1. Individuals are better off
by playing the equilibrium strategy x∗ik rather than free-riding, as in classic public goods games.
Consequently, introducing between-group competition moderates the within-group conflict and
increases cooperation.
Equilibria with group identity
In the next step, we introduce group identity. This far, individuals have adjusted their behavior
solely based on pecuniary incentives. However, individual decision making is influenced by a
person’s sense of self, more specifically by the degree of identification with one’s membership
in groups. Therefore, investment decisions can be expected to depend on in-group attachments,
as high attachments will be accompanied by an urge for cooperation. In general, individuals
try to maintain a comfortable self-image and deviations from ideal levels are associated with
losses in utility (Akerlof, Kranton, 2005; Ploner, Regner, 2013). Linking it to our setting, we
assume that individuals suffer from utility losses by less cooperative behavior towards favored
group-members, respectively when they do not invest their full endowment, with the loss in
utility increasing proportionally to the withheld amount.8
However, as described by Akerlof, Kranton (2005), as well as Huettel, Kranton (2012), such
losses depend on the situational context. If individuals do not feel attached to their group, we
cannot expect a loss in utility from non-cooperative behavior. To model this, we introduce zik
(0 ≤ zik) as the degree to which individual i from group k identifies with her group, namely the
degree of her in-group attachment. An individual’s expected utility function, formerly outlined
8We are aware that our assumption of full contribution as the social norm is quite strict. It might well be the
case that a norm, denominated as w, is expected to be rather x∗ik ≤ w ≤ e instead of w = e. However, it can be
expected that individuals will profit from a utility gain due to an overcontribution with xik > w, in the same way
they will suffer from a utility loss by an underprovision with xik < w. Following this, assuming x
∗
ik ≤ w ≤ e instead
of w = e would not change the general argument of our analysis.
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by equation (5), changes to
π
identity


















The more that an individual identifies with her in-group, associated with higher values of zik,
the greater her loss in utility by less cooperation. In contrast, individuals with a minimal group
attachment, i.e. zik = 0, will base their investment decision purely on pecuniary aspects.
Lemma 2: With group identity and symmetric players, an individual’s optimal investment
strategy depends on her intensity of in-group attachment zik:
(1) if zik < 1−
t
mk









(2) if zik ≥ 1−
t
mk
, individuals invest their full endowment, x∗ik2 = e.




































However, note that by introducing zik, incentives to invest in the public good have changed.
Even while assuming that (8) still holds, it might become individuals’ dominant strategy to
invest their full endowment, depending on the actual value of zik. We need to distinguish two
cases:
Case 1: zik < 1−
t
mk











Case 2: zik ≥ 1−
t
mk
In this case, it is the strict dominant strategy for individuals to invest their full endowment.
Since the expected payoff by deviating from full cooperation is negative, we derive
x∗ik2 = e. (13)
Remark: In both cases we observe strictly higher investments in public goods with increased
group identity compared to the case of low identity, as long as zik > 0. Notice that the
higher the number of in-group members mk, the greater needs to be either an individual’s
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in-group attachment zik or the multiplier t for public goods to attract her for full cooperation,
which constitutes the circumstance of increasing difficulties to sustain stable cooperations with
increasing group size.
Since stable cooperation leads to higher expected payoffs, overall welfare also increases. We
conclude that the higher the group attachments in a setting with multi-level interactions, the
more cooperative individuals are expected to become and the higher the investments in public
goods.
4 Experimental design
Within their groups, subjects play a standard public goods game while simultaneously
competing for an external and commonly-known prize (contest). The prize is distributed among
members of the winning group by either the egalitarian, c = 0, or the proportional profit-sharing
rule, c = 1, with the probability of winning depending on all players’ contributions to their
public good. Payoffs are denominated in tokens, accumulated over periods and paid at the end
of the experiment, where one token corresponds to EUR 0.01.
In each session, eight subjects participate and are allocated randomly into two groups of four
persons, i.e. n = 2 and m = 4. The allocation remains constant over all ten periods, T =
109. For reasons of comparison of low and high identity treatments we need to play a partners
matching10. At the beginning of each round, subjects decide how much of their endowment,
e = 50, they want to invest in the public good. We set the maximum payoff from the public
good to gk = 100 to generate a marginal per capita return (MPCR) of 0.5.
The exogenous prize is determined by S = 152 (equal to Gunnthorsdottir, Rapoport, 2006) and
awarded according to the contest success function (see (2)). Finally, after each round, subjects
are informed about the prize-winning team, the underlying winning probabilities, their own
payoff from the actual round, as well as how much they have earned over all periods played this
far.
In low identity treatments, we allocate subjects randomly to either group 1 or group 2 without
informing the subjects about the identity of their group members (minimal group identity).
By contrast, in high identity treatments group identity is artificially increased above the minimal
group identity by using a puzzle task (according to Eckel, Grossman, 2005)11. In detail, subjects
participate in an unpaid team-building task prior to the experiment, in which they jointly have
to construct a puzzle. Moreover, we also use a special labeling of group red and group green
rather than group 1 and 2, as well as equipping subjects with color tags to wear on their clothes
9The group size of four as well as 10 rounds is commonly in public goods experiments(Zelmer, 2003).
10Gunnthorsdottir, Rapoport (2006) use 80-round strangers matching. Previous research indicates that partners
matching compared to strangers matching increases the level of contribution (Keser, Van Winden, 2000).
11Eckel, Grossman (2005) tested six different treatments to analyze the impact of team identity on team
production, namely a baseline procedure, team color treatment, quiz treatment, puzzle treatment, wage treatment
and tournament treatment. The puzzle task is the method of choice given that it leads to the highest level of
contribution.
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to present group affiliation. In the subsequent puzzle task, all subjects have to solve a colored
puzzle, corresponding to their group color, in cooperation with their group members12. For this
purpose, they are seated within their group, separated from the other group and are allowed to
talk and support each other while solving the task. The groups had no information about the
subsequent game to prohibit agreements or strategical planning.
The puzzle comprises five different pieces that add up to a square. However, since nobody
possesses all five necessary pieces at the beginning, the subjects have to engage in trading with
their group members. To enable comparison with low identity treatments, each subject there has
to solve the same, but uncolored, puzzle task in separation and without knowing that they will
play in groups in the subsequent experiment.
In all treatments, after the puzzle task was finished by each subject, the materials were collected,
each of whom was placed alone in a cubicle and instructions for the subsequent task are
distributed to the subjects. In addition, each cubicle was equipped with pen and paper for
taking notes. After reading the instructions, all subjects had to pass a pre-experimental quiz to
ensure their understanding of the instructions.
At the end of the experiment, the subjects had to complete a questionnaire. Besides general
socioeconomic questions, we asked for individuals’ in-group attachment. Subjects reported
their degree of in-group attachment on a scale between 1 and 10, with higher scores representing
stronger in-group attachment (Chen, Li, 2009)13.
4.1 Treatment conditions
We employ four different experimental treatment conditions that differ in terms of group
identity and prize-sharing mechanism.14
Low ID EG: Subjects solve the puzzle task in separation and are subsequently randomly
allocated to group 1 or group 2. The prize is distributed equally among the winning
team’s members, i.e. c = 0.
Low ID PR: Subjects solve the puzzle task in separation and are subsequently randomly
allocated to group 1 or group 2. The prize is distributed proportionally among the winning
team’s members, i.e. c = 1.
High ID EG: Subjects are allocated to group green or group red and solve the puzzle task in
cooperation with their team members. Communication is possible during the puzzle task.
The prize is distributed equally among the winning team’s members, i.e. c = 0.
12For detailed instructions, see Appendix.
13On a scale from 1 (=absolutely not) to 10 (=extremely), how strong was your in-group attachment?
14Abbreviations are to read as follows: Low identity is abbreviated as Low ID and high identity as High ID. If
the prize is shared equally the index is EG and in case of proportional profit sharing it is PR.
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High ID PR: Subjects are allocated to group green or group red and solve the puzzle task in
cooperation with their team members. Communication is possible during the puzzle task.
The prize is distributed proportionally among the winning team’s members, i.e. c = 1.
Table 1 briefly summarizes the game parameters and Nash equilibria for all four treatments.







Rounds Prize High Identity
Nash
Equilibrium
Low ID EG 4 10 50 100 10 152 0 4.75
Low ID PR 4 10 50 100 10 152 0 33.25
High ID EG 4 10 50 100 10 152 1 > 4.75
High ID PR 4 10 50 100 10 152 1 > 33.25
Note: High identity is coded as a dummy: 0 = artificial group identity is not increased, 1 = artificial group identity is increased.
4.2 Hypotheses
In order to predict subjects’ cooperative behavior we insert our experimental parameters to our
theoretical framework. By taking individuals’ group identity into consideration, we expect
higher investments in public goods with increased identity, meaning higher values of zik.
According to the literature as well as the theoretical framework, individuals’ behavior in
social dilemmas is not purely driven by self-interest, with people being rather altruistic and
conditional cooperators when they are part of a group and perceive themselves as a part of
it. We assume that these effects will increase when group identity is made more salient, thus
by intergroup competition and communication. We expect higher rates of cooperation in high
identity treatments.
Hypothesis 1: Investments in public goods are higher with increased group identity.
As outlined by the theoretical framework, individuals adjust their investment behavior according
to the prize-sharing mechanism, with a higher investment leading to a higher value of c. We
expect subjects to invest more in public goods under the proportional sharing rule, c = 1, than
under the egalitarian sharing-rule, c = 0.
Hypothesis 2: Investments in public goods are higher under the proportional than under the
egalitarian profit sharing rule.
Based on the theory, if zik exceeds the value of 1 −
t
mk
, full cooperation becomes the
dominant strategy. By increasing group identity, more individuals are expected to become full
cooperators, defined as individuals who invest their entire endowment, e = 50 tokens, in each
round.
Hypothesis 3: The number of full cooperators increases with increased group identity.
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4.3 Experimental procedure
The experiment was conducted between May and July 2016 in the Laboratory for Behavioral
Economics at the University of Goettingen. The experiment was programmed using
zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). Participants were recruited with ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). We
implemented a 2 x 2 design, crossing the dimensions IdentitynoIdentity and egalitarian profit
sharingproportional profit sharing. Before the start of the main task, subjects went through a
puzzle task either alone (no identity) or as a team (identity). 320 subjects participated in 40
sessions, which lasted about 45 minutes, with average earnings of EUR 11.17. Approximately
53% of the participants were female15. Overall participants were 24 years old16 and roughly
41% of the participants are economics or business administration students17.
5 Results and discussion
In the following section, we investigate how subjects willingness to cooperate is affected by
(I) their group identity and (II) the applied profit-sharing rule. Furthermore (III), we analyze
the interplay of identity and full cooperation. We start by reporting the data overview and
summary statistics, followed by non-parametric and parametric tests. The main interest behind
our experiment is the individual behavior, which cannot be depicted by averages. Given the
panel structure of the data (320 individuals played in groups of eight over 10 rounds in 40
sessions), the main part of the analysis will be the regression analysis. A simple way of
regression is just to control for clustered standard errors. A superior way is to treat the data set
as a panel data set, which ”explicitly recognizes that n subjects are observed making a decision
in each of T time periods” (Moffatt, 2015, p. 90). Accordingly, for a more detailed view of
how contributions are affected by identity and profit-sharing rules, we apply tobit panel models
including the typical control variables.
5.1 Analyzing the effects of low vs. high identity
First, we study the effects of increased group identity on the level of contribution, comparing
low and high identity treatments. We find significant differences between the mean contribution.
On average, individuals mean contributions in low identity treatments are x̄Low ID = 40.55
tokens in contrast to x̄High ID = 43.51 tokens in high identity treatments (see Table 2). Overall,
15Participants played in mixed groups. We find no differences for gender.
16We find no effect of age on the level of contribution. When interpreting such age effects we need to keep in
mind that they might be due to different social conditions of the cohorts in other studies.
17Economic students are assumed to behave more rational. We find that economic students, ceteris paribus,
contribute less than students from other fields. But, this effect is driven by the behavior in the low identity
sub-sample. Here, economics students cooperate significantly less than those from other disciplines, while this
effect is not observable in the high identity treatment. This indicates that the social incentive is stronger than the
monetary incentive and that it outweighs a fully rational behavior.
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differences between low and high identity treatments on group level are significant at a 5% level
(Mann-Whitney-U18: z =−2.056, p = 0.0398).
Table 2: Summary statistics
Low ID Low ID EG Low ID PR High ID High ID EG High ID PR
Mean contribution 40.55 39.27 41.83 43.51 44.38 42.64
SD 10.77 10.57 10.88 9.83 9.73 9.91
25%-quantile 35 32.8 39.7 41.2 43.25 40.6
50%-quantile 44.75 40.75 46.85 48 49.85 45.5
N 160 80 80 160 80 80
Note: Table 1 displays statistics of individuals decisions, thereforeN denotes the number of individuals participated in each
treatment.
These findings are in line with previous research indicating that identity (Chen, Li, 2009;
Eckel, Grossman, 2005) as well as between-group competition (Gunnthorsdottir, Rapoport,
2006) positively influences the level of contribution. Our results show that even the pure
introduction of competition leads to significantly higher contributions (one-sample t-test:
tLow ID EG(79) = 29.205, pLow ID EG = 0.0000 and tLow ID PR(79) = 7.058, pLow ID PR = 0.0000)
than the predicted Nash equilibrium19 (see Table 3).
The boxplot (Figure 1) displays distributional details for low and high identity treatments in
general, with both differentiated as well by profit-sharing rules.
Additionally, we plot investments over all ten rounds to analyze whether the observed pattern
is driven by individual behavior in one or particular rounds.
The positive effect of high group identity can be found for all ten rounds (see Table 2). Overall
and in each single round, investments are higher in the high identity treatment. Contributions
in low as well as high identity treatments increase from round one (x̄Low ID = 37.98, x̄High ID =
41.86) to two (x̄Low ID = 42.19, x̄High ID = 44.29). A paired t-test reveals that the difference
is significant at the 1%level (tLow ID(159) = −4.332, pLow ID = 0.0000 and tHigh ID(159) =
−3.364, pHigh ID = 0.0005) (See Appendix for details.)
20.
In sum, variations of investments are lower under the high identity treatments. This indicates
that identity can sustain cooperation and increase the level of contribution. Contrary to previous
findings of public goods games, we find that contributions are almost stable over time in
the high identity treatment. Our results suggest that free-riding-reducing incentives, namely
increased group identity and competition for monetary rewards, shift the focus from pure selfish
interests to welfare maximizing considerations. Subjects only sometimes contribute 0 and the
number of these actions on group level is significantly higher in the low identity treatment
compared with the high identity treatment (Mann-Whitney-U: z = −11.662, p = 0.0000).
18We use independent observations (group level) for the Mann-Whitney-U test.
19Mean values are tested against the Nash equilibrium of 4.75 for LOW ID EG and 33.25 for LOW ID PR.
20Furthermore, in both treatments we observe a significant end-game effect from round nine to ten (paired t-test:
tLow ID(159) = 2.101, pLow ID = 0.0186 and tHigh ID(159) = 2.976, pHigh ID = 0.0017).
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However, we find no individual full free-riding (=̂ contribution of 0) over all ten rounds.
Our results are similar to the findings of Eckel, Grossman (2005), indicating that increased
group identity leads to increasing contributions from the first round to the second and relatively
stable contributions until the end-game effect kicks in.
We only have ten independent observations per treatment given our data structure (group-level),
whereby the power of the non-parametric tests is limited. For a more nuanced view of how
contributions are affected by identity, it is helpful to simultaneously control for several variables
such as profit-sharing rule, age, gender and pre-experimental experience while using tobit
panel models21, treating our dataset as a panel data set. Table 3 displays the results of these
estimations. Accordingly, we estimate different models: first, we introduce step-wise the main
interesting variables (whole data set). The analysis of sub-samples offers a more detailed
insight into the data, thus secondly, we estimate three models for each subsample (low and
high identity), while step-wise including the main interesting and control variables.
21We use these censored regression models given our data structure. Our dependent variable is the level of
contribution. It is a non-negative integer and it is in the range from 0 to 50.
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Table 3: Regression results
Full model Sub-sample: low identity Sub-sample: high identity
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (1e) (1f) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3a) (3b) (3c)
High Identity 13.417∗∗∗ 13.5∗∗∗ 4.553 1.850 −0.162
(3.537) (3.54) (4.861) (4.551) (3.775)
Egalitarian PSR 2.261 2.596 −6.205 −7.867 −4.684 −7.067 −8.593∗∗ −5.109 11.681∗∗ 9.166∗ 8.141∗∗
(3.561) (3.491) (4.813) (4.494) (3.748) (4.489) (4.265) (3.566) (5.400) (4.942) (4.133)
High Identity * Egalitarian PSR 18.257∗∗ 17.920∗∗ 13.403∗
(6.982) (6.523) (5.479)
Attachment 3.681∗∗∗ 2.620∗∗∗ 2.984∗∗∗ 2.025∗∗∗ 4.590∗∗∗ 3.394∗∗∗
(0.580) (0.495) (0.738) (0.627) (0.904) (0.770)
Investment own group in t-1 0.367∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.036) (0.044)
Prize won in t-1 9.691∗∗∗ 8.713∗∗∗ 12.096∗∗∗
(2.333) (3.065) (3.687)
Profit in t-1 −0.345∗∗∗ −0.319∗∗∗ −0.409∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.071) (0.093)
Female −4.466 −4.991 −4.55 −3.687 −3.362 −3.089 −0.297 0.716 0.097 −7.847 −8.435∗ −6.802
(3.516) (3.590) (3.519) (3.499) (3.267) (2.726) (4.552) (4.309) (3.584) (5.479) (5.006) (4.163)
Economics −7.919∗ −6.962 −7.841∗∗ −8.589∗ −9.202∗∗ −7.695∗∗ −11.489∗∗ −12.308∗∗∗ −10.345∗∗∗ −5.778 −6.110 −4.785
(3.566) (3.632) (3.569) (3.547) (3.318) (2.771) (4.604) (4.363) (3.637) (5.412) (4.951) (4.105)
Experimental experience 1.304∗ 1.075∗ 1.323∗∗ 1.264∗ 1.21∗ 0.762 1.226∗ 1.129∗ 0.792 1.476∗ 1.495∗∗ 0.878
(0.522) (0.529) (0.523) (0.519) (0.485) (0.405) (0.688) (0.652) (0.546) (0.791) (0.724) (0.601)
Age −0.391 −0.235 −0.419 −0.436 −0.401 −0.344 −0.646 −0.398 −0.319 −0.133 −0.347 −0.295
(0.562) (0.572) (0.563) (0.557) (0.521) (0.434) (0.780) (0.739) (0.613) (0.799) (0.731) (0.606)
Constant 65.566∗∗∗ 68.426∗∗∗ 64.833∗∗∗ 69.762∗∗∗ 49.733∗∗∗ 27.9∗ 74.687∗∗∗ 53.272∗∗∗ 26.494∗ 66.976∗∗∗ 44.685∗∗ 28.659∗
(13.060) (13.324) (13.1) (13.099) (12.619) (11.302) (17.907) (17.659) (15.716) (18.804) (17.746) (15.960)
Obs 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200 2880 1600 1600 1440 1600 1600 1440
σu 28.346
∗∗∗ 29.046∗∗∗ 28.35∗∗∗ 28.014∗∗∗ 25.848∗∗∗ 20.605∗∗∗ 25.588∗∗∗ 23.975∗∗∗ 18.930∗∗∗ 30.354∗∗∗ 27.232∗∗∗ 21.583∗∗∗
(1.657) (1.697) (1.657) (1.638) (1.528) (1.423) (2.015) (1.914) (1.829) (2.666) (2.415) (2.182)
σ e 21.274
∗∗∗ 21.272∗∗∗ 21.275∗∗∗ 21.275∗∗∗ 21.235∗∗∗ 20.350∗∗∗ 22.178∗∗∗ 22.137∗∗∗ 21.318∗∗∗ 20.070∗∗∗ 20.033∗∗∗ 19.068∗∗∗
(0.542) (0.542) (0.542) (0.542) (0.540) (0.559) (0.750) (0.748) (0.779) (0.779) (0.777) (0.796)
ρ 0.64 0.651 0.64 0.634 0.597 0.506 0.571 0.540 0.441 0.696 0.649 0.562
AIC 11583.26 11597.18 11584.71 11579.91 11542.81 9854.368 6609.1 6595.235 5609.86 4972.839 4949.933 4251.518
BIC 11631.82 11645.75 11639.35 11640.62 11609.59 9937.886 6652.122 6643.635 5673.129 5015.861 4998.333 4314.786
Tobit panel model with 0 for lower limit and 50 for upper limit. Estimations for whole sample (1a-f) and sub-samples(2a-c and 3a-c).Dependent Variable: Level of contribu-
tion to group’s own public good. Standard errors in parentheses: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗ p < 0.1.
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When taking a closer look at the regression table (see Table 3), the positive impact of increased
group identity on cooperative behavior is confirmed, whereby the coefficient is positive and
highly significant. Going a step further, we interact high identity with the egalitarian profit
sharing rule. Model 1d-1f indicate that the effect is mainly driven by the profit sharing
rule. Egalitarian profit sharing is a mechanism which treats all individuals in the same way.
Separating the data into two subsamples indicates that the egalitarian profit sharing rule has a
negative impact in the low identity treatment while its impact in the high identity treatment is
positive. Our results indicate that artificially increased group identity in the laboratory triggers
cooperative behavior, with the strongest effect under the egalitarian profit sharing rule. It seems
that increasing group identity leads individuals to feel that he or she should put more weight on
the welfare of other in-group members.22
These results are mirrored when focusing more narrowly on the perceived level of group
attachment. This step is made because group identity is associated with group attachment
(Chen, Li, 2009), which is a basis for social identity. We asked the participants to value
the strength of their in-group attachment. The coefficient of the group attachment variable
is positive and highly significant in all models, while the effect is higher for high identity
treatments. This indicates that higher perceived in-group attachment triggers higher
contributions. Our results are in line with the findings of Chen, Li (2009), showing a positive
effect of in-group attachment.
Result 1: Contributions to public goods are significantly higher with increased group identity.
5.2 Prize sharing mechanism
Differentiating the low identity condition by profit-sharing rules (Table 2), we find a lower
mean value on group level with x̄Low ID EG = 39.27 for egalitarian profit-sharing compared to the
proportional profit-sharing with x̄Low ID PR = 41.83 (Mann-Whitney-U: z = 1.209, p = 0.2265).
The MWU Test is thus insignificant and indicates no difference between the profit-sharing rules
in the low identity treatment23. Comparing our results to the expected equilibrium contributions
(see Table 1) shows that in contrast to our assumptions, under both profit-sharing rules higher
average contributions are realized in the low identity treatments. Possible explanations for
these high contributions, compared to the usual values in public goods games, are that we use a
partners matching and that we introduce a contest. Even without any artificial increased group
identity, the group competes for an exogenous prize against another group. Partners matching
22This is in line with findings of e.g. Chen, Li (2009); Solow, Kirkwood (2002); Kagel, Roth (2016). Already
Gaertner et al. (1993) showed that it is possible to induce group identity by manipulating seemingly irrelevant
variables. The puzzle task is a team-building task which leads to higher cooperative behavior, as previously shown
by Eckel, Grossman (2005).
23If cooperative behavior is rewarded, cooperation is a rational strategy. The results of Gunnthorsdottir, Rapoport
(2006) indicate that proportional rewarding looms larger than equal rewarding, which can be explained by the
non-satiation axiom of choice theory. Thus, our results are in contrast to their findings, indicating only small
differences between the profit sharing rules.
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as well as contests are mechanisms which lead to an increase of cooperative behavior (Keser,
Van Winden, 2000).
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In high identity treatments, the mean contributions for both profit-sharing rules contradict
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hypothesis 3 as they show an opposite pattern in comparison to low identity treatments (Table
2). The contribution under the egalitarian profit-sharing rule on group level shows a higher mean
value with x̄High ID EG = 44.38 tokens, compared to proportional profit sharing with a mean value
of x̄High ID PR = 42.64 tokens (Mann-Whitney-U: z = −1.436, p = 0.1509). The MWU test is
insignificant and indicates no difference between the profit-sharing rules in the high identity
treatment. Nevertheless, the contribution is slightly higher under the egalitarian profit sharing
rule. This particular result is in contrast to the findings of Gunnthorsdottir, Rapoport (2006),
and a first, careful interpretation might be that identity is the reason for the reverse effect of the
profit sharing rules in the high identity treatment.
Given the limited number of independent observations, the power of our non-parametric tests
is limited. Taking a closer look at our regression results (Table 3), we find support for our
hypotheses that both profit-sharing rules impact on the level of contribution, albeit in different
ways. Overall, there is no effect of the profit-sharing rule (1a-1f). Dividing the sample into
the two sub-samples confirms what was already observable in the tendencies of the descriptive
(non-significant) results. While we find no effect in the main (full) model (1f), this might be
due to the circumstances that they offset each other. Analyzing the subsamples indicates that
the egalitarian profit sharing rule has a strong negative effect in the low identity treatment
(2a-2c), while the effect is positive and significant in the high identity treatment (3a-3c). This
indicates that the social incentive is stronger than the monetary incentive24, which could be
an explanation for higher mean contributions in the high identity treatment with equal prize
sharing. Our findings for the low identity treatment, that proportional sharing is favored, are in
line with those of Gunnthorsdottir, Rapoport (2006).
Result 2: Egalitarian and proportional profit sharing differ in their impact on individuals
willingness to contribute. Contributions are higher under the proportional profit sharing rule in
low identity treatments. Increasing identity leads to a reverse result. In high identity treatments
contributions are higher under the egalitarian profit-sharing rule.
These findings are surprising upon first glance. As outlined by the theoretical framework and the
complemented basic experiment (Gunnthorsdottir, Rapoport, 2006), we expected investments
in public goods to be higher under the proportional rather than the egalitarian profit-sharing
rule, given their different monetary incentives (Kugler et al., 2010).
There might be a plausible explanation for these findings. The egalitarian profit-sharing
rule can be described as a more social sharing rule, given that all group members profit
equally from a prize won. By contrast, the proportional profit-sharing rule is more related
24Additionally, having a closer look at the low identity treatment shows that the number of fully non-cooperative
decisions per round (contribution=̂ 0) in the low identity treatment is significantly higher under the equal profit
sharing (6.5%) compared to the proportional (4.125%) profit-sharing rule (Mann-Whitney-U: z = 9.165, p =
0.0000 and see, Appendix Table 4). Analyzing this for the high identity treatment shows that the number of
fully non-cooperative decisions per round (contribution=̂ 0) in the high identity treatment is again significantly
higher under the equal profit sharing (4.5%) compared to proportional (2%) profit sharing rule (Mann-Whitney-U:
z = 7.141, p = 0.0000 and see, Appendix Table 4).
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to rational economic behavior, since in this case individuals receive a higher expected payoff
from investing in public goods, which should lead to higher equilibria contributions. While
in low identity treatments these monetary incentives could outweigh social considerations, in
high identity treatments individuals are primed to pro-social behavior due to the preceding
team-building task, thus they might be more receptive for the influence of egalitarian sharing,
which reverses the possible effects of the profit-sharing rules. Our results indicate that identity
has a positive impact on the contribution level. Therefore, it might not be so surprising that
subjects behave in a more social manner in the high identity treatments. Explanations in line
with this argumentation are e.g. in-group attachment (Chen, Li, 2009), fairness preferences
(Fehr, Gächter, 2000) and social preferences (Fischbacher, Gächter, 2010). Chen, Li (2009)
show that individuals’ distribution preferences are affected by their degree of group attachment,
with subjects being more generous and less envious towards their in-group members. Moreover,
group attachment changes reciprocal behavior as good intentions are more often positively
rewarded and misbehavior less often rewarded towards in-group matches in comparison to
out-group matches. Our group-attachment variable (Table 3) is positive and highly significant,
giving support to this assumption. In addition, Fischbacher, Gächter (2010) show that social
preferences can sustain cooperation. Nevertheless, contributions decline because people in
general are imperfect conditional cooperators. Fehr, Schmidt (1999) argue that fairness can also
be interpreted as self-centered inequity aversion. According to their model, we could assume
that sharing the prize equally among group members reduces inequity, while a proportionally
shared prize enhances inequity; even though cooperative behavior is more rewarded under
the proportional prize sharing mechanism. Furthermore, we could assume that increased
group identity, especially the way we increased it, i.e. meeting group members in person
and successfully conducting a group task, ascribes more importance towards inequity aversion
among group members.
5.3 Group identity and full cooperation




becomes the dominant strategy. Overall, 100 out of 320 individuals are full cooperators,
with 36 full cooperators in low identity treatments and 64 in high identity treatments. In
absolute terms, the number of full cooperators is significantly higher (Mann-Whitney-U:
z =−9.950, p = 0.0000) with increased group identity.
Result 3: The number of full cooperators is significantly higher in high identity treatment.
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6 Summary and concluding remarks
We explored experimentally how increased group identity impacts individuals’ willingness to
cooperate in a contest setting in the present paper. For this purpose, we played a public goods
game with two groups competing for an exogenous price and introduced artificial group identity
by using a puzzle task. We used a standard 2x2 design with partners matching by varying the
level of group identity as well as added a contest with an exogenous and commonly-known
prize (either egalitarian or proportional).
Our results show that first, investments in public goods increase with increased group identity
and subjects’ willingness to cooperate increases through artificially increased group identity
in a contest setting. Secondly, we had thought that investments in public goods are higher
under the proportional than under the egalitarian profit sharing rule. This can be confirmed
for the low identity treatments. Subjects invest less in public goods under the egalitarian
sharing rule than under the proportional one. The effect is reverse in high identity treatments
as subjects contribute significantly more to the public good under the egalitarian profit-sharing
rule. This finding is astonishing as it contradicts previous findings indicating a stronger effect
of the proportional profit sharing rule. Possible explanations for this finding could be e.g.
inequity aversion (Fehr, Schmidt, 1999). The third point we assumed was that the number of
full cooperators increases with increased group identity. Looking at the varying prize-sharing
mechanisms shows that the number of subjects who fully cooperate is significantly higher when
group identity is artificially increased.
Our findings contribute to a better understanding of group behavior and the role of identity in
a contest setting. Summing up all results shows that cooperative behavior can be described
by, at least, three factors: first, increasing group identity and perceived in-group attachment
impact positively and significantly on the willingness to cooperate; second, contest situations
(e.g. external monetary incentives, even if they are not certain) increase cooperation. And
third, history, or to be more precise, the previous rounds, matter, especially if group members




Table 4: Free-riding per treatment and round
Rounds
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
Low ID EG 3 4 4 4 4 6 3 3 8 13 52 out of 80
Low ID PR 0 0 1 1 4 5 4 3 7 8 33 out of 80
High ID EG 2 1 2 2 4 3 3 5 5 9 36 out of 80
High ID PR 0 0 1 0 3 4 2 1 0 5 16 out of 80
Total 5 5 8 7 15 18 12 12 20 35 137 out of 320
Table 5: Mean individual contribution per round and treatment
Low ID Low ID EG Low ID PR High ID High ID EG High ID PR
Round Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
1 37.98 14.57 35.65 15.91 40.3 12.78 41.86 13.14 43.28 12.36 40.45 13.81
2 42.19 12.62 40.36 14.50 44.03 10.17 44.29 11.1 45.68 9.92 42.91 12.06
3 41.77 13.2 39.56 14.98 43.98 10.8 44.29 11.51 45.39 11.34 43.19 11.65
4 42.09 13.17 41.13 14.12 43.06 12.15 44.78 10.24 45.94 10.05 43.63 10.35
5 41.71 14.26 41.36 14.45 42.06 14.15 43.55 13.25 44.69 12.59 42.41 13.87
6 40.03 16.08 39.44 16.1 40.63 16.14 43.76 12.92 45.61 11.6 41.9 13.95
7 40.58 14.37 40.05 14.23 41.11 14.58 43.79 13.03 45.13 12.05 42.46 13.89
8 41.61 14.4 40.99 14.27 42.23 14.59 43.59 13.32 43.54 14.82 43.65 11.72
9 39.93 17.31 38.83 17.12 41.02 17.53 44.14 12.44 43.78 14.2 44.51 10.47
10 37.61 18.58 35.3 19.54 39.92 17.38 41.02 16.12 40.74 16.82 41.3 15.48
Mean 40.55 10.77 39.27 10.57 41.83 10.88 43.51 9.83 44.38 9.73 42.64 9.91
N 160 80 80 160 80 80
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Appendix B - Instructions
Puzzle instructions (Task 1)
All instructions were originally written in German and are available upon request. The puzzling
instructions for low identity treatments were included in zTree and participants received envelopes
containing the puzzle while being seated at computers. The puzzling instructions for high identity
treatments were printed and laid out on tables where all members of a group were seated to solve the
task together. The participants did not receive any information about what kind of treatment they played.
Instructions for the first task (in low identity treatments)
Your task in the 1st part is to form a square.
The following rules must be obeyed during the course of this exercise:
1. Open the envelope and take out the pieces of the puzzle.
2. You have 5 different pieces; each piece exists only once.
3. You have to puzzle until you solve it.
4. The puzzles have a gray top side and a white bottom side. The gray side must always face upwards.
5. When you have solved the puzzle, please click the ”next” button and wait for further instructions.
Instructions for the first task (in high identity treatments)
The task of your team in the 1st part is to form five squares of equal size. The task will not be complete
until each team member has before him/her a perfect square of the same size as that held by all other
team members.
The following rules must be obeyed during the course of this exercise:
1. Open the envelope and take out the pieces of the puzzle.
2. In the beginning, each of you has 5 different pieces.
3. You have to exchange and puzzle together with your group members until each of you has solved
his/her puzzle.
4. The puzzles have a colored top side and a white bottom side. The colored side must always face
upwards.
5. There are 5 different pieces and each piece exists 4 times. Each player needs one piece of each
kind to solve his/her puzzle.
6. You may not simply throw pieces into the center for others to take; you must give the piece directly
to one other team member. Team members may give pieces to other team members but may not
take pieces from other team members.
7. When all group members have completed their puzzle, you are allowed to talk about whatever you
want. Please remain seated and wait for further instructions. You do not need to give any signal
to the adviser.
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Experimental Instructions (Task 2)
Depending on the treatment, subjects received different instructions: T1: low identity treatment, T2:
high identity treatment; a: egalitarian profit-sharing rule, b: proportional profit-sharing rule.
Instructions for the second task
You are about to participate in an experiment in which two groups (á 4 players) play for winning a
lottery (in each round). 10 rounds will be played with an identical course. [T1: At the beginning, you
will be allocated randomly to either group 1 or group 2] [T2: You play in group red/green]. Within the
experiment, there are two types of interaction:
1. The within-group interaction and
2. The between-group interaction.
Both types of interaction are compensated. Therefore, your final payoff depends on your decisions, your
group members’ decisions and the decisions of the other group’s members.
The course for each round in brief:
1. Each player receives an endowment of 50 tokens.
2. Each player decides how many tokens of his/her endowment he/she wants to provide for his/her
group’s project. It is possible to provide any integer amount between 0 and 50 tokens. These
tokens of the endowment that are not provided will be kept for oneself.
3. The tokens provided by all players of a group generate the group project. Each of the two groups
generate an independent group project. The number of tokens provided to one’s group project are
doubled and distributed equally among all group members.
4. Both groups play to win a lottery. The probability of winning the lottery depends on the total sizes
of the group projects of both groups. The larger one’s own group project the more likely it is to
win the prize.
5. At the end of each round, you will receive a summary of the results.
General information
• All decisions during the experiment are anonymous. You will not receive any information on the
individual decisions of the other players at any point of time.
• Earned tokens will be rounded to the nearest integer number.
• At the end of the game, tokens earned will be converted into euros and paid out (1 token = EUR
0.01).
(1) Within-group interaction
In every round, a group project is generated based on the group members provided tokens. The sum
of tokens provided by all group members equals the value of this group’s project. At the end of every
round, the value of the group project is multiplied by 2 and distributed equally among all 4 group
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members. Tokens not provided to the group project move directly into one’s payoff.
For each player, the payoff from the the within-group interaction is, consequently, based on the retained
tokens (first square bracket) and the payoff from the group project (second square bracket).
Payoff from the the within-group interaction =





• If all group members retain their entire endowment for themselves, each member receives a payout
of 50 tokens in this round from the within-group interaction (50 tokens from the private account;
0 tokens from the group project) → 4∗0 tokens ∗2
4 players
= 0 tokens /player.
• If all group members provide their entire endowment to the group project, each member will
receive a payout of 100 tokens in this round from the within-group interaction (0 tokens from the
private account; 100 tokens from the group project) → 4∗50 tokens ∗2
4 players
= 100 tokens/player.
(2) Between-group interaction (lottery)
In every round, your group plays against the other group to win a lottery. It is only possible for either your
group or the other group to win. The payoff amounts to 152 tokens. The winning group is determined
by the probability displayed below. This implies that no group can be certain to win the prize, even
if it has a higher probability of winning than the other group. However, the probability of one group
winning can be influenced by the number of tokens provided to the group project. The larger one’s own
group project compared to the other group’s project, the higher the probability of one’s own group
winning the lottery in this round.
Probability of your group winning the lottery =
Value your group’s project
Value of your group’s project + Value of the other group’s project
Example
Assume that group 1 provides 100 tokens to their group project and group 2 provides 200 tokens to their
group project, then. . .
• the probability of group 1 winning the prize is 100
100+200 = 33%;
• the probability of group 2 winning the prize is 200
100+200 = 66%.
Distribution of the lottery payoff (in case your group has won)
If your group has won the prize, the payoff of 152 tokens is distributed [T1a,T2a: equally among all








[T1b, T2b: proportionally among all your group’s members according to individuals’ provisions to the
group project. Therefore, your share of the lottery payoff depends on the number of tokens that you
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provided to the group project, as well as the number of tokens provided to the group project by your
group members]
Example:
Player 1 provides 40 tokens to the group project. His/her group members provide 20 tokens each.
Consequently, the group project has a value of 100 tokens. Assume, that this group wins the lottery,
then the lottery payoff is distributed as follows: player 1 receives a share of 61 tokens from the











= 30,4 = 30 tokens).]
In case your group does not win the lottery, you will receive any payoff from the between-group
interaction.
Information about total payoff per round
In each round, your total payoff comprises the payoff from the within-group interaction as well as of the
payoff from the between-group interaction (lottery).
Appendix C: Derivations
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1 Introduction
In markets for expert services, consumers are incapable of determining adequate treatments or
services to solve their problem of a certain severity. Experts can perfectly infer both a problem’s
severity and the adequate service to solve the problem. Due to this ex ante information
asymmetry, consumers have to purchase not only an expert’s service but also information
given by the expert’s superior knowledge. In addition, ex post information asymmetries are
immanent as consumers are unable to verify the received service’s quality. Consequently,
experts have incentives to exploit their superior knowledge trough overcharging, undertreatment
or overtreatment (Dulleck and Kerschbamer 2006, 2009; Dulleck et al. 2011). Consumers
anticipate this exploitation and might thus refrain from contracting with experts. This leads
to market inefficiency or even market breakdown (Akerlof 1970). Examples of markets for
expert services are plentiful, with physicians, car mechanics, taxi drivers, home improvement
contractors and lawyers - to name just a few - providing services that match the outlined
framework.
To protect consumers from being exploited while enhancing market efficiency, politics and
consumer groups have made consumer information campaigns their principle. This principle
is rooted in the idea that by equipping consumers with additional information, they are better
protected against bad deals while forcing experts to be more sincere in their recommendations
(Hadfield et al. 1998; Howells 2005). This approach has undoubtedly grown in importance
and tremendously expanded in scope over the last couple of years, complemented by the
development of various official websites, online initiatives aggregating and making available
user content (information) such as Wikipedia or communication through social media or
message boards. Consumers gather information about their likely problems and adequate
services at minimal cost, even for very specific issues (Murray 1991). However, the
theoretical analysis by Hyndman and Ozerturk (2011) challenges the folk wisdom assuming
the general desirability of providing more consumer information since experts might exploit
this information to customize their fraudulent service offers trough consumer discrimination.
Our paper accounts for this development and growing importance of consumer information
and researches into this field by considering both consumer entry decision and expert cheating
behavior.
Despite numerous studies on the effects of consumer knowledge about experts’ past behavior,
e.g. Akerlof (1970), Darby and Karni (1973) and Dulleck et al. (2011), those on the effects
of varying consumer information sets remain scarce. To our best knowledge, we are first in
introducing a controlled laboratory study on the influence of varying consumer information on
a market for expert services. Nonetheless, our model builds on the work by Hyndman and
Ozerturk (2011) and Fong (2005), who show that this varying information and experts’ ability
to observe it are crucial in assessing the likely outcomes on markets for expert services. Further,
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our analysis connects well to field studies in markets for expert services like Balafoutas et al.
(2013) and Schneider (2012). Our paper thus adds to theoretical and empirical findings. The
key advantages of the laboratory approach lies in the possibility to shed light on consumer
decision-making. In field studies, one might learn about expert cheating behavior but nothing
much can be learned about consumer behavior as only consumers actually treated by experts
are observed. However, whether consumers with a certain set of information tend to enter the
market or not has to be considered crucial to the efficiency of markets featuring expert services
and thus in the design of policy instruments.
Our experimental design thus evaluates the effects of additional consumer information that
alters the distinct properties of the information asymmetry between consumers and experts.
Consumers have either a serious or minor problem that needs to be solved by an expert
service. Before visiting an expert, consumers receive a noisy signal about their problem
severity. Liable experts observe the actual problem severity and recommend a verifiable cheap
or expensive treatment, whereby the cheap treatment only solves a minor problem and the
expensive treatment solves both. Accordingly, the only possibility for experts to cheat is
given by overtreatment.1 Consumers either accept the treatment recommendation, resulting
in the corresponding payoffs, or reject the treatment leaving the expert and consumer with an
outside option payment. This gives the consumer entry decision. Following a random matching
protocol to avoid reputation building, we introduce three treatments: (1) consumers receive an
uninformative signal, (2) consumers receive an informative signal observed by experts and (3)
consumers receive an informative signal hidden to experts. Our (3) treatment builds upon the
finding of Hyndman and Ozerturk (2011) who show that it might be optimal for consumers to
hide their information to avoid being cheated according to specific cheating tolerances.
While fraudulent behavior is evident across all treatment conditions, our results confirm the
findings of Lee and Soberon-Ferrer (1997), Fong (2005), Balafoutas et al. (2013) as well
as Schneider (2012), who show that experts tend to cheat consumers conditional on their
identifiable characteristics, i.e. they cheat high-risk consumers more frequently than neutral
ones and low-risk consumers the least. In contrast to our theoretical predictions, experts’
fraudulent behavior remains unaffected from hiding consumer information. Consumers’
acceptance rates - i.e. their likelihood of entering the market - of expensive treatments are quite
low in the absence of consumer information, substantially increase with bad signals and drop
with good signals. Overall, more contracts are realized given additional consumer information,
whereby more problems are solved and aggregate welfare increases. However, superior
aggregate welfare benefits experts through more realized contracts and low-risk consumers by
being cheated less, while high-risk consumers are cheated more frequently and become worse
off.
1Liability precludes experts from undertreating consumers, while verifiability precludes overcharging.
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Our findings add to the research on markets for expert services, whereby we deal with
credence goods. The term credence goods was introduced in the seminal paper by Darby and
Karni (1973), where ”generally speaking, credence goods have the characteristic that though
consumers can observe the utility they derive from the good ex post, they cannot judge whether
the type or quality they have received is the ex-ante needed one” (Dulleck et al. 2011, p.526).
In the subsequent strand of literature, it is generally assumed that consumers hold only vague
information about their problem that needs to be addressed by an expert (Angelova and Regner
2013; Emons 2001; Pesendorfer and Wolinsky 2003; Roe and Sheldon 2007). Homogeneous
consumers are only aware that they suffer from either a minor or a serious problem with
common probabilities (Bonroy et al. 2013; Dulleck and Kerschbamer 2006, 2009; Dulleck
et al. 2011; Mimra et al. 2013, 2014; Wolinsky 1993).
Despite numerous investigations about varying mechanisms to overcome market inefficiencies
in expert markets,2 research about solving the dilemma through additional consumer
information is sparse. Darby and Karni (1973) show that experts’ optimal level of fraud is
likely to decrease with consumers’ knowledge. This corresponds to the folk wisdom that
informed consumers are less likely to be exploited as they more commonly tend to decline
experts’ faulty advice. However, Hyndman and Ozerturk (2011) show that in comparison
to a setting with uninformed consumers, experts’ cheating behavior depends on the specific
signals: experts cheat consumers with a minor problem most often when they have received
a bad signal, whereas consumers receiving a good signal are cheated the least. The authors
conclude that more information does not necessarily lead to less fraudulent expert behavior.
In addition, Lee and Soberon-Ferrer (1997) as well as Fong (2005) confirm that experts tend
to cheat selectively based upon consumers’ identifiable characteristics. Bonroy et al. (2013)
show that in a market with homogeneous consumers who are committed to a liable expert
once she gives a recommendation, the higher the consumers’ risk aversion, the less likely
experts are to invest in costly diagnosis. Fong (2005) - in accordance with Pitchek and
Schotter (1987) and Hyndman and Ozerturk (2011) - conclude that consumers could be better
off by withholding specific information, i.e. their expectation about having a rather serious
problem and being likely to require expensive treatment. Balafoutas et al. (2013) identify
consumers’ observable characteristics - e.g. income or city of origin - as being decisive
for experts’ tendency towards fraudulent behavior. In their field experiment, taxi drivers in
Athens were significantly more likely to overtreat and overcharge non-locals and high-income
customers when compared to locals and low-income customers. The authors conclude that
these differences in observable characteristics determine an expert’s perception of a consumer’s
information set. This perception translates to differences in a fraudulent act’s expected profit
2The effect of reputation and/or brand-naming goods (Akerlof 1970; Darby and Karni 1973; Grosskopf and
Sarin 2010; Dulleck et al. 2011; Mimra et al. 2013); the influence of competition (Dulleck et al. 2011; Mimra et al.
2013); the possibility for second-opinion (Wolinsky 1993; Mimra et al. 2014).
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and ultimately in different probabilities for consumers to be cheated. Overall, the effects of
enhanced consumer information depend on the distinct signals received and the experts’ ability
to observe these signals. Additional information does not imply superior market outcomes per
se in the context of expert services.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section two presents our theoretical
framework, before section three describes our experimental design and section four states our
hypothesis. Section five presents our results and finally section six concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
Following the notation by Hyndman and Ozerturk (2011), we model a market for expert
services. Consumers suffer from either a minor or serious problem, denoted by ω ∈ {m,s}.
While they cannot observe their problem severity, the probability of suffering from a serious
problem is common knowledge and given by Pr(ω = s) = α ∈ (0,1). Each consumer visits
one (monopolistic) expert, who can perfectly infer a consumer’s problem and recommends
either a cheap treatment at fixed price pm and cost cm or an expensive treatment at ps and
cs, where ps > pm and cs > cm. An expensive treatment solves both problem types, whereas a
cheap treatment solves only a minor problem. If a consumer accepts the recommendation, the
corresponding expert has to carry out the recommended treatment, i.e. treatments are assumed
to be verifiable. Given that we also assume liability, an accepted treatment recommendation
will always solve the consumer’s problem, which yields utility V . If a consumer rejects, both
the consumer and the expert receive an outside option σC and σE , respectively.
2.1 Payoffs
Payoff for experts
Given our assumptions of liability and verifiability, experts can exploit asymmetric information
by overtreatment only. Experts might recommend an expensive treatment despite a cheap
treatment being sufficient to solve a consumer’s problem. Experts might overtreat if the
mark-up for an expensive treatment exceeds a cheap treatment’s mark-up. We thus set
ps − cs = ys > ym = pm − cm with ym > 0 such that treating a consumer always yields positive
profits. We denote the expert cheating probability by β ∈ [0,1]. In addition, we assume that
experts strictly prefer to treat consumers rather than falling back on the outside option, which
gives σE < ym.
Payoff for consumers
We assume that consumers suffer from a greater loss in utility given an untreated serious
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problem rather than an untreated minor one, such that σcm > σcs. Consumers strictly prefer
to be treated with a suitable treatment rather than falling back on the outside option as
V − ps > σcs and V − pm > σcm. While consumers are unable to identify ex ante the severity
of their problem, the different outside options imply the ex post revelation of an untreated
problem’s severity.3 Due to the liability of experts, consumers will accept minor treatment
recommendations with certainty. Expensive treatment recommendations will only be accepted
with a certain probability γ ∈ [0,1]. Consumers are assumed to be better off when rejecting an
expensive treatment given a minor problem, which gives V − ps < σcm. Table 1 summarizes the
payoff structure of the game.
treatment
expensive cheap rejected
problem serious (ω = s) V − ps, ps − cs -, - σcs, σE
minor (ω = m) V − ps, ps − cs V − pm, pm − cm σcm, σE
Table 1: Summary of (consumer, expert) payoffs
2.2 Information
Before visiting an expert, consumers receive a signal on the severity of their problem. A
consumer’s type t ∈ T = {h, l,n} is referred to as high risk if he receives a bad signal, as
low risk if he receives a good signal and as neutral if he receives an uninformative signal. The
probability of receiving a bad signal is given by q ∈ [0,1]. Note that in our model a market
comprises either uninformed (t = n) or informed consumers (t = (l,h)) only. We exclude the
case where experts are confronted with informed and uninformed consumers at the same time.
Therefore, q always determines the proportion of high-risk consumers and (1−q) the proportion
of low-risk consumers in a market. Signal precision - denoted by φ - can be written as







3We feel that these specific outside options are crucial to model actual conditions on expert markets. Consumers
can observe their utility from a treatment without knowing whether this solution was optimal. However, they are
also able to observe their loss in utility for an untreated problem. Consider e.g. a person that feels sick: while the
person might be unsure about the severity of the illness ex-ante, they will definitely learn about the severity of the
illness when it remains untreated.
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We can derive the following posterior beliefs after consumers have learned about their type








αn ≡ Pr(s|n) = α. (4)
We exclude the trivial case where consumers always accept expensive treatment
recommendations by
V − ps < αtσcs +(1−αt)σcm, (5)
which gives
αt <
V − ps −σcm
σcs −σcm
. (6)
While experts can perfectly infer a consumer’s problem, expert behavior depends on their ability
to observe consumer signals. Therefore, we derive the equilibrium behavior conditional on
consumer types and experts’ ability to observe the underlying signals. The game trees in figure
1 illustrate our settings of the game, which we subsequently analyze in further detail.
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(a) open consumer signal
(b) no consumer signal
(c) hidden consumer signal
Figure 1: Settings of the game
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2.2.1 Equilibrium: signal observed by experts
In this section, we derive equilibria when consumers receive a signal that is observed by
experts. If a signal is informative, consumers receiving a bad signal have a higher probability
of suffering from a serious problem with αh > α compared with consumers who receive a good
signal with αl < α . If signals are uninformative, neutral consumers face a probability between
those two values with αn = α .
We assume symmetric equilibria where experts choose a uniform cheating probability βt and
consumers accept an expensive treatment recommendation, depending on their type, with
uniform probability γt . Considering pure strategy equilibria, we derive a full circular argument.
Lemma 1: There are no pure strategy equilibria in the game with consumer signals that are
open to experts.
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider experts with strategy β = 0, i.e. they never cheat. In this
case, consumers anticipate this honest behavior and always accept an expensive treatment
recommendation with γ = 1, since V − ps > σcs. However, when γ = 1, experts have the
incentive to always cheat and thus optimally play β = 1, which gives a consumer payoff of
V − ps. Consumers choosing γ = 0 instead - i.e. rejecting expensive treatment recommendations
with certainty - become better off given the expected payoff αtσcs + (1−αt)σcm due to our
assumption in (6). We thus arrive at full circle implying that there are no pure strategy equilibria.

We now turn to mixed strategy equilibria.
Lemma 2: In the mixed strategy equilibrium with experts observing consumer signals,




. Experts cheat consumers conditional on their type t with




Proof of Lemma 2: An expert following a mixed strategy recommends an expensive treatment
to a consumer suffering from a minor problem with probability 0 < β < 1. We can formulate
the necessary condition defining a consumer’s accepting probability of an expensive treatment
that makes an expert indifferent between an honest and a dishonest treatment recommendation
by
γt(ps − cs)+(1− γ)σE = pm − cm (7)
⇒ γ∗t =
pm − cm −σE
ps − cs −σE
. (8)
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For a consumer of type t ∈ T to be indifferent between accepting and rejecting an expensive
treatment recommendation, experts must choose a corresponding cheating probability
β ∗t =
αt(σcs + ps −V )
(1−αt)(V − ps −σcm)
. (9)
If an expert cheats with a probability strictly greater [lower] than β ∗t , a consumer of type t
always rejects [accepts] an expensive treatment recommendation. Moreover, β ∗t increases with
a consumer’s belief about having a serious problem αt . Since experts observe consumer signals,
they are able to choose different strategies for each consumer type. Hence, in the mixed strategy
equilibrium, experts discriminate consumers according to their type-specific cheating tolerance.
High-risk consumers are cheated with a greater probability than neutral and low-risk consumers,
with the latter being cheated the least. Therefore, Hyndman and Ozerturk (2011) interpret β ∗t
as the tolerance of consumers of type t towards being cheated. Since αh > αn > αl , we obtain












1 if β < β ∗t
γ∗t if β = β
∗
t
0 if β > β ∗t .
(11)
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t )(pm − cm), (12)






E = pm − cm, (13)
where the superscript open refers to the case of an open signal observed by the expert. A





t ) = αtγ
∗













t )(V − pm). (14)
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Ct (αt) =V − pm −αt
(σcs −σcm)(ps − pm)
V − ps −σcm
. (15)
Since high-risk consumers are cheated more often, a consumer’s expected payoff decreases in
the risk αt of having a serious problem.
2.2.2 Equilibrium: signal not observed by experts
In this section, we assume that experts are no longer able to observe consumer signals.
Consequently, experts are incapable of discriminating consumers with respect to their
type-specific cheating tolerance. However, experts learn about the fractions of high- and
low-risk consumers in the market as they observe q, where (1−q) gives the fraction of low risk
consumers due to the absence of neutral-risk consumers.
Again, we arrive at a full circular argument in trying to identify pure strategy equilibria.
Lemma 3: There are no pure strategy equilibria in the game with consumer signals that are
hidden to experts.
Proof of Lemma 3: see proof of Lemma 1.

In the mixed strategy equilibrium, consumers’ acceptance strategy γ∗t - as derived in (7) - makes
the expert indifferent between cheating and being honest. However, since experts are no longer
able to discriminate with respect to consumer types, they have to choose a uniform strategy β
for all consumers.
If the expert sets β > β ∗t [β < β
∗
t ], consumers of type t will reject [accept] an expensive
treatment recommendation with certainty. Choosing β < β ∗l [β > β
∗
h ] would make all
consumers strictly accept [reject] an expensive treatment recommendation, which contradicts
equilibrium behavior as described in the proof of Lemma 1.
This leaves the expert with two equilibria choices for β . By setting β = β ∗h , the expert causes
all low-risk consumers to reject expensive treatment recommendations with certainty. This
would be optimal if the more frequent cheating of high-risk consumers (over-)compensates
the loss from low-risk consumers always rejecting expensive treatment recommendations.
For this consideration to hold true, an expert’s expected profit by setting β = β ∗h needs to be












l ). If the
expert chooses β = β ∗l instead, all high-risk consumers would accept an expensive treatment
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recommendation with certainty and low risk-consumers, respectively, with γ∗l .
Lemma 4: If consumer information is hidden, experts always choose the low-risk consumer
equilibrium with β = β ∗l =
αl(σcs+ps−V )
(1−αl)(V−ps−σcm
. In this scenario, high-risk consumers always
accept expensive treatment recommendations, i.e. γh = 1, and low-risk consumers play their




Proof of Lemma 4: If experts choose β = β ∗h =
αh(σcs+ps−V )
(1−αh)(V−ps−σcm
, all low-risk consumers reject
an expensive treatment recommendation all of the time, i.e. γl = 0. By contrast, all high-risk
consumers choose their mixed strategy equilibrium, i.e. γ∗h =
pm−cm−σe
ps−cs−σe
. In this scenario an
expert’s expected payoff is given by
πhE(αl,β
∗









If experts choose instead β = β ∗l =
αl(σcs+ps−V )
(1−αl)(V−ps−σcm
all high risk-consumers accept an expensive
treatment recommendation with certainty, i.e. γh = 1. By contrast, all low-risk consumers
choose their mixed strategy equilibrium, i.e. γ∗l =
pm−cm−σe
ps−cs−σe
. In this scenario, an expert’s













Experts would choose the high-risk equilibrium if and only if πhE(αl,β
∗





However, since we assume 0 < q < 1, πhE(αl,β
∗






This property of our model stems from an unfavorable outside option for experts in case of
treatment rejections, making contracting - even by providing a cheap treatment - experts’
predominant objective if they are unable to observe consumer types. Consequently, experts
prefer the low-risk cheating equilibrium to maximize their number of realized contracts.
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In this equilibrium, low-risk consumers’ expected profit is given by
π lCl(αl) =V − pm −αl
(σcs −σcm)(ps − pm)
V − ps −σcm
. (20)
High-risk consumers’ expected profit is given by
π lCh(αh,β
∗




l )(ps − pm). (21)
2.3 Welfare
In the following, we analyze how consumer information affects welfare as measured by the
expected aggregate income and the distribution of income between consumers and experts.
2.4 Expert Welfare
No signal vs. open signal
If there is no consumer information - i.e. consumers receive an uninformative signal observed by
experts - all consumers are of the same type t = n and experts’ cheating probability becomes β ∗n ,
as described in (9). In case of informative signals observed by experts, consumers are cheated
with respect to their types and they choose their corresponding mixed strategy acceptance
probability γt = γ
∗
t , as shown in (7). The expected income of experts becomes equivalent for no









t ) = 0. (22)
Therefore, experts are indifferent between no consumer information at all and consumer
information that they can observe. Note that this result is independent of the actual share q of
high-risk consumers in the market.
Hidden signal vs. open signal





In this case, they cannot discriminate consumers along their cheating tolerance. According to
Lemma 4, experts always opt for β = β ∗l and their expected payoff becomes (19). The expected
change in income in comparing an open and hidden signal can be written as










By inserting and rearranging, we obtain




l )]> 0. (24)
Since pm − cm < ps − cs, the expression is strictly positive and the expert is better off by not
observing consumer signals and being able to commit to the low-risk cheating equilibrium. In
addition, the proportion of high-risk consumers in the market determines the shift in income,
with a higher proportion the more intense it is.
2.5 Consumer Welfare
No signal vs. open signal
Consumers receiving either an uninformative signal or a signal observed by experts accept an
expensive treatment recommendation with probability γ∗t in the mixed strategy equilibrium,
which yields them an expected payoff as described in (15). As outlined above, consumer payoff
decreases with the probability of having a serious problem, i.e. αt . Therefore, the difference in











∆πC = (αt −αn)
(σcs −σcm)(ps − pm)
V − ps −σcm
. (26)
As this ratio is strictly positive, high-risk consumers are worse off with an open signal since
αh > αn. By contrast, low-risk consumers are better off with an open signal since αl < αn.
Consequently, welfare is redistributed by consumer information from high- to low-risk
consumers.
Hidden signal vs. open signal
Consumers receiving a signal that is not observed by experts are cheated with a uniform




h } and react according to their reaction function described in (11).
By experts always setting β ∗l , all high risk-consumers accept an expensive treatment
recommendation with certainty, i.e. γh = 1. Their expected income is given by (21). By contrast,
low-risk consumers accept an expensive treatment recommendation with γ∗l and their expected
payoff amounts to (20). Since low-risk consumers’ expected profit is equivalent for an open and
hidden signal, we can assess the difference in income by considering high-risk consumers only.
We arrive at









∆π lC = q[(ps − pm)
(V − ps −σcs)(αl −αh)(1−αh)
(1−αl)(V − ps −σcm)
]> 0. (28)
Since αl − αh < 0, as well as V − ps − σcm < 0, both the numerator and denominator are
negative. Consequently, the expression becomes strictly positive, implying that (high-risk)
consumers become better off by hiding consumer information.
2.6 Overall Welfare
Overall welfare is the aggregate of consumer and expert income. Both depend on the share of
high-risk consumers in the market and the availability of consumer information.
No signal vs. open signal
As previously mentioned, there are no differences for experts in terms of welfare when
comparing the scenarios of no signal and open signal. However, overall welfare depends on
the share of high-risk consumers in the market q, since consumers’ payoff decreases with the












(σcs −σcm)(ps − pm)
V − ps −σcm
[qαh +(1−q)αl −αn)]. (30)
With the fraction being strictly positive, whether market participants are better or worse off as
a whole, depends on the actual values of q, αh and αl .
Hidden signal vs. open signal
In case of hidden signals, experts choose the uniform cheating probability β = β ∗l and
consumers react according to their reaction function given by (11). As previously mentioned,
both (high-risk) consumers and experts are better off in this scenario when consumer
information is hidden. This results from contracting generally being more favorable for
experts. Experts abstain from causing low-risk consumers to always reject expensive treatment
recommendations by choosing the low-risk cheating equilibrium and benefit from increased
contracting rates. We can write
∆π2 = π
l(β ∗l )−π


















The expression is strictly positive, implying that overall welfare increases in this scenario by
hiding consumer information.
3 Experimental design
3.1 Overview of the game and parameterization
Our experimental design builds upon the theoretical framework and the assumptions described
above. Each session features one market for expert services comprising twelve subjects, similar
to Mimra et al. (2014). Subjects are randomly assigned to the role of an expert or consumer.
The roles remain constant throughout the eight periods of the game. Payoffs are denominated
in ECU, accumulated over periods and paid at the end of the experiment, where ECU 1 converts
to EUR 0.60.
Consumers suffer either from a serious or minor problem. The probability of having a serious
problem depends on a consumer’s type, i.e. αn = 0.5 without an informative signal and either
αl = 0.2 with a good signal or αh = 0.8 with a bad signal. Consumers are matched with one
expert who recommends an expensive or a cheap treatment. Experts learn about a consumer’s
problem at no cost. Experts can either recommend an expensive treatment which costs her
cs = 4 or cheap treatment which costs her cm = 3. Consumers can accept this treatment
recommendation and pay ps = 8 for an expensive treatment or pm = 5 for a cheap treatment.
An accepted expensive treatment solves both serious and minor problems, whereas a cheap
treatment only solves minor problems. If a consumer’s problem is solved, he earns V = 10. As
we assume liability, given a serious problem an expert is obliged to recommend an expensive
treatment. Accordingly, if a consumer accepts a treatment recommendation, his problem will
be solved with certainty. If a problem remains untreated - as a consumer rejects the expert’s
recommendation - the consumer as well as the expert earn an outside option. For a consumer,
the outside option depends on the severity of his problem, i.e. σcs = 1.6 in case of a serious
problem and σcm = 4 in case of a minor one. An expert’s outside option is independent of a
consumer’s problem and amounts to σE = 1.
According to the strategy method, experts recommend a treatment for each of the six consumers
in every period. Due to liability, experts only choose a treatment recommendation for the
hypothetical case that a consumer suffers from a minor problem. Experts observe the relevant
information for each consumer, i.e. a consumer’s likelihood of suffering from a minor or serious
problem, treatment prices and costs. Decisions are taken by checking radio buttons. However,
one expert is matched with only one consumer at the end of a period, and hence we assume
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monopolistic experts. In order to avoid reputational concerns, the presentation of each consumer
- i.e. the position at which each consumer is displayed on the screen - is randomly determined
in each period (Dulleck et al. 2011).
The experts’ decision screen is shown in figure 2.
Figure 2: Expert decision screen
3.2 Treatment conditions
We implement three experimental treatment conditions that differ in terms of consumer
information and experts’ ability to observe this information.
noSignal: Consumers do not receive any informative signal about their likely problem and the
market comprises uninformed consumers (t = n) only. The probability of having a serious
problem is given by the ex-ante probability αn = 0.5.
openSignal: Consumers receive an informative signal before visiting an expert. Consumers
are of either high (t = h) or low risk (t = l). High-risk consumers face a αh = 0.8 chance
of suffering from a serious problem, whereas for low-risk consumers αl = 0.2. Experts
observe these signals.
hiddenSignal: Consumers receive an informative signal before visiting an expert. Consumers
are of either high (t = h) or low risk (t = l). High-risk consumers face a αh = 0.8 chance
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of suffering from a serious problem, whereas for low-risk consumers αl = 0.2. Experts
do not observe these signals.
3.3 Course of the game
Each period of the game comprises six stages.
1. In openSignal and hiddenSignal each consumer is randomly selected to be of either high-
or low-risk type by receiving an informative signal that updates their probability to suffer
from a serious problem. In noSignal, all consumers receive the same uninformative
signal.
2. Experts decide how to treat each of the six consumers given the hypothetical case that
they suffer from a minor problem. In openSignal, experts can identify a consumer’s
type, whereas they cannot observe the type in hiddenSignal. Experts can choose to
either overtreat a consumer by recommending an expensive treatment or act honestly
by recommending a cheap treatment.
3. Each consumer is randomly matched to one expert. Based on the type-specific
probabilities, it is randomly determined whether a consumer actually has a minor or
serious problem.
4. Consumers suffering from a serious problem are assigned an expensive treatment
recommendation in any case due to the liability assumption. Consumers suffering from a
minor problem are assigned the matched expert’s treatment recommendation.
5. Consumers observe the assigned treatment recommendation and decide to accept or
reject.
6. If a consumer accepts, the recommendation with associated payoffs is implemented. If a
consumer rejects, both the expert and consumer are paid according to their outside option.
Each subject’s payoff from the current period and the cumulative payoff are displayed.
3.4 Procedure
For noSignal / openSignal / hiddenSignal, there were 8/8/7 sessions with 96/96/84 participants.
Experiments were conducted with a standard subject pool across disciplines in the Laboratory
of Behavioral Economics at the University of Goettingen; using ORSEE (Greiner 2015) and
z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). The sessions lasted about 40 minutes, whereby subjects earned
EUR 11.50 on average.
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4 Hypotheses
In this section, we insert our experimental parameters to our theoretical framework to obtain
hypotheses about subjects’ behavior and the overall market outcome. Table 2 provides an
overview of the expected parameter values.
β β ∗h β
∗
l γ
∗ γh γl πE πC πCh πCl
noSignal 0.2 - - 0.5 - - 2.0 3.2 - -
openSignal - 0.8 0.05 - 0.3 0.3 2.0 - 2.12 4.28
hiddenSignal 0.05 - - - 1 0.3 2.9 - 2.29 4.28
Table 2: Theoretical predictions
Since there is no equilibrium for experts to restrain from cheating, we expect them to overtreat
consumers partially to increase their monetary payoff. Experts with knowledge about consumer
information are able to adjust their treatment recommendations such that consumers are
discriminated conditional on their type-specific cheating tolerance. Therefore, we expect
experts to more frequently cheat high- rather than low-risk consumers in openSignal. We
further expect neutral-risk consumers to be cheated less frequently than informed high-risk
consumers and - conversely - more frequently than informed low-risk consumers. In case
consumer information is hidden for experts, we expect experts to opt for the low-risk cheating
equilibrium, i.e. β = β ∗l = 0.05.
Hypothesis 1 (”expert behavior”)
H1a) Experts engage in cheating with and without consumer information.
H1b) Experts cheat high-risk consumers more often compared with neutral-risk consumers.
H1c) Experts cheat low-risk consumers less often compared with neutral-risk consumers.
H1d) Experts opt for the low-risk cheating probability when consumer information is hidden.
Given an observable signal, we expect that consumers’ acceptance probability remains constant
if they learn about their risk type, given that experts should adjust their cheating probability. In
case of a hidden signal, low-risk consumers are expected to put forth the acceptance probability,
whereas high-risk consumers react to the uniform cheating probability by always accepting
expensive treatment recommendations.
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Hypothesis 2 (”consumer behavior”)
H2a) Consumers accept expensive treatment recommendations with the same probability
when there is no consumer information and with an open signal.
H2b) Consumers receiving an open signal show an acceptance probability for expensive
treatment recommendation independent of their specific risk type.
H2c) High-risk consumers accept all expensive treatment recommendations when consumer
information is hidden, whereas low-risk consumers show the same probability to
accept without or with observable consumer information.
Since there is an equal proportion of high- and low-risk consumers in the market with q = 0.5
and corresponding symmetric probabilities of serious problems of P(ω = s|t = h) = αh = 0.8
as 1−αh = αl = 0.2, there should be no difference in aggregate income due to open signals
when compared to no consumer information. However, we expect a redistribution of income
from high- to low-risk consumers. According to our theoretical predictions, in case the signal
becomes hidden, we expect an increase in experts’ and high-risk consumers’ welfare. Since
low-risk consumers’ welfare should remain constant, we expect an overall increase in welfare
when consumer signals are hidden.
Hypothesis 3 (”welfare”)
H3a) Overall welfare remains constant if observable consumer information is introduced.
H3b) If consumer information is hidden to experts, overall welfare increases due to more
contracts between high-risk consumers and experts.
H3c) High-risk consumers benefit from introducing observable information, while low-risk
consumers generate less income.
5 Results
We analyze our experimental data according to the structure of our hypotheses: first, we
investigate expert cheating; second, we investigate consumer acceptance; and third, we reach
an overall conclusion by deriving aggregate income conditional on the availability of consumer
information. Unless mentioned otherwise, all tests are carried out treating one market, i.e. each
group of six consumers or six experts interacting in a session, as one independent observation
only. Therefore, we control for reputation building and other intra-group dynamics despite the
random matching protocol applied in each period.
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5.1 Expert behavior
Recall that all experts choose a treatment recommendation for the hypothetical case of
































Figure 3: Experts’ dishonest treatment recommendations
For all treatments, there is a considerable fraction of dishonest treatment recommendations,
which is rather constant over time. In noSignal/openSignal/hiddenSignal the average share of
dishonest recommendations amounts to 0.59/0.56/0.57, which gives strong evidence in support
of H1a. On average, experts tend to cheat much more frequently than predicted by theory
when there is no consumer information (0.59 > βn = 0.2) or hidden consumer information
(0.57 > β ∗l = 0.05). We further hypothesized (H1b/H1c) that consumers in open signal will
be cheated according to their cheating tolerance, which holds true as the fraction of dishonest
recommendation in case of bad signals amounts to 0.8 (= β ∗h ) and only 0.31(> β
∗
l = .05) in
case of good signals. Both are significantly different from the fraction cheated when there
is no additional consumer information (Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum-test: for high risk z = −2.100
and p = .0357; for low risk z = 3.046 and p = .0023) and when there is hidden consumer
information (Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum-test: for high risk z = 2.083 and p = .0372; for low risk
z = −2.893 and p = .0038). However, there is no difference in cheating behavior between
noSignal and hiddenSignal, which contradicts H1d (WRS test: z = .753 and p = .4515). To























noSignal openSignal_good openSignal_bad hiddenSignal
Figure 4: Distribution of experts’ dishonest treatment recommendations
It becomes evident that cheating behavior is quite homogeneous. The fraction of approximately
60% dishonest treatment recommendations in noSignal and hiddenSignal do not stem from
experts either cheating all the time or never cheating; rather,they apply a mixed strategy
of cheating with a certain probability. There are 14.58/2.08/7.14% (4.17/4.17/7.14%) of
experts who always (never) overtreat their consumers.
Result 1: Experts tend to cheat much more often than suggested by theory when there
is no additional consumer information. Experts adjust their treatment recommendations to
account for differences in consumers’ cheating tolerance. Experts do not adjust their treatment
recommendations in terms of whether there is no consumer information or hidden consumer
information.
5.2 Consumer behavior
Figure 5 depicts the fraction of realized contracts, the equivalent to accepted recommendations

























Figure 5: Consumer acceptance conditional on treatment recommendations
The acceptance rate in case of cheap treatment recommendations is close to - but not
perfectly - 1 and there is neither a trend over time nor a substantial difference across
treatments (Kruskal-Wallis test: χ2 = 3.113 and p = .2109). For expensive treatment
recommendations, in noSignal there are significantly more rejections compared to openSignal
and hiddenSignal (Kruskal-Wallis test: χ2 = 14.048 and p = .009), which contradicts H2a.
Without additional consumer information, consumers are more reluctant to accept expensive
treatment recommendations than suggested by theory (.29 < γ∗ = .5). Therefore, consumers
with additional information tend to accept expensive treatment recommendations significantly
more often, which can be analyzed in further depth by differentiating acceptance with respect
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Figure 6: Consumer acceptance conditional on treatment recommendations and signals
Optimal behavior suggests that cheap treatment recommendation should always be accepted. As
expected, we find no specific pattern with respect to good or bad signals. However, it has to be
considered that there are very few observations for consumers who received a cheap treatment
recommendation and a bad signal, which explains the peaks in graphs.4
In case of expensive treatment recommendations, there is an evident difference with respect
to consumers’ received signals. Recall that we expected that the probability of accepting an
expensive treatment remains constant over treatments with γl/h = 0.3, except for high-risk
consumers in hiddenSignal who should always accept an expensive treatment recommendation
(cp. table 2).
If consumers received a bad signal, they are substantially more willing to accept a serious
treatment recommendation (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test: for openSignal
z =−2.521 and p = .0117; for hiddenSignal z =−2.366 and p = .0180), which detrimentally
contradicts H2b, where we hypothesized that the acceptance probability is independent of the
specific risk type when there is an open signal. However, there are no differences due to signals
being open or hidden to the expert (WRS test: for good signal z = 1.158 and p = .2467; for bad
signals z = 0.926 and p = .3545). This has to be interpreted as mixed evidence with respect to
H2c.
4In openSignal this pattern occurred only eight times, in hiddenSignal ten times.
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Result 2: Consumers tend to frequently reject expensive treatment recommendations if they
do not receive additional information. Good signals are associated with very low levels of
acceptance, while bad signals are associated with very high levels of acceptance. Whether the
signal is open or hidden to the expert has no influence on this basic pattern.
5.3 Welfare
We rely on aggregate income to evaluate welfare. Recall that aggregate income is maximal if a
consumer’s problem is solved by the appropriate treatment. Furthermore, in terms of aggregate
income, it is superior that a consumer with a minor problem is assigned an expensive treatment
rather than no treatment at all. Consequently, welfare increases in the number of contracts and
the frequency of contracts featuring the appropriate treatment. Figure 7 details the fraction of
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Figure 7: Contracts realized
Contradicting H3a, the fraction of realized contracts - with and without an appropriate
treatment - is substantially lower when there is no additional consumer information and
thus welfare is superior when introducing consumer information (Kruskal-Wallis test: for
fraction of contracts χ2 = 12.682 and p = .0018). The median fraction of realized contracts
drops by about 20 p.p. in the absence of consumer information. Differences between open
and hidden consumer information are rather small and contracts tend to be less frequent in
hiddenSignal, which contradicts H3b. Average aggregate income on the market level for
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noSignal/openSignal/hiddenSignal amounts to ECU 228/257/249. 70/40/44% of serious
problems remain untreated in noSignal/openSignal/hiddenSignal.
Result 3: Aggregate income is higher when additional consumer information is introduced,
independent of whether experts are informed. Accordingly, there are more contracts realized
and appropriate treatments are more frequent. Contradicting our predictions by theory, hidden
signals tend to reduce welfare.


















































































Figure 8: Distribution of income
The box-plots of 8a and 8b confirm our previous findings. Bad signals make consumers
accept expensive treatment recommendations much more frequently, which disproportionately
benefits experts. This is due to the difference between an expert’s outside option σE = 1 and
her income for carrying out an expensive treatment ps − cs = 8 − 4 = 4, which is equal as
for the consumer receiving σCm = 4 > V − ps = 10 − 8 = 2 at best or at worst σCs = 1.6.
Therefore, as predicted by our theory (cp. table 2), it is the experts - rather that consumers -
who predominantly benefit from additional consumer information as bad signals substantially
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reduce consumers’ reluctance to accept expensive treatment recommendations.
Moreover, we expected a redistribution of income to the detriment of high-risk consumers
when there is observable consumer information. As indicated by 8c and 8d, consumers earn
significantly more when they are of low risk (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test: for
openSignal z = 2.521 and p = .0117; for hiddenSignal z = 2.366 and p = .0180), which
supports H3c. Furthermore, in openSignal consumers earn less (more) when they are of high
(low) risk when compared to uninformed consumers (WRS test: for uninformed vs. high risk
z = 3.046 and p = .0023; for uninformed vs. low risk z = −3.361 and p = .0008). The same
holds true in hiddenSignal (WRS test: for uninformed vs. high risk z = 1.967 and p = .0491;
for uninformed vs. low risk z =−3.240 and p = .0012).
Result 4: Experts benefit from introducing consumer information due to the substantial
reduction in consumers’ reluctance to accept expensive treatment recommendation when
receiving bad signals. For both open and hidden signals, low-risk consumers benefit from
additional consumer information, while high-risk consumers are worse off.
6 Conclusion
In the literature, there is plenty of research about markets for expert services, in which
ex-ante consumer information has not gained much attention. However, providing additional
consumer information is among the most prominent proposals to overcome the inefficiencies
due to asymmetric information. Therefore, we have investigated how consumers receiving an
informative yet noisy signal before visiting an expert influences experts’ cheating behavior,
consumers’ acceptance probabilities and overall welfare in a market for expert services. In our
theoretical model, we introduced three different treatments in which consumers receive either
(1) an uninformative signal, (2) an informative signal observed by experts or (3) an informative
signal hidden to experts. We built closely on the incentive structure by Pitchek and Schotter
(1987), i.e. there is a difference in consumer welfare conditional on the severity of an untreated
problem. Our model enables us to derive behavioral hypotheses on the effects of additional
consumer information, which we tested experimentally.
We find that experts’ likelihood of fraudulent behavior - i.e. recommending an expensive
treatment when a cheap one would be sufficient to solve a consumer’s problem - is influenced
by ex-ante consumer information observed by experts. Our novel lab results thus confirm
the findings of Lee and Soberon-Ferrer (1997), Fong (2005), Schneider (2012) as well as
Balafoutas et al. (2013) that experts tend to cheat consumers conditional on their identifiable
characteristics, which is given by the risk type in our setting determined by received signals.
Our data shows that experts cheat high-risk consumers significantly more often than low-risk
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consumers, which supports the hypothesis by Hyndman and Ozerturk (2011) that hiding bad
signals might be beneficial to consumers. Our results thus indicate that - in contrast to common
sense - uninformed consumers are not the most likely victims of fraudulent behavior; rather,
it is the informed high-risk type. In contrast to our theoretical predictions, we do not find any
influence on experts’ fraudulent behavior by hiding consumers’ signals compared to the case of
no ex-ante consumer information.
Moreover, our results show a significant influence of consumers’ information on their
acceptance probability - i.e. their likelihood of market entry - for expensive treatments. Without
additional information, consumers show substantially lower rates of acceptance than suggested
by theory. This might be due to consumers hoping for a minor problem, in which case the
outside option doubles their income in comparison to accepting an expensive treatment. In the
worst case, they fall back on the outside option and suffer from a serious problem, which only
reduces their income by 20%. Accordingly, the risk in monetary terms of an untreated serious
problem compared to a treated one was quite small. Based on this consideration, it is quite
surprising that consumers substantially change their behavior and show very high acceptance
probabilities when receiving bad signals. Since consumers condition their behavior on the
received signals, more serious problems are treated appropriately with informative signals.
However, there is no evidence that consumers account for experts’ ability to observe their
signals as they behave similarly in terms of accepting probabilities in case of hidden and open
signals.
Aggregate income increases when there is additional consumer information. This stems from
consumers’ tendency to reject expensive treatment recommendation if they do not distinctively
receive a bad signal. In case of open signals, low cheating probabilities associated with good
signals meet low acceptance rates of expensive treatments, whereas bad signals are associated
with high cheating probabilities and high acceptance rates. This results in more realized
contracts and more consumer problems are solved appropriately. In case of hidden signals,
experts tend to cheat as if there was no consumer information, while consumers with bad signals
show higher acceptance rates of expensive treatments. Again, there are more contracts realized
and especially more serious problems solved.
In sum, markets for expert services generate superior levels of overall welfare when there
is additional ex-ante consumer information. This is driven by experts benefiting from more
frequently accepted expensive treatment recommendations implying more realized contracts
and less outside option payments. Whether consumers benefit or not crucially depends on risk
types, where low-risk consumers are better off and high-risk consumers are worse off when
introducing additional consumer information.
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Appendix A - Instructions
General Information about the Experiment
There are twelve participants and eight periods in the experiment. The course of a period is the
same for all periods. In each period, new pairs of two participants will be matched randomly.
Each pair comprises exactly one player with role A and one player with role B. In general, the
experiment is about player B having a problem in each period, which can be solved by an action
of player A. In the beginning of the experiment, it will be randomly determined whether you are
playing as player A or player B: therefore, half of all participants will be playing as player A
and the other half as player B. The roles remain fixed throughout the course of the experiment.
Your profit in this experiment is calculated in credits with 1 credit = 0.60 Euro. At the end of
the experiment, your income will be converted from credits into Euros and paid to you. Your
final payoff depends on your own and other participants’ decisions. At the end of each period
you will see your own payoff from this period, as well as how much you earned over all periods
up to this point.
In every period player B has exactly one problem: either problem 1 or problem 2. The problem
will again be determined randomly in each period for each player B, independently and with
a fixed probability. [T1: The probability of player B having problem 1 is 50%. Consequently,
the probability of player B having problem 2 is also 50%.] [T2,T3: The probability of player B
having either problem 1 or problem 2 depends on his type: either type 1 or type 2.] Player B’s
type is again randomly determined in each round. The relations are displayed in the following
table:
Player B with... Probability of having Probability of having
Problem 1 Problem 2
Type 1 80 % 20 %
Type 2 20 % 80 %
The table can be read in the following way:
• If you are a player B type 1, your probability of having problem 1 is 80% and the
probability of having problem 2 is 20%.
• If you are a player B type 2, your probability of having problem 1 is 20% and the
probability of having problem 2 is 80%.]
As a player B you will never be informed which problem you actually have. [T2,T3: You
are merely informed about your probability of having either problem 1 or problem 2.]
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General Course of the Experiment
The course for each of the eight periods is identical and summarized in the following:
1. Player A decides which actions she wants to take.
2. Pairs are matched randomly and each player B’s actual problem is determined.
3. Player B decides whether he wants to accept player A’s proposed action.
4. Each player is informed about her/his payoff.
In the following, each stage is explained in detail. Additionally, player A’s and player B’s
payoffs are summarized on the last page of the instructions.
1. Player A’s Action
Player A’s task is to solve player B’s problem through her action. In each round, she can choose
between two distinct actions: action 1 or action 2. The selectable actions for player A depend
on player B’s actual problem in each round:
• If player B has problem 1, player A can choose both action 1 or action 2. Both actions
solve the problem but lead to different costs and earnings for player A and player B.
• If player B has problem 2, player A has to solve this by choosing action 2.
Each action leads to different earnings for player A, which have to be paid by player B (player
B’s payoff will be described later):
• Action 1: Player B pays 5 credits to player A.
• Action 2: Player B pays 8 credits to player A.
In addition, each action causes different costs for player A:
• Action 1 induces costs of 3 credits.
• Action 2 induces costs of 4 credits.
In the beginning of each round, player A decides for each of the six players B, which action
she wants to carry out for each of them. At this time, player A does not know about the player
B with which she will be matched in this round. Consequently, player A decides in advance
how she wants to behave towards each player B in case she will be matched to him. The
position where all player Bs are represented on the screen will be randomly determined in each
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[T1,T2: Player A can observe each player B’s probability of having either problem 1 or problem
2.] [T3: Player A cannot observe players B’s probabilities of having either problem 1 or problem
2. Therefore, player A remains uninformed about whether a specific player B is either type 1
or type 2. However, she knows that a player B’s probability of being either type 1 or type 2
is 50%.] Moreover, player A’s costs and earnings for action 1 and action 2 are shown on the
screen. At the bottom of the screen, player A has to choose which action she wants to carry out
for each player B. For each player B a decision has to be made.
Note that in case player B has problem 2, player A has to carry out action 2. If the player B who
is actually matched to her has problem 2, action 2 will be assigned automatically to this player
A. Therefore, the decision made by player A is only implemented if the matched player B
has problem 1!
2. Matching and Determining Player B’s Problem
After all players A chose their actions for a period, each player B is randomly matched with one
player A. The random matching is carried out in each round.
Subsequently, for each player B it is determined - according to his type and the corresponding
probabilities - whether he has problem 1 or problem 2.
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• If a player B has problem 1, the matched player A’s chosen action is presented to him.
This can be either action 1 or action 2.
• If a player B has problem 2, action 2 is presented to him automatically, since player A
has no choice in this case than to carry out action 2.
Since player B does learn about his actual problem, he cannot infer - in case action 2 was
chosen for him - whether player A chose action 2 or if it was assigned automatically.
3. Player B’s Action
Player B knows whether action 1 or action 2 was chosen for him and learned about the
underlying probabilities of having either problem 1 or problem 2 in this period. However,
he is not informed about his actual problem. Player B now decides whether to accept or reject
the chosen action.
• If player B accepts the action, it will be implemented. Player B receives a payment of
10 credits. These 10 credits are reduced by the amount that player B has to pay to his
matched player A for her action. Player A’s earnings are reduced by the cost of the action.
• If player B rejects the action, both players receive an outside payment. Player A’s
outside payment amounts to 1 credit. The amount of player B’s outside payment depends
on whether he had problem 1 (= 4 credits) or problem 2 (= 1.6 credits) in this period.






A period ends after player B’s decision. At the end of each round...
• each player A is informed which actual problem her matched player B had, which action
she took accordingly and whether this player B accepted or rejected this action.
• each player B is informed which action was chosen for him and whether he accepted or
rejected the action, but not which problem he actually had.
At the end of each period, player A and player B are informed about their payoffs from this
period and how much they have earned over all periods up to this point.
Payoff Summary
The payoffs for player A and player B depend on their choices within the matched pair.
Player A’s payoff for each period:
• If the matched player B accepts the action:
Payoff = earnings from action - costs from action
• If the matched player B rejects the action:
Payoff = outside payment = 1 credit
Player A’s payoffs are summarized in the following table:
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Accepted Action 1 Accepted Action 2 Rejection
Player B has 2 credits 4 credits 1 credit
Problem 1
Player B has - 4 credits 1 credit
Problem 2
Player B’s payoff for each period:
• If the action of the matched player A is accepted:
Payoff = 10 credits - player A’s earnings for the action
• If the action of the matched player A is rejected and player B had problem 1:
Payoff = outside payment = 4 credit
• If the action of the matched player A is rejected and player B had problem 2:
Payoff = outside payment = 1.6 credits
Player B’s payoffs are summarized in the following table:
Accepted Action 1 Accepted Action 2 Rejection
Player B has 5 credits 2 credits 4 credit
Problem 1
Player B has - 2 credits 1.6 credit
Problem 2
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1 Introduction
Expert markets are a constant feature in economic transactions: visiting a doctor or a car
mechanic, taking a cab in a foreign city, engaging financial services or home improvement
contracts are suitable examples. The issue underlying all these interactions is given by
consumers’ uncertainty about the specifics of their demand, being only aware that some service
or good is required. Commonly, consumers are neither able to identify ex ante on their own the
severity of their problem nor ex post - in the case of a solved problem - which service actually
solved it. With consumers lacking the necessary knowledge, they have to visit an expert for
diagnosis and treatment. By contrast, experts can not only identify consumer problems but also
determine and carry out necessary services. This particular kind of information asymmetry
enables fraud, as experts might exploit their informative edge to increase their own monetary
payoff at consumers’ expense. This can result in either inefficiencies or market breakdowns
with consumers anticipating potential fraud and refraining from contracting (Akerlof, 1970;
Dulleck, Kerschbamer, 2006; Dulleck et al., 2011; Emons, 2001; Mimra et al., 2016).
Due to this potential for market failure, markets for expert services are commonly regulated
by entry barriers with specific requirements like completed studies and vocational training. In
most fields, it appears quite easy for consumers to identify someone as actually being an expert.
By contrast, it is much more difficult to identify whether an expert is high or low skilled in
comparison to colleagues. Consider, for instance, ordering a tradesman to estimate the costs for
repairing a washing machine. While I can be expected to identify whether the arriving person
is a mechanic per se, as I interact in a regulated market and called a professional provider, I
cannot easily determine whether he is of high or low skill. In most cases, I am not aware of
his individual talent, years of experience, additional training or specializations, but will only
observe his recommendation for service as the result of his diagnosis. Consequently, without
irrational costs and effort, in a market for expert services, consumers cannot distinguish experts
of different skill, as has been previously outlined, e.g. by Emons (2001), Pesendorfer, Wolinsky
(2003), as well as Feser, Runst (2015).
Experts with different skill sets vary in their ability to diagnose consumer problems. For
example, in a model with second opinions and price competition, Pesendorfer, Wolinsky (2003)
let experts’ skill levels directly determine their ability to recommend an appropriate treatment.
They show that the mechanism of multiple opinions for mitigating the information problem
can solve this only partially and needs additional institutions for full efficiency. In contrast to
them, we argue that the assumption of low skilled experts unanimously providing low quality in
diagnosis does not capture real life circumstances. While it is plausible that there are qualitative
differences in the ability to diagnose, a low skilled expert can also be expected to succeed in
correctly identifying consumer problems if he is willing to invest sufficient effort. Therefore,
rather than high skilled experts always giving correct recommendations and low skilled experts
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always giving wrong ones, a diagnosis’ accuracy should depend on individuals’ willingness to
invest effort in it. Accordingly, a high skilled expert might provide a wrong diagnosis if he only
invests minimal effort, while a low skilled expert who invests a great amount of resources can
give a correct recommendation.
Most of the credence goods literature assumes that experts can determine consumers’ problems
perfectly at no costs (Wolinsky, 1993; Dulleck, Kerschbamer, 2006; Dulleck et al., 2011;
Hyndman, Ozerturk, 2011; Mimra et al., 2016). However, this does not represent real-life
circumstances, as diagnosis is actually costly for experts - at least time consuming. Experts
have to choose how much effort they are willing to invest in their diagnosis: is someone only
interested in faking a genuine diagnosis by presenting a plausible story or is he really concerned
for consumers’ well-being and willing to invest a substantial effort to make a more precise
diagnosis? Due to the credence goods character, consumers are in general unable to determine
experts’ effort levels without irrationally high costs (Emons, 2001; Feser, Runst, 2015), which
results in a moral hazard problem. This might prompt experts to underinvest in diagnosis to
maximize their own utility. This, in turn, would lead to inferior service recommendations based
on guesses rather than real diagnosis.
In this paper, we are primarily concerned with the moral hazard problem of experts in providing
truthful but costly diagnosis, due to the unobservability of their effort choices. We examine a
market with heterogeneous experts regarding their ability to identify problems, while consumers
are able to verify experts’ recommendations through multiple opinions. We extend the
framework of Pesendorfer, Wolinsky (2003) by introducing heterogeneously-qualified experts.
In accordance with Brush et al. (2017) and Norman et al. (2007), we incorporate the notion
that high skilled experts have an edge in diagnosis by being able to identify consumer problems
with less effort than low skilled experts. Our model allows for a more detailed view on experts’
willingness to invest in costly diagnosis, consumers’ willingness for contracting and how this
affects overall welfare. Moreover, it enables us to provide policy implications concerning how
to adapt prices for diagnosis and service to maximize overall welfare in reaction to different
market conditions, i.e. experts’ costs for high effort and transaction costs for consumers to visit
an expert, as well as market composition, i.e. the share of high skilled experts in the market and
their edge in qualification in comparison to low skilled experts. To our best knowledge, there is
no other model that analyzes how qualification levels affect markets for expert services.
To introduce our model, imagine again the aforementioned tradesman scenario. In our model
a consumer is in need of a service, as she notices that she has some issue, whereby she wants
to get her washing machine repaired. However, she is unaware which kind of service would
actually solve her problem. We model the continuum of possible services by b ∈ [0,1]. Let
V > 0 be a consumer’s utility when the problem is solved appropriately, i.e. the service carried
out corresponds to b, and zero otherwise. Experts can identify consumer problems depending
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on their individual skill level and their effort choice. For simplification, let experts be of either
high or low skill and able to only choose between high and low effort. Notice that we do not let
experts decide on their recommendation strategy, implying that whether a recommendation is
correct or not is being determined by an expert’s effort choice and degree of qualification only.
This let us also derive conclusions about experts’ propensity for undertreatment, as in this case
an underprovision of diagnosis due to low effort is driven only by experts having a financial
incentive for it. In order to model high skilled experts’ edge in diagnosis, they have some
probability y ∈ (0,1) of providing a correct diagnosis even with low effort, while low skilled
experts always give a false recommendation in this case. When an expert chooses high effort,
he will always give a correct recommendation irrespective of his skill. However, all experts
have to incur costs c > 0 for high effort.
We assume a market with a finite number of N experts and M consumers. Let a ∈ [0,1] be
the share of high skilled experts in the market, which is common knowledge. Each consumer
is free to visit up to N experts for diagnosis. A visited expert offers a contract comprising
fees for diagnosis and service. Additionally, let s > 0 be the transactions costs that arise for
consumers by contacting an expert. However, we assume that informing oneself about diagnosis
and service costs is free and consumers only have to bear the transaction costs s in case they
actually receive a diagnosis. When a consumer decides to get diagnosed, she automatically
receives a service recommendation conditionally on the visited expert’s effort choice and skill.
Subsequently, the consumer can either buy the corresponding service or get further diagnoses
to potentially confirm her first recommendation. Notice that we assume that experts can only
provide services that they have formerly recommended. This design enables an endogenous
verifiability of diagnosis. With the possibility to search for matching opinions consumers can
verify a recommendation on their own but have to bear higher search costs in this case.
We analyze expert and consumer behavior as well as overall welfare regarding their reactions
to different market compositions, i.e. the share of high skilled experts in the market a, their
degree of qualification y, and market circumstances, i.e. consumer valuation V , transaction
costs s and costs for high-effort choices c. We are particularly interested in experts’ high effort
choices and consumers’ search behavior, as for the latter there is no possibility for a unique
strategy to make all experts choose their mixed strategy due to heterogeneous qualification.
We find that consumers will adapt their search behavior according to market composition, as
they need to search for matching opinions more often to make high skilled experts choose high
effort with a positive probability. However, if a is sufficiently high, there is the possibility
for a second best equilibrium, in which welfare is maximized even without the intervention
of a policy-maker, e.g. by fixing prices for service and diagnosis. By contrast, with a being
relatively low, a stable second best equilibrium requires fixed prices as outlined by Pesendorfer
and Wolinsky before. In sum, the optimal price level for service - and whether a stable second
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best equilibrium is possible - depends on the share of high skilled experts in the market,
their degree of qualification, as well as whether prices are fixed or flexible and the amount of
transactions costs consumers have to bear for diagnoses.
Related Literature
The central aspect in our model is experts’ moral hazard problem to costly but unobservable
diagnosis effort. In a model, where experts compete with discounters, Dulleck, Kerschbamer
(2009) show that the former undertreat consumers to avoid free-riding behavior. Moreover,
Bonroy et al. (2013) find that risk averse experts are less likely to invest in costly diagnosis.
Pesendorfer, Wolinsky (2003) show that only with fixed prices and consumers being able to
receive multiple opinions, a stable second best outcome can be realized where consumers’
welfare is maximized. Furthermore, Bester, Dahm (2017) argue that by introducing
unobservable subjective evaluation of consumers regarding service success, even first-best
outcomes can be achieved by separating diagnosis and treatment. However, as they do not
incorporate transactions costs in their model, this first-best solution needs to be seen as rather
special case.
Additionally, it appears decisive whether consumers can consult more than one expert for
diagnosis. Wolinsky (1993) shows that depending on the costs for visiting multiple experts this
can lead to an overall welfare increase. This is in line with the results of Mimra et al. (2016),
showing that the rate of overtreatment decreases significantly with the possibility of second
opinions. Here, market efficiency increases depending on additional search costs. Nevertheless,
in their experiment the willingness to search for second opinions was significantly lower than
theory had predicted. Mimra et al. (2016) attribute this to consumers might thought that honest
expert types are prevailing in the market or to consumers’ risk aversion. It seems, therefore, that
already the threat of second opinions might lead experts to less fraudulent behavior. However,
Pesendorfer, Wolinsky (2003) show theoretically that the possibility for multiple opinions, in
a market where experts decide on their effort for diagnosis, does not lead to Pareto optimal
outcomes due to incentive incompatibility and transactions costs for consumers.
Another relevant institution in our model is given by price competition. Dulleck et al. (2011)
show when experts compete for consumers through price setting, this drives down overall prices
and increases trade volume. Additionally, in case that experts are liable, price competition has
a positive effect on market efficiency. Mimra et al. (2016) confirm the price reducing effect
and show that price competition significantly drives down experts’ profits, shifting surplus
to consumers. However, with price competition, experts seem to show more willingness for
undertreatment and overcharging.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section two introduces our model. Section
three presents our analysis and discusses our results and section four concludes.
2 Model
Our theoretical model builds closely on Pesendorfer, Wolinsky (2003) which we apply to the
case of heterogeneously qualified experts and a limited number of players.
We assume a finite number of N experts and M identical consumers in the market. In general,
consumers need some service for a problem which can be identified and treated by experts.
However, an expert needs to exert effort for a correct diagnosis. We assume consumers are
unable to observe experts’ actual effort choices, as well as their degree of qualification and
experts do not know a consumer’s history, i.e. whether she has consulted other experts before
her visit. Additionally, we exclude reputation as experts are not identifiable and are contacted
in random order.
Consumers receive a positive payoff V > 0, if they purchase a service b ∈ [0,1] matching
their problem type i ∈ [0,1], otherwise they get a payoff of zero. Since consumers do not
know about their actual type i, they need to consult one or more experts. Each expert offers
a contract (d, p) to consumers with d as the diagnosis costs and p as the costs of service.
Experts provide diagnosis by recommending a service to consumers conditional on their effort
choice. In return, consumers decide whether they are willing to accept the recommendation
which would automatically lead to the execution of the recommended service. Consumers can
consult up to N experts but have to bear transaction costs s for each consulted expert in addition
to diagnosis costs d.
In contrast to Pesendorfer, Wolinsky (2003), we assume experts with varying degrees of
qualification which affect their ability for correct diagnosis. For simplification, we assume
experts are either high or low skilled. Let an expert’s skill type be qt ∈ {0,1} with t ∈ {h, l},
where qh = 1 denotes high skill and ql = 0 denotes low skill. Notice that by introducing
heterogeneous experts in the market, there are two dimensions which can affect market
outcome:
Firstly, there is the magnitude of how much high skilled and low skilled experts differ
in their degree of qualification, i.e. to which extent high skilled experts are better in
diagnosis. For our model, we assume that to diagnose a consumer, experts need to decide
on their effort level e ∈ {0,1} with e = 1 denotes high effort and e = 0 denotes low effort.
High effort always leads to correct recommendations, regardless of the individual level
of qualification. In contrast, low effort always leads to a wrong recommendation, if an
expert is low skilled. If an expert is high skilled he makes a correct diagnosis by low
effort with probability y ∈ (0,1). Consequently, the variable y defines the magnitude of
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the difference in qualification to which we will refer as the degree of qualification in the
following. Moreover, experts do not decide over their recommendation strategy: if an
expert chooses high effort, his recommendation is always correct, i.e. he recommends a
service b = i.
Secondly, there is the share of high skilled and low skilled experts in the market. We
assume a share a ∈ [0,1] of high skilled experts and a share 1−a of low skilled experts.
All experts have to bear costs c > 0 for high effort. For simplification, we assume that low
effort, as well as all services performed are free. All information about market composition
and payoff functions are common knowledge across all players.
The game consists of an infinite number of periods with the following identical course:
1. Each consumer is randomly matched with one of the N experts who proposes a contract
(d, p).
2. Assuming a consumer has visited n ≥ 0 experts so far, she decides whether she will
(i) accept the offered contract and get diagnosed by this expert; (ii) if n ≤ N, visit
another expert; (iii) buy the service from any expert whose diagnosis has been received
previously; (iv) leave the market without purchase and/or diagnosis. With decisions (iii)
and (iv) the game ends.
3. If the contract is accepted, the consumer pays the diagnosis costs d to the expert and also
has to bear the transactions costs s > 0.
4. Each visited expert chooses his diagnostic effort e ∈ {0,1}. We denote the probability of
experts type qt for high diagnostic effort by xt ∈ [0,1].
5. Each consumer receives a recommendation conditionally on her visited expert’s effort
choice and skill
6. Each consumer has to decide how to proceed further (see stage 2).
In sum, a consumer’s expected utility is determined by how many experts she consults for
diagnosis, the offered contracts by experts and whether a potentially bought service matches








V − p−∑nj=1 d j −ns if a = i
−p−∑nj=1 d j −ns if a 6= i
−∑nj=1 d j −ns no purchase
(1)
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In contrast, an expert’s profit function depends on how many consumers consult him for
diagnosis, his effort choices and whether some consumers are buying his service, conditional
his offered contract (d, p). An expert’s expected payoff who is contacted by m consumers with







m(d − ec)+ rp r consumers buy service




Experts cannot observe how many experts a consumer has contacted before. They maximize
their expected profit by choosing their contracts (d, p) as well as their effort level e(t) ∈
{0,1}, conditional on their beliefs of consumers’ searching strategy. According to symmetry,
identically qualified experts will choose the same strategy profile (dt , pt ,εe) with εt being
denoted as the probability for high diagnostic effort xt , conditional on the offered contract
(dt , pt).
Consumers condition their choices on experts’ expected probability to choose high diagnostic
effort xt ∈ [0,1] , the share of high skilled experts in the market a, the degree of qualification of
high skilled experts y, and the offered contracts (dt , pt). Sampling a random expert will give a
consumer a correct recommendation with the following probability
z = xha+(1−a)xl +(1− xh)ay, (3)
where xh,xl ∈ [0,1] determine the probabilities that an expert with high or low qualification
chooses high effort.
Let f ∈ [0,1] be the probability for a consumer to stop after her first recommendation. If f = 1,
her expected payoff is given by
U(z| f = 1) = zV − p− (s+d). (4)
In contrast, with probability 1− f a consumer searches for two matching opinions. Since a
randomly sampled expert makes a correct recommendation with probability z, the expected
duration for a correct diagnosis is given by 1/z. Consequently, the expected duration for two
matching recommendations is 2/z. The underlying search and diagnosis costs for matching
diagnosis are, therefore, 2(s+ d)/z. The expected utility for a consumer, in this case, is given
by
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U(z| f = 0) =V − p−2s+d
z
+θ . (5)
For a consumer to enter the market in the first place, the expected payoff from either (4) or (5)
need to be positive.
Lemma 1: A consumer’s best response to (dt , pt ,xt) will always be one of the following
strategies: (i) quit without any action; (ii) get exactly one diagnosis and purchase its service;
(iii) get diagnosis until two recommendations match and buy the service from one of the two
experts with matching recommendations.
Proof of Lemma 1: see Appendix A.

On the other side, experts have to decide how much effort they are willing to invest in diagnosis.
For their best response, they have to build a belief about consumers’ search behavior. Let B be
an expert’s belief about the probability that a consumer has not been diagnosed by another
expert, conditional on this consumer accepting to be diagnosed by him. When an expert is
consulted and decides for high diagnostic effort, he will get an expected payoff given by




with f B being the probability that a consumer has not contacted another expert before and stops
after the first recommendation and (1− f B) being the probability that a consumer is searching
for matching opinions. We assume that in the latter case, a consumer purchases with probability
1/2 from an expert who provides a correct recommendation, as she has no preferences regarding
the sampling order.
In contrast, if a consulted expert invests low effort for diagnosis by not incurring the costs c, his
expected profit is given by




With low effort, an expert will only sell his service to a consumer if she is either on her
first visit and stops afterwards or with probability y/2, if a consumer searches for matching
recommendations and the expert is high skilled. For a pure best response, experts choose high
effort, i.e. e = 1, when (6) is strictly greater than (7). In case of indifference, any xt ∈ [0,1]
is optimal. Notice that by introducing different degrees of qualification, high skilled experts’
incentive for high diagnostic effort has decreased. This implies that in order to make high skilled
112
experts indifferent between high and low effort, consumers need to search ceteris paribus for
matching opinions more often.
3.1 Equilibria with Fixed Prices
In the first step, we assume prices to be fixed with all experts offering identical contracts
(d, p). According to Pesendorfer, Wolinsky (2003), (d, p,z, f ) is a fixed price equilibrium, if
consumers’ choices for f are optimal given (d, p,z) and experts’ effort decisions xt ∈ [0,1] are
optimal given (d, p, f ) and their beliefs B. We define an equilibrium as perfectly non-degenerate
when all experts choose high diagnostic effort with positive probability, i.e. xh,xl > 0. In
contrast, in a degenerate equilibrium, all experts always opt for low diagnostic effort, i.e.
xh,xl = 0. Furthermore, there can be a partial non-degenerate equilibrium with only low skilled
experts choosing high effort.1 As mentioned before, the expected duration of search depends on
consumers’ applied strategy. With probability f , a consumer stops after her first diagnosis and
buys in which case the duration is one period. In contrast, with probability 1− f , a consumer
searches for matching opinions resulting in a duration of 2/z. Consequently, the expected
duration of search S for consumers is given by
S = f +(1− f ) 2
xha+(1−a)xl +(1− xh)ay
. (8)
For being a Bayesian fixed price equilibrium, B needs to be consistent according to f and z
which is fulfilled, if it equals the inverse of the expected duration of search.
Lemma 2: Experts’ beliefs are consistent with (d, p,z, f ) if and only if
B =
xha+(1−a)xl +(1− xh)ay
f (xha+(1−a)xl +(1− xh)ay)+2(1− f )
=
z
f z+(2(1− f ) . (9)
Proof of Lemma 2: see Pesendorfer, Wolinsky (2003).

For a non-degenerate equilibrium of any kind, experts need to get an expected payoff from high
effort at least equal to low effort, given by
d + f Bp+(1− f B) p
2




From (10) follows that p ≥ 2c(1−qty) needs to be fulfilled for a non-degenerate equilibrium.
Notice that the less often consumers are willing to search for matching recommendations
1As high skilled experts demand higher searching rates for matching opinions to be indifferent in their effort
choice, there is only the possibility for partial non-degenerate equilibrium with low skilled experts choosing xl ∈
]0,1].
113
and/or when experts are higher qualified, the greater needs to be experts’ markup, i.e. the
difference of high effort costs c and service price p, in order to attract them for high effort.
If consumers would always buy after their first recommendation, i.e. f = 1, (10) would not
hold, since in this case f B = 1 and 1− f B = 0. Consequently, for a non-degenerate equilibrium
consumers need to weakly prefer searching for matching opinions, i.e. f < 1. This will only be




≥ zV − p− (s+d). (11)
Three market conditions for a non-degenerate equilibrium follow from (11): (i) z has to lie
within a determined interval, i.e. z ∈ [z,z]; (ii) the costs for diagnosis and the transaction costs
may not exceed a specific threshold s+ d ≤ s ≡ V (3− 2
√
2); (iii) consumers will only search
for matching recommendations, if N ≥ 2
z
.2 Finally, to be willing to choose f < 1, consumers




If experts would always provide correct diagnosis by high effort, consumers would never search
for matching recommendations and, therefore, (10) would not hold. If experts would always
choose low effort, this would be a degenerate equilibrium by definition. For 0 < xt < 1, (10)
must hold with equality, making experts indifferent between high and low effort choice.
d + f Bp+(1− f B) p
2




Solving (13) for f by substituting B we can determine f ∗, making experts indifferent between







Since experts differ in their degree of qualification, i.e. qt ∈ {0,1}, and have a different expected
utilities depending on et , consumers are not able to choose a uniform f making all experts
indifferent at the same time. As noticed before, (14) shows that for making high skilled experts




< 0. Consumers will choose f according to what yields them the highest expected
payoff. Experts will react to consumers’ choice depending on their degree of qualification, i.e.
2For detailed calculations see Appendix B.
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qy, and the fixed ratio of the price for service p and the costs for high effort c. We determine f ∗l
[ f ∗h ] as the search rate which makes low [high] skilled experts indifferent.
It is important to emphasize that in order to establish a mixed strategy equilibrium, experts
need to choose their effort level in accordance to make consumers indifferent between buying
after one recommendation and searching for matching opinions. Otherwise, if consumers
choose a pure strategy while p > 2c, there cannot be a non-degenerate equilibrium. Suppose
consumers would never search for matching opinions. This would make all kind of experts
strictly preferring low effort. As counter, consumers would not enter the market in the first
place, unless there is a very high share of extremely well qualified high skilled experts
that V − p − 2 s+d
z
> 0 which we shelve for the moment. On the other side, if consumers
always search for matching opinions, experts would strictly prefer high effort, as long
as p > 2c/(1 − qty). As reaction, consumers would switch to never search for matching
opinions with the same consequences as before. Consequently, for getting to a non-degenerate
equilibrium, it is necessary that experts choose their effort according to make consumers
indifferent in their search behavior.
Lemma 3: If xh = 0, low skilled experts will balance z that z ∈ [z,z], as long as a(1−y)≤ 1− z
and y ≤ z
a
. If xl = 1, high skilled experts will balance z that z ∈ [z,z], as long as a(1−y)≥ 1−z.
Proof of Lemma 3: From (11) follows that the probability z for getting a correct diagnosis by
sampling a random expert must lie in the determined interval z = xha+(1−a)xl +(1−xh)ay ∈
{z,z}. If, for example, all high skilled experts choose only low effort when f > f ∗h , low skilled
experts in the market will balance the downshift in z, as xh = 0, by increasing their own effort
level. In contrast, high skilled experts will, as well, adapt their effort choice in equilibrium when
all low skilled experts choose only high effort. Consequently, we can define the threshold values
for xt in reaction to a chosen f and x−t by x∗t ∈ [xt ,xt ]. Only if x∗t lies within the defined interval,
a non-degenerate equilibrium is possible. This adaptation will always take place as long as



























Note that xt can only take values between 0 and 1. Consequently, if x
∗
t falls below or exceeds
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this, an adaptation of z to the equilibrium interval z ∈ [z,z] becomes impossible. By extracting
the necessary conditions from (15) and (16), we receive for low skilled expert adaptation
a(1− y)≤ 1− z, (17)
ay ≤ z, (18)
and for high skilled expert adaptation
a(1− y)≥ 1− z, (19)








. In the following, we will refer to these
equations as the adaptation conditions for high and low skilled equilibria, since they need to
be fulfilled in order to make consumers choose their mixed strategy. Conditions (17) and (18)
account for low skilled experts while (19) is required for high skilled ones.3 It follows that the
share a of high skilled experts in the market and their degree of qualification y has opposed
effects on high skilled experts’ ability to adapt their effort choice. While an increase in a
increases the possibility for adaptation, an increase in y decreases it, respectively. In contrast,
for low skilled experts, an increase of a decreases the possibility for adaptation. The effect of y
on low skilled experts adaptation is mixed and depends on its ratio to the other parameters.
If a(1− y)> 1− z, low skilled experts loose their ability for adaptation. With a(1− y)> 1− z,
only high skilled experts will be able to adapt their effort level that z ∈ [z,z]. This implies
that at this point, there are so many high skilled experts in the market that the existing low
skilled experts cannot balance xh = 0 anymore. In return, high skilled experts become able to
balance xl = 1 which changes the possible non-degenerate equilibrium from a partial to a perfect
one. However, it is important to mention that z can take at least two values in equilibrium, i.e.
z ∈ [z,z]. It follows that not the full range of the interval z ∈ [z,z] have to be continuously one
type of equilibrium. If (11) holds, i.e. z ∈ [z,z], there exist some values for y and a that z is a
partial non-degenerate equilibrium and z a perfect non-degenerate equilibrium. Consequently,
there exist a value z = 1 − a(1 − y) where both high and low skilled experts’ condition for
adaptation hold.

Expert’s reaction function, i.e. their probability of choosing high effort in non-degenerate
equilibria, according to f is given by
3Notice that we leave out condition z ≤ 1 for high skilled expert adaptation, as it is always fulfilled.
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xt = 0 if f > f
∗
t
xt ∈ {x∗t ,x∗t } if f = f ∗t 6= 0
xt ∈ [x∗t ,x∗t ] if f = f ∗t = 0




We return to the influence of a and y, as well as which equilibria type will be preferred by
experts or consumers in the welfare section section.
Lemma 4: Depending on the fixed price ratio 2c/p there exist several types of non-degenerate
equilibria with the fixed profile (d, p,z, f ), if N ≥ 2
z
, s + d < s = V (3 − 2
√
2), and
V − p − 2 s+d
z
> 0: (i) With 2c ≤ p, consumers will choose f = f ∗l , if (17) and (18) are
holding, resulting in a partial non-degenerate equilibrium. Low skilled experts will choose
either xl ∈ {x∗l ,x∗l } if p = 2c, or xl ∈ [x∗l ,x∗l ] if p > 2c while high skilled experts always choose
xh = 0; (ii) with 2c/(1− y) ≤ p, if (19) holds, consumers will choose f = f ∗h , resulting in a
perfect non-degenerate equilibrium. There high skilled experts will choose either xh ∈ {x∗h,x∗h}
if p= 2c/(1−y), or xh ∈ [x∗h,x∗h] if p> 2c/(1−y) while low skilled experts always choose xl = 1.
Proof of Lemma 4: See Appendix A.

As outlined by the proof of Lemma 4, the feasibility of non-degenerate equilibria types
depends not only on market composition, outlined by the adaptation conditions, but also on
parameter values, i.e. the ratio of service price and high effort costs in combination with
high skilled experts’ degree of qualification. With an increasing markup for service, a perfect
non-degenerate equilibrium becomes possible. However, with experts always need to adapt
their effort choices according to market composition to keep consumers indifferent, in any
equilibrium the possible interval for z remains constant in high skilled, as well as in low skilled
equilibria and only changes, if V , d and s, change.
3.2 Equilibria with Flexible Prices
In the next step, we turn to equilibria under flexible prices. Experts now have the possibility
to choose their contracts (dt , pt) individually. For being an equilibrium, it is necessary that
all experts choose a strategy profile (dt , pt ,εt), conditional on their consistent belief B, and
consumers adapt a corresponding searching behavior, described by f .
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As before, there is always the possibility for degenerate equilibria, if the defined market
conditions are not fulfilled. In this case, consumers will not enter the market unless ay > 2(s+d)
V−p .
Lemma 5: For the profile (d, p,z, f ) being a non-degenerate flexible price equilibrium, similar
market conditions as for fixed price equilibria must hold, i.e. N ≥ 2
z
, and V − p−2 s+d
z
> 0. All










, and f = f ∗(qt) = 1− 2cp(1−qty)/1+
c(z−2)
p(1−qty) . According to market
composition, there are two possible outcomes: (i) with ay ≤ z and a(1 − y) < 1 − z, there
will be xh = 0, xl = x
∗
l = (z− ay)/(1− a) and f = f ∗l with the possible price range given by
p∈ [2c,V − 2c
z
]. (ii) with a(1−y)≥ 1−z there will be xl = 1, xh = x∗h =(z−1+a(1−y))/(1−a)
and f = f ∗h with the possible price range given by p ∈ [ 2c1−y ,V − 2cz ]
Proof of Lemma 5: Our proof of Lemma 5 is based on Pesendorfer, Wolinsky (2003) and
adapted for our case with heterogeneous experts. However, while we do not replicate every
single calculation in the beginning, the interested reader can find it there. Again, an equilibrium
in pure strategies is not feasible due to the formerly stated reasons. In order to enable a mixed
strategy equilibrium, consumers need to choose f ∈]0,1[. Consequently, (11) needs to hold
with equality, which requires z ∈ {z,z}.
With the introduction of heterogeneous experts, there might be the possibility for experts to
signal their type by different price setting behavior. This could potentially lead to different
equilibrium strategies according to individual qualification, resulting in different prices for
diagnoses or services. However, there will not be competition in diagnosis fee d. There is no
incentive for experts in trying to signal higher qualification by higher prices in diagnosis, as
consumers are not able to verify skill neither ex ante nor ex post. According to 10, experts’
effort decision is independent of d. Low skilled experts, therefore, could always mirror higher
diagnosis prices and cannot be driven to always provide wrong diagnoses, i.e. xl = 0. Using
a standard Bertrand argumentation, d must be zero for all experts because from the moment
on a consumer agrees to being diagnosed, these costs are sunk and non-binding for experts
investment decision, irrespective of their skill. Accordingly, d has no effect on experts’ effort
choice. If d > 0, experts’ would be able to accumulate full market demand on their own
by setting d′ < d, since consumers are unable to differentiate. Therefore, the only feasible
equilibrium outcome with flexible prices is d = 0.
In contrast to the diagnosis fee, the price for service directly affects experts’ effort choices.
However, there is no incentive for any expert to increase a given price p. Recall that
d + f Bp+(1− f B) p
2
− c ≥ d + f Bp+qp(1− f B)y
2
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is necessary in order to attract an expert for high effort. If he increases his price to p′> p, he will
loose all consumers who are looking for matching opinions, as they could buy the same service
cheaper elsewhere. Consequently, there is no incentive for experts of any kind to increase their
price above an established equilibrium level. However, there might be an incentive to undercut
prices for accumulating full demand from consumers who are looking for matching opinions.
For an expert to deviate from a given situation (d = 0, p,z, f ), two conditions need to be fulfilled:
it needs to be profitable for the deviating expert and consumers need to prefer the deviating offer
(d′, p′) as well.
Let a consumer’s difference in expected continuation value for contacting the deviating expert
be given by






V −2(s/z)+ p′− p
V − (s/z)+ p′− p − s−d
′. (21)
For being an equilibrium, consumers must not have an incentive for accepting the deviating
offer. As outlined before, a price deviation with p′ > p is not feasible, as experts would always
choose low effort which makes it unattractive for consumers to follow. However, it might be
profitable for a consumer to follow a price reduction with p′ < p. This depends on whether the
price reduction (over-)compensates a deviating expert’s reduction in high effort. Assuming that
p′ is arbitrarily close to p, we receive
∂
∂ p′





From (22) follows that ∂
∂ p′ ∆(d








]. If z does not lie
within this interval, consumers would strictly prefer a price p′ < p.
According to the equality of (11), z can only take the two roots of the determined interval. As








], only z might be a flexible price





(V + s)2 −8sV ≤ s(3+
√
5). (23)






].5 In sum, given






, there is no incentive for consumers to follow a
deviating expert who offers p′ < p. With consumers restrain from following a price reduction,
there is no incentive for experts to choose p′ 6= p.6
4This derives from the boundary of s in all non-degenerate equilibrium with s ≤ s =V (3−2
√
2).














2), this is fulfilled in every non-degenerate equilibrium.








[, consumers would prefer p′ > p. However, since
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The minimum price for an equilibrium is p = 2c/(1− qty). According to (10), experts would
strictly prefer low effort, if it falls below which would make consumers to stay away from the
market from the beginning. The maximum price for an equilibrium is p = V − 2s/z which
represents the total surplus for consumers who are searching for matching recommendations.
In sum, if there would be only low skilled experts in the market, i.e. a = 0, any price within
p ∈ [2c,V − 2c
z
] could be an equilibrium, depending on the formerly defined conditions.
In a given equilibrium with both high skilled and low skilled experts choosing xt > 0, low
skilled experts might have an incentive fur undercutting an existing price level to accumulate
full demand of consumers who are searching for matching opinions on their own. Imagine there
is an established price p = 2c(1−y) . For high skilled experts, there is no possibility to reduce this
price any further while credibly committing to xh > 0. In contrast, low skilled experts could
undercut this price level while still choosing xl > 0. With p
′ < 2c(1−y) , they would force high
skilled experts to follow the price reduction and, as a consequence, to always choose low effort
which would make them lose all consumers searching for matching opinions. Notice that in
case high skilled experts would not follow the price reduction, they are clearly distinguishable
from low skilled experts with the consequence of being abandoned altogether, since in this case
xh = 0. The only possibility for getting a positive expected payoff would be to follow the price
reduction.
However, as long as conditions (17) and (18) hold, consumers anticipate experts’ adaptation
behavior and choose the partial non-degenerate equilibrium strategy from the beginning, i.e.
f = f ∗l . This implies that the full price range p ∈ [2c,V − 2cz ] is feasible and there is no
possibility for a perfect non-degenerate equilibrium. According to (22), low skilled experts







choose xl = x
∗
l = (z−ay)/(1−a).
If (17) no longer holds, low skilled consumers are no longer able to balance xh = 0.
Consequently, a partial non-degenerate equilibrium becomes impossible. With V − p−2 s+d
z
>
0, consumers strictly prefer a perfect non-degenerate equilibrium. As high skilled experts
will always choose low effort if p < 2c
1−y , the possible price range for equilibrium reduces to
p ∈ [ 2c
1−y ,V − 2cz ]. Again, experts do not have an incentive to undercut a given price as long as






], since consumers would not follow a deviation.

Notice that different price levels are compatible with equilibrium due to consumers’ adaptation
of their search behavior f . As outlined by Pesendorfer, Wolinsky (2003), higher price levels,
we assume services being perfect substitutes, consumers are always buying the service with the cheapest price
and, therefore, would buy at p. This implies that with p′ > p an expert would loose all consumers searching for
matching opinions. Consequently, there is no incentive for experts to offer higher prices.
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which are associated by increased incentives for high effort must be counterbalanced in
equilibrium by lower rates of searching for matching opinions.
3.3 Welfare
In this section, we will analyze welfare implications, depending on formerly determined
equilibria. We will focus on the influence of market composition, i.e. the share a of high skilled
experts in the market and their degree y of qualification, how this influences the possibility for
welfare maximization and its determinants.
The present model does not allow for Pareto optimality. Since search is costly with all
transaction costs being lost, optimality would require consumers to stop and to buy after one
recommendation, as well as experts always choosing high effort. As this is not incentive
compatible by also the introduction of high qualified experts in the market, there is no possibility
for a first best outcome. Instead, we will focus on potential second best outcomes. We define
an equilibrium (d, p,z, f ) as second best, if it maximizes overall welfare under fixed market
composition, i.e. a, y and the proportion of consumers in the market k = M/(M + N), as
well as under fixed market conditions, i.e. c, s and V , in comparison to any other equilibrium
(d′, p′,z′, f ′). Consequently, we assume that only d, p, z and f are endogenous.
In the following, we first analyze consumer and expert welfare separately and how it can be
maximized for certain groups. Afterwards, we show how overall welfare would be maximized,
given market conditions and composition.
Consumer Welfare
In any non-degenerate equilibrium with the profile (d, p,z, f ), consumer welfare is given by




with f = f ∗(qt) = 1− 2cp(1−qty)/1+
c(z−2)
p(1−qty) and z = axh +(1− a)xl +(1− xh)ay ∈ [z,z]. As
long as z ∈ {z,z} and p < V − 2(s + d)/z, consumers are indifferent between any kind of
non-degenerate equilibrium, since (11) holds with equality. Consequently, depending on the
ratio of service price p, costs for high effort c and high skilled expert qualification y, there is
no effect of either y or a on consumer welfare. Notice that this result is independent of the
defined adaptation conditions. As this payoff represents the minimum payoff for consumers in
equilibrium to participate in a given market, we determine it as πc.
For consumers to realize a higher expected payoff than πc, two conditions, among market
conditions for non-degenerate equilibria, need to be fulfilled: (11) needs to hold with strict
inequality enable z ∈]z,z[, and depending on the price ratio for service p, the adaptation
conditions must hold.
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As we have outlined in the former section that only z = z can be a non-degenerate flexible price
equilibrium, there is no possibility for consumers to realize a higher than their minimum payoff
with flexible prices.
Assuming fixed prices, there is the possibility for πc > πc in scenario (ii) and scenario (iv). In
scenario (ii) p = 2c. Assuming adaptation conditions (17) and (18) hold, low skilled experts are
able to balance xh = 0. Moreover, with p = 2c, low skilled experts are indifferent between any




l ], since they get an expected payoff of zero, which enables (11) to hold
with strict inequality, if z ∈]z,z[. As a consequence, consumers will opt for f ∗l = 0 which leads
to π lc > πc, since ∂πc/∂ f < 0.
A similar argumentation holds for scenario (iv), p = 2c
1−y . Assuming a >
1−z
1−y , high skilled
experts can balance xl = 1 and the price level is high enough to attract them for xh > 0.
Moreover, with p = 2c
1−y , high skilled experts are indifferent between any value for xh within
[x∗h,x
∗
h], since they get an expected payoff of zero, which enables (11) again to hold with
strict inequality. As a consequence, consumers will opt for f ∗h = 0 instead of f
∗
l > 0, since
∂πc/∂ f < 0, implying π
h
c > πc.
In sum, assuming a benevolent policy maker, consumers payoff can be increased by setting
prices according to market composition, i.e. the share of high skilled experts a and their degree
of qualification y. This can increase consumer welfare to π lc,π
h
c > πc. Since ∂πc/∂ p < 0,
consumer welfare is maximized with p = 2c/(1−qty).
Expert Welfare
With all experts offering identical contracts (d, p), the probability for an expert for being visited
by a single consumer depends on the total number of experts and consumers in the market and
is given by its ratio M/N. Moreover, notice that the formerly used expert payoffs, i.e. (6)
and (7), were conditional on a consumer accepting his contract. Since consumers accept on
average St contracts, each experts is expected to get consulted for (M/N)St times, receiving the
diagnosis fee d and bearing the potential costs for high effort xtc every time. Consequently, in
any non-degenerate equilibrium with the profile (d, p,z, f ), individual expert welfare depending
on qualification qt is given by
πe(xt ,qt , f ) =
M
N




with f B = f ∗(qt)B = 1/(1+ 2cp(1−qty)−2c), St = f
∗(qt)+2(1− f ∗(qt))/z, N as the total number
of experts and M as the total number of consumers in the market. Since ∂πe/∂ p > 0, experts
welfare strictly increases in p, irrespective of individual qualification. Moreover, with d > c,
expert welfare strictly increases ceteris paribus with consumers consulting more experts on
average, i.e. with an increasing St .
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Assume a situation with a(1− y) ≤ 1− z and ay ≤ z, consumers will choose f = f ∗l , resulting
in xl = x
∗












In contrast, a high skilled expert’s expected payoff amounts to











If low skilled adaptation fails and only high skilled experts are able to adapt with a(1−y)> 1−z
with p′ ≥ 2c
1−y , consumers will choose f = f
∗
h , resulting in xh = x
∗
h and xl = 1. Now, low skilled
experts gain an expected payoff of





















In building the difference, we can analyze which equilibrium gain the higher expected payoff
for experts by assuming identical contracts (d, p = p′). With f ∗(qt)B = 1/(1+ 2cp(1−qty)−2c) we




[∆S(d − (1− x∗l )c)− cx∗l + c
1−2y
1− y ], (30)
with ∆S = Sh − Sl . Whether low skilled experts gain in terms of welfare by a switch to the
high skilled equilibrium depends primarily on the ratio of d and c, as well as on the absolute
value of y. Since ∆S > 0 as long as y > 0, low skilled expert welfare strictly increases by an
equilibrium switch, as long as d > c and y < 0.5. Under these circumstances, this increase
stems from additional gains by higher income from diagnosis fees and a higher probability
for selling services to consumers searching for matching recommendations, outperforming the
increase in high effort costs and the decrease in selling services to consumers being on their
first visit. With d > c, low skilled consumers are strictly worse off by an increase in y, since
∂∆S/∂y < 0 and the fraction of the equation also decreases in y.










Whether high skilled experts gain in welfare by a switch to the high skilled equilibrium is also
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primarily determined by the ratio of d and c and the absolute value of y. It is quite surprising
that they strictly lose welfare by an increasing degree of qualification, since both ∆S and the
last term of the equation decreases in y. It can be easily seen that the additional gains due to
their higher qualification y happen in both kind of equilibria with (1− f ∗(q)B)p/2. However,
with increasing y the term (1− f ∗h )px∗h(1− y)/2 decreases which implies a reduction for high
skilled experts in the high skilled equilibrium. Consequently, with d being relatively low and
high skilled experts are well qualified, i.e. with y being relatively high, high skilled experts
prefer the low skilled equilibrium.
Overall Welfare
In former sections, we have outlined how the separate welfare of consumers and experts are
affected by various factors and whether they gain or lose by a switch to the high skilled
equilibrium. Since, so far, it remains questionable how societies welfare can be maximized
in our setting and whether an equilibrium switch would be worthwhile, we analyze how overall
welfare reacts to changes in the setting. We assume that there is a share k = M
M+N of consumers
and a share 1− k = N
M+N of experts in the market. Therefore, overall welfare, as a combination
of consumer and expert welfare, is given by





[Se(d − c(axh +(1−a)xl)+ f Bp+
2
z
(1− f B) pz
2
]. (33)
The first line of the equation is determined by consumer welfare. Its relative influence is
given by the share of consumers in the market k. The second line is given by expert welfare.
However, notice that expert welfare is directly determined by how many experts are consulted
by consumers, which is displayed by the term M/N. As outlined in the section for expert
welfare, each consumers consults on average St experts for a recommendation. Moreover,
from Lemma 1 follows that each consumer will buy exactly one service in case she enters
the market. Consequently, each experts sells on average M/N services with the individual
probability depending on f ,xt and y. Since in case a consumer searches for matching opinions,
she will visit in sum 2/z experts who have on average the probability (1− f B)z/2 for selling a
service.
In equilibrium, f = f ∗(qt), f B = f ∗(q)B = 1/(1 + 2cp(1−qy)−2c) and axh + (1 − a)xl + (1 −
xh)ay = z ∈ {z,z}. Moreover, note that (1− k)MSt/N = kSt and St = f ∗(qt)+(1− f ∗(qt))2/z.
Accordingly, we receive the following equilibrium outcome for overall welfare
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π( f ∗,z,a,y,k) = k[ f ∗q (zV − s− c(z− (1− xh)ay) (34)






Overall welfare in equilibrium depends on the endogenous factors z and f ∗(qt), which are
determined in equilibrium by offered contracts (d, p), as well as by market composition, i.e.
k, a and y. While the former variables are influenced within a given equilibrium, the market
composition factors are assumed to be external and only amendable in the long run.
We investigate how the possible range for z is determined in equilibrium and how it affects
overall welfare. In every non-degenerate equilibrium, z is determined by the values of V , d
and s only. In contrast to the transaction costs s and the valuation for consumers of a solved
problem V which directly affect overall welfare, d is welfare neutral but affects whether experts
will become better off by a change to a high skilled equilibrium. However, with decreasing
d, the possible range for z ∈ [z,z] increases. Consequently, when overall welfare should be
maximized, independently whether z has a positive or negative effect, d needs to be minimized.
We now analyze how z affects overall welfare. Since in all non-degenerate equilibrium with
f ∗(qt)> 0, z which will be determined only by market conditions, i.e. d, V and s. Consequently,








By inserting f = f ∗(qt)= (p(1−qty)−2c)/(p(1−qty)+(z−2)c) and solving for p, we receive





Notice that in a market with only few and/or relatively lowly qualified high skilled experts, i.e.
with ay < s/c(1− xh), (37) always holds, since p ≥ 2c/(1−qty).
However, independently of whether an increase in z increases or decreases overall welfare,
the only choice for d, in order to maximize welfare, is given by z(d = 0), since a decrease in
d strictly widens the interval for z in any non-degenerate equilibrium. Depending on market
composition, either z(0) or z(0) will maximize overall welfare.
In the next step, we now turn to the optimal value for f ∗q . In every non-degenerate equilibrium,
the possible values for f ∗(qt) are determined by p, c, y and z. We have already shown that in
all welfare maximizing states z ∈ [z(0),z(0)]. This implies that (11) needs to hold with equality.
Since d = 0, we get
125
zV − p− s =V − p− 2s
z
. (38)
By using (34) and (38), we get the following inequality equation as condition for ∂π/∂ f > 0









This corresponds to the second adaptation condition for low skilled equilibria. Consequently, as
long as ay < z, which is given in all non-degenerate low skilled equilibria, there is ∂π/∂ f > 0.
However, if the relative amount of high skilled experts, as well as their qualification increases
above the defined threshold, this relationship turns to ∂π/∂ f < 0 but cannot be a low skilled
equilibrium anymore.
According to Lemma 3, in a non-degenerate equilibrium the probability for consumers to stop
and purchase after their first recommendation f ∗(qt) is given by (14) which increases strictly in
p. Consequently, in every welfare maximizing equilibrium, p needs to be either p= 2c/(1−qy)
or p = zV − (d + s) in order to maximize or minimize f ∗(qt). With an increasing price in
service, it becomes more attractive for experts to invest high effort which, furthermore, increases
consumers’ tendency to stop after their first visit.
According to (40), in every low skilled welfare maximizing equilibrium, it is necessary that
p = zV − (d + s) and d = 0, which results in
f ∗l =
z(0)V − s−2c
z(0)V − s+ c(z(0)−2) . (41)
In a corresponding high skilled equilibrium, we receive either p = 2c/(1−qy) with f ∗h = 0 or
p = zV − (d + s) with
f ∗h =
(1− y)(z(0)V − s)−2c
(1− y)(z(0)V − s)+ c(z(0)−2) . (42)
Proposition 1: If (d, p,z, f ) is second best, then z ∈ {z,z} and d = 0. According to market
composition, there are the following possible second best equilibria (SBE):
(i) if p > p∗, a(1− y)≤ 1− z and ay < z, (0, p,z(0), f ∗l );
(ii) if p > p∗, ay < z/(1− x∗h) and a(1− y)≥ 1− z, (0, p,z(0), f ∗h );
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(iii) if p < p∗, ay > z/(1− x∗h) and a(1− y)≥ 1− z, (0, p,z(0), f ∗h ).
Proof of Proposition 1: See Appendix C.
SBE (i) is feasible with adaptation conditions for a low skilled equilibrium holding, while SBE
(ii) and (iii) correspond to high skilled equilibria. Whether and which SBE is actually feasible
will be determined by market composition, as well as market conditions. For a social planer to
maximize welfare by intervention, for example by stipulating some price level for services, it is
essential to know about the market. As long as such a social planer is assumed to be only able to
determine price levels for diagnosis d and service p, to maximize welfare she needs to apply to
the outlined SBE conditions. Notice that according to the dependence of p∗, which determines
the optimal level for z in any SBE, on z itself, there is the possibility that a given market can
reach two different kinds of SBE, with either z or z. In the next step, we investigate whether the
outlined SBEs are stable.
According to Pesendorfer, Wolinsky (2003), in any given equilibrium (d, p,z, f ) with p > p∗,
the level z for consumers to receive a correct diagnosis cannot hold with flexible prices, since
experts have an incentive to deviate to a lower price or reduce their effort level. Assuming
a service price p = 2c/(1 − y), with flexible prices, z must get reduced to prevent price
undercutting and cannot be second best. We do not replicate their full discussion, as the
interested reader can find it there. However, they conclude due to this reduction in effort levels
in a non-degenerate flexible price equilibrium, that price regulation might be beneficial in order
to achieve SBE (i).
In a market with only low skilled experts, i.e. a,y = 0, there is only one potential SBE. As we
introduced high skilled experts in the model, the variety for possible SBE increases to three.
Nevertheless, the argumentation of Pesendorfer, Wolinsky (2003) regarding the instability of
any flexible price equilibrium with p > p∗ and z still holds. Consequently, only SBE (iii) might
be stable in this case.
In any SBE d = 0 and, therefore, s needs to be relatively large in SBE (iii), as otherwise z
becomes close to zero which would make the possibility for a high skilled equilibrium, i.e.
f = f ∗h with xh = x
∗
h and xl = 1, more improbable. We have outlined that in any non-degenerate






]. In contrast, with fixed prices, s ≤ V (3−
2
√






. This implies that a market with flexible prices, needs a greater share a of
high skilled experts for being an equilibrium with (0, p,z(0), f ∗h ), as otherwise an adaptation
of high skilled experts is not possible. Moreover, since z is relatively small, the condition
regarding the necessary number of experts in the market to enable an equilibrium N > 2/z
increases. Consequently, SBE (iii) is only feasible in markets with relatively large transaction
costs and a relatively large number of contactable experts.
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In SBE (iii) p equals the minimum price p = 2c/(1 − y) for a non-degenerate high skilled
equilibrium. This implies that experts will make zero profits and all generated welfare is shifted
to consumers. Moreover, f = f ∗h = 0 implies that consumers will always search for matching
opinions. Referring to Pesendorfer, Wolinsky (2003), this small probability z results in high
costs to verify an expert’s recommendation. This makes it less attractive for consumers to
accept an expert’s offer who deviates from equilibrium price. As we have outlined in 3.2, with






, a non-degenerate equilibrium is possible which also would be second
best to our definition. However, notice that from (19) follows that in markets with relatively
low transaction costs, the possibility for a stable SBE becomes the more improbable the more z
approaches to zero and the higher qualified high skilled experts are.
4 Conclusion
Even though there is a broad literature on credence goods markets, analysis with experts
having to invest in costly diagnosis to identify consumers’ problems are rare. In such markets,
consumers are neither able to observe effort decisions nor whether an expert is high or low
skilled, which results in a moral hazard problem. Instead of assuming a homogeneous level
of qualification, in reality there are considerable differences in skills among experts of any
given field. While Pesendorfer, Wolinsky (2003) assume low skilled experts to always deliver
an incorrect diagnosis, we argued that this will depend on their willingness to invest effort in
their diagnosis. High skilled experts’ advantage, therefore, only consists in being able to carry
out diagnosis with less effort but not having monopoly power for correct diagnosis. For this
reason, we introduce heterogeneous experts into the model of Pesendorfer, Wolinsky (2003)
where consumers can visit multiple experts to verify recommendations. For simplification, we
assume experts being either high or low skilled. We model this by high skilled experts having
some probability to identify consumer problems even with low effort while low skilled experts
always give a false recommendation in this case.
Our results show that second best equilibria are possible in the presence of high skilled experts,
even with flexible prices. However, for such an equilibrium being stable requires special market
circumstances, whereby transaction costs for consumers must lie under a specific threshold.
Additionally, the share of high skilled experts needs to be relatively large and their edge in
qualification relatively low. If these conditions are not fulfilled, it might be worthwhile for
policy-makers to intervene by fixing service prices to increase overall welfare. According
to our results, there might be an incentive for policy makers to regulate service prices in
markets with only few or rather extremely heterogeneously qualified experts. However, if
one drops the assumption that market composition cannot be influenced externally, there can
be an incentive to regulate the share of high skilled experts. As not only the possibility of
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SBEs but of any non-degenerate equilibrium in general depends on consumers’ transactions
costs not exceeding the given threshold, market breakdowns might be prevented by reducing
consumers’ costs for visiting an expert. However, in any second best equilibrium, all welfare
surplus is either accumulated completely with consumers or with experts, which might make
welfare maximization complicated.
Even though our model incorporates many dimension regarding market conditions and market
composition, it has some open space for further research. Our assumption that there is always
only one service which yields consumers a positive payoff is quite strict. It appears much more
realistic that consumers value undertreatment and overtreatment differently, as the latter actually
solves their problem. However, while this would make the model more complicated, it would
not change its form in general (Pesendorfer, Wolinsky, 2003). Moreover, in a next step, it would
be interesting to drop the assumption that market composition cannot be influenced externally.
While this would be accompanied by introducing some costs for qualifying experts, it might be
worth this investment with regard to the potential gains in overall welfare by enabling a SBE.
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Appendix A - Proof of Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 1:
Since s + d > 0, receiving recommendation(s) without purchase cannot be optimal for a
consumer. This implies, to enter the market she must get a positive expected utility from
purchasing, which is only possible with buying a service based on a correct diagnosis.
Moreover, it cannot be optimal for consumers to continue searching after having received two
matching recommendations, since searching is costly and matching recommendations reveal a
correct diagnosis.7
By adapting the proof of Pesendorfer, Wolinsky (2003), we show that stopping and purchasing
after two or more non-matching recommendations cannot be optimal.
Suppose a consumer has contacted 2 ≤ n < N experts who gave all different recommendations.
Let φ(n) be the probability that exactly one randomly drawn recommendation out of these n
resembles the correct diagnosis.
φ(n) =
(1− z)n−1z
(1− z)n +n(1− z)n−1z =
z
1+(n−1)z .
Let τ(n) be the probability that the next recommendation, i.e. the (n+1)-st, will match one of




While still assuming this consumer has contacted n experts who gave distinct recommendations,
to continue searching for matching opinions she needs her expected continuation value W n to
be at least equal her outside option, i.e. W n ≥ −∑nj=1 d j − ns. Since she can always decide to
buy from the last contacted expert, continuation in searching also requires
W n ≥ zV − p− (s+d),
For being a best response, a consumer needs to maximize W n. This maximization problem
stems from consumers always having the choice to (i) leave the market without purchase; (ii)
buy a service based on any former recommendation; (iii) get a new recommendation if n < N.
Consequently, assuming n < N, consumers face the following maximization problem




d j −ns,φ(n)V − p,−(s+d)+(1− τ(n))W n+1 + τ(n)(V − p)},
As consumers’ outside option shrinks by the number of contacted experts, it decreases in n.
Consequently, if a consumer’s expected profit by entering the market is positive with n = 0
contacted experts, it could never be optimal to leave the market for the outside option after
n > 0 consulted experts.
If a consumer decides for getting another recommendation, she will receive matching ones with
probability τ(n) and will buy the service from one of the two experts. With probability 1−τ(n)
she gets another recommendation.
7Due to extreme improbability of matching wrong signals we exclude this case from analysis.
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Assuming it would be optimal if she buys the service in n + 1 while still having different
recommendations only, her expected utility would be
W n+1 = φ(n+1)V − p.
Inserting this into the former maximization problem gives









di −ns,φ(n)V − p,−(s+d)+V z− p}
According to the assumption φ(n+1)V − p =W n+1 ≥ max{−∑ni=1 di−ns,−(s+d)+V z− p}.
Since φ(n) is decreasing in n, we get




di −ns,−(s+d)+V z− p}.
This reveals that it would be optimal to buy after n distinct recommendations instead after n+1.
Consequently, it could never be optimal for a consumer to purchase after two or more different
recommendations.
In contrast to Pesendorfer, Wolinsky (2003), we introduced a limited number of N experts in the
market. This might change consumers’ behavior as they are no longer able to search infinitely
long for matching recommendations. If a consumer has consulted n = N experts and received
distinct recommendation only, she is not able to continue searching for matching opinions. In
this case, she has to decide whether to purchase a service from any formerly visited expert or
leave the market without purchase. In this case, a consumer’s maximization problem becomes




di −ns,φ(n)V − p}
Setting outcomes equal, we receive a critical threshold for z, given by
z∗ =
p−n(s+d)
V − (n−1)[p−n(s+d)] .
In maximizing her welfare, a consumer will opt for purchasing from a random expert if
n = N and z > z∗. Otherwise she will choose to leave the market without purchase. However,
ending up with n = N distinct recommendations cannot be optimal, as not only the outside
option decreases in n but it would have been better to purchase the service from any of the
n − 1 consulted expert before as well. Consequently, ending up with n = N non-matching
recommendations cannot be an equilibrium. A consumer will only opt to search for matching
opinions if its expected duration 2
z
does not exceed the available number of N experts in the
market.
In sum, if consumers decide to enter the market, they will...
• never leave the market without purchase if n < N;
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• never stop and buy after receiving different recommendations only, if n < N or z < zcrit ;
• either stop after the first recommendation with purchasing;
• or search until two recommendation coincide and then purchase;
• will leave without purchasing, if they have received n = N distinct recommendations and
z < z∗ = p−n(s+d)
V−(n−1)[p−n(s+d)] .
Proof of Lemma 4:
As outlined before, feasibility of non-degenerate equilibria and their kind depend on parameter
values p, c, a and y. We, therefore, have to define the following scenarios where we assume
that the market conditions for non-degenerate equilibria are fulfilled.
(i) Scenario (i)
p < 2c →
{
xh,xl = 0
In scenario (i), there is no possibility for a non-degenerate equilibrium of any kind,
since the fixed price for service is too low in comparison to high effort costs. Even if
consumers are searching for matching opinions all the time, they cannot make any kind
of experts willing to choose high effort, since (10) is not fulfilled. Consequently, there
will be a degenerate fixed price equilibrium in which all experts would always choose
low effort and consumers do not enter the market. However, if there is a substantial high
share of very well qualified experts in the market, consumers are willing to enter the
market by searching for matching opinions, i.e. if ay > 2(s+d)
V−p . This does not change
experts effort choice, though.
(ii) Scenario (ii)
2c = p < 2c/(1− y)→
{
xl ∈ [x∗l ,x∗l ],xh = 0 if f = f ∗l = 0 > f ∗h
xh,xl = 0 if f > 0
In scenario (ii), consumers prefer to make low skilled experts indifferent between high
and low effort by always searching for matching opinions, i.e. f = f ∗l = 0. In this case,
any solution for xl within the defined interval that xl ∈ [x∗l ,x∗l ] is possible. Since f > 0
would lead to all experts choosing low effort, consumers strictly prefer to search for
matching opinions as long as V − p−2 s+d
z
> 0. However, if adaptation conditions (17)
and (18) for low skilled experts are not fulfilled, xl ∈ [x∗l ,x∗l ] is not feasible and there will
be a degenerate equilibrium.
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(iii) Scenario (iii)
2c < p < 2c/(1− y)→
{
xl ∈ {xl,xl},xh = 0 if f = f ∗l > f ∗h
xh,xl = 0 if f > f
∗
l
In scenario (iii), there is a great difference between low skilled and high skilled experts
in their ability for diagnosis, i.e. y is relatively large. This implies that even while
consumers can make low skilled experts indifferent between high and low effort, there is
no possibility to achieve a perfect non-degenerate equilibrium, as high skilled experts will
never choose high effort. For consumers choosing a mixed strategy with f = f ∗l ∈ ]0,1[ ,
(11) must hold with equality. Therefore, in equilibrium xl can take only the extreme
values of the determined interval {x∗l ,x∗l } with adaptation conditions for low skilled
experts holding. With V − p− 2 s+d
z
> 0, consumers will opt for f = f ∗l leading to a
partial non-degenerate equilibrium with low skilled experts choosing xl ∈ {x∗l ,x∗l } and
high skilled experts choosing xh = 0.
(iv) Scenario (iv)




xh ∈ [xh,xh],xl = 1 if f = f ∗h = 0 < f ∗l
xl ∈ {xl,xl},xh = 0 if f = f ∗l > f ∗h





In scenario (iv), the difference in qualification between high and low skilled experts
in comparison to relative price p/2c is less extreme than in scenario (iii). Depending
on adaptation conditions, consumers will choose either f = f ∗h = 0 or f = f
∗
l ∈]0,1[.
In the former case, consumers search for matching opinions all the time, making
high skilled experts indifferent between high and low effort and low skilled experts
strictly preferring high effort. In the latter case, consumers play heir mixed strategy
which makes high skilled experts to always choose low effort. In contrast, low skilled
experts become indifferent between high and low effort, which would result in the same
outcome as in scenario (iii). With V − p − 2 s+d
z
> 0, consumers strictly prefer any
kind of non-degenerate equilibrium to a degenerate one. Notice that in the case that
all adaptation conditions hold, consumers can choose freely between a partial and a
perfect non-degenerate equilibrium. We show in the welfare section, that consumers
prefer equilibria with f = f (q)∗ = 0, since their welfare decreases in f . Consequently,
consumers will opt for the perfect non-degenerate equilibrium in this scenario, if they
can choose freely.
(v) Scenario (v)













xh ∈ {xh,xh},xl = 1 if f = f ∗h < f ∗l
xl ∈ {xl,xl},xh = 0 if f = f ∗l > f ∗h






In scenario (v), consumers are confronted with the same choices as in scenario (iv).
However, note that in this scenario there is no possibility for an equilibrium with
f = f (q)∗ = 0. Again, consumers will adapt their behavior according to adaptation
conditions. If all holds, they will opt for the equilibrium with the lower f , which will be
a perfect non-degenerate equilibrium.
Appendix B - Further Calculations
Proof of conditions for non-degenerate equilibrium:
(i) Solving (11) reveals the possible values for z ∈ {z,z}
V − p−2s+d
z
= zV − p− (s+d)












V +d + s
2V
.












Since z ∈ [0,1], the only feasible solution is z∗ = 2−
√
2.













Appendix C - Proof of Proposition 1
For any situation (d, p,z, f ) being an equilibrium, all formerly defined market conditions need
to be fulfilled. For an equilibrium to be a SBE, it needs to maximize overall welfare, given the
market conditions, i.e. V , c and s, as well as given the market composition, i.e. a, y and k. It
has been outlined that in any SBE z ∈ {z,z} which requires d = 0. Moreover, f = f ∗q ∈ { f ∗q , f ∗q }
which requires that p ∈ {p, p}.
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With adaptation conditions holding for low a low skilled equilibrium, given p = p and f ∗l = f
∗
l ,
the necessary value for z to make the situation a SBE, is determined by whether p > p∗. If
p = p, it follows that c ≤ p/2c = (zV − s)/2. From (37) follows that for p < p∗, it is necessary















Since in any equilibrium, s = zV (1−z)
2−z , there is no z which fulfills the condition. Consequently,
p < p∗ cannot be a low skilled equilibrium. However, with p > p∗ there is a potential low
skilled SBE given by (0, p,z(0), f ∗l )
By a switch to a high skilled equilibrium, p∗ increases. This enables an equilibrium with
p < p∗ while f = f ∗h which requires a(1 − y) ≥ 1 − z. Consequently, (0, p,z(0), f ∗h ) with
p < p∗, ay > z/(1− x∗h) and a(1− y)≥ 1− z is a possible high skilled SBE.
Assume a potential high skilled equilibrium with p > p∗, ay > z/(1− x∗h) and a(1− y)≥ 1− z.
If this SBE is possible, it would result in (0, p,z(0), f ∗h ). However, if a(1− y) ≥ 1− z and
ay > z/(1− x∗h), this requires that there exist an y = y∗ with
y∗ =
z
(1− z)(1− x∗h)− z
.
Notice that by assuming a = (1− z)/(1−y), this implies x∗h = 0 according to (16). With x∗h = 0
it follows that y∗ = z. Therefore, in order to be an equilibrium, this requires y > z. However,
as simultaneously a ≥ (1− z)/(1− y) this leads to a contradiction, since a ≤ 1. Consequently,
(0, p,z(0), f ∗h ) cannot be an equilibrium.
Next, assume the potential high skilled SBE (0, p,z(0), f ∗h ). If this is possible, it follows from
(37) that
z < z∗ =
2c(c(1− xh)ay− s)
(V − c)(p(1− y)−2c) .
Since p = p > 2c/(1− y), for z < z∗ it is necessary that c(1− xh)ay− s ≥ 0. Moreover, it
requires that p ≤ p ≤ p. With ∂ p/∂ s > 0, it requires that p ≤ p at least if s = s =V (3−2
√
2),
which is the maximum amount for s in any equilibrium.8 With s = s, the former condition for
z < z∗ becomes c ≥ s/(ay(1− xh). Inserting this into p ≤ p gives






which is more restrictive than in the fixed















≤ (1− y)ay(1− xh).








> 1 which results in a contradiction, as (1− y)ay(1− xh) ≤ 1. Consequently,
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1 Introduction
Markets for credence goods - commonly referred to as markets for expert services - are
characterized by information asymmetries between consumers and experts. Consumers are
only aware of having a problem but cannot determine the exact kind and service that would
be optimal for a solution. They have to contact experts for advice, who are typically better
informed and can both diagnose consumer problems and carry out necessary services. The most
common examples are given by markets for health care, automobile repair, legal and financial
services, as well as home improvements. The exception for credence goods - in contrast
to search and experience goods - is given by information asymmetries even persisting after
trade has taken place, implying that consumers cannot determine whether the received service
was optimal even if their problem has been solved (Darby, Karni, 1973). These information
asymmetries lead to incentive problems which can result in welfare losses and potential market
breakdowns (Akerlof, 1970). According to the literature, we assume that these problems remain
unaffected or are even amplified by expert qualification and price competition, branding them
as Sisyphean tasks (Pesendorfer, Wolinsky, 2003; Schneider, Bizer, 2017). According to the
everyday practiced and demanded qualification in professional life as well as the immanent
importance of credence goods markets (Bester, Dahm, 2017; Kerschbamer, Sutter, 2017) and
rare empirical evidence, an analysis of potential side effects of expert qualification appears
immanent.
The main body of literature on credence goods focuses on exploitation by experts providing
suboptimal treatments enabled by their sole ability to identify consumer problems, while
missing out the moral hazard problem in the diagnosis stage. It is mainly assumed that experts
are able to identify consumer problems with certainty at no costs, e.g. (Wolinsky, 1993; Dulleck,
Kerschbamer, 2006; Dulleck et al., 2011; Hyndman, Ozerturk, 2011; Mimra et al., 2016a;
Schneider et al., 2016). However, (Akerlof, 1970) has already highlighted in his ’market for
lemons’ that sellers need to invest some effort to identify the quality of an owned car, e.g. by
possessing and using it. In case experts do not invest sufficient effort in their diagnosis, this
endangers consumers being undertreated. There is a moral hazard problem because experts’
invested effort is not observable for consumers. Imagine that a physician needs to diagnose the
type and severity of a patient’s illness. He has to decide how much time and which diagnostic
tools or procedures he wants to apply. While the patient may have some indication about
the physician’s intentions according to his conduct, she will struggle to identify whether the
invested effort is appropriate for a corresponding diagnosis, given her individual situation and
the physician’s abilities and attributes. Trying to solve this dilemma by allowing patients to visit
multiple physicians for diagnosis - e.g. (Pesendorfer, Wolinsky, 2003; Mimra et al., 2016b) -
the problem prevails for two factors: first, the physician’s invested effort is not observable to
its full extent, e.g. the patient cannot identify how much time their physician actually spends
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on interpreting results after examination; second, even if effort were perfectly observable, the
patient could not estimate whether the invested amount is appropriate to diagnose her problem
sufficiently (Emons, 2001). She could only compare the invested amount of different physicians
and evaluate the likely quality of diagnoses accordingly. However, this would not enable her
to determine neither the optimal nor the necessary amount of effort to identify her problem.
Regarding the information asymmetry, the optimal amount of effort for a diagnosis remains
unknown to consumers even with multiple visits. This might be reinforced by physicians
not being homogeneous, e.g. regarding their social preferences (Kerschbamer et al., 2017),
diagnostic ability or their capacities, which makes the optimal amount of effort to diagnose a
problem vary across physicians (Emons, 2001; Schneider, Bizer, 2017). Furthermore, additional
qualification seems also not appropriate to solve the dilemma but is rather a Sisyphean task. We
suspect that more qualified experts will reduce their effort in diagnosis, as they rely on their
additional expertise and maximize their own welfare by reducing their investments. The results
from Schneider (2012) in a field experiment with car mechanics point in the same direction, as
he cannot identify an influence of age or acquiring a certification on the repair quality. Assuming
that qualification is costly for society, qualification and certification programs might be in sum
a waste of resources.
With experts’ moral hazard problem in diagnosis, they might have incentives to under-invest
for maximizing their own welfare. In a model where experts have restricted capacities,
(Emons, 2001) show that full observability leads to an efficient outcome but market breakdowns
otherwise. However, his results crucially depend on the absence of variable costs once capacity
is chosen by experts. By contrast, in a market where consumers can visit multiple experts
who have to invest in costly but unobservable diagnostic effort to identify consumer problems,
Pesendorfer, Wolinsky (2003) show that welfare-maximizing states need additional institutions,
i.e. fixed prices. Dulleck, Kerschbamer (2009) investigate a two-sided incentive problem
when experts have a moral hazard problem in diagnosis and consumers can free-ride on this
information by buying the required service from a discounter. They show that contingent
diagnostic fees - i.e. reducing diagnostic costs in case the service is bought from the same
expert - can solve the dilemma. Bonroy et al. (2013) show that experts’ willingness to invest
in costly diagnosis decreases with risk averse consumers but can be fixed by liability clause.
However, all of these studies do not cover the topic of heterogeneously qualified experts in
the market. In Schneider, Bizer (2017), we extend the framework of Pesendorfer, Wolinsky
(2003) by introducing heterogeneously-qualified experts in their ability to diagnose consumer
problems. We find that in case the share of high-skilled experts in the market is sufficiently
high second-best equilibria are possible even with flexible prices and do not need additional
institutions.
To our best knowledge, we are the first to introduce an experimental design to investigate
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experts’ moral hazard problem from costly but unobservable diagnostic effort in a market for
credence goods. Our main focus lies on how a varying share of high-skilled experts - who
need to invest less effort to diagnose consumers (Brush et al., 2017; Norman et al., 2007) -
and price competition affect economic outcome. We are particularly interested in the effect
on experts’ investments in diagnosis, consumers’ willingness to contract and overall market
efficiency. With experts’ invested effort being unobservable to consumers, experts might have
a financial incentive to under-treat consumers in diagnosis. For simplification, we assume that
experts have the choice to invest either high or low effort in their diagnosis. With high effort, all
experts unanimously provide a correct diagnosis. We further assume that experts are either high
or low skilled, with high-skilled experts having some positive probability to provide a correct
diagnosis even with low effort, while low-skilled experts will strictly provide wrong diagnoses
in this case.
Our experiment builds closely on the designs of Dulleck et al. (2011), Mimra et al. (2016b)
and Mimra et al. (2016a). However, rather than restricting possible services to only two levels
- as in common credence goods model based on Wolinsky (1993) - we allow for a broader
range. Additionally, by letting consumers search for matching opinions, we allow them to
verify received recommendations endogenously. Outlined by Schneider, Bizer (2017), such a
game has multiple equilibria. Besides the pure strategy degenerate equilibrium with consumers
leaving the market without any action and no trade taking place, mixed strategy non-degenerate
equilibria are possible in which consumers search for matching opinions and experts invest
in high effort, both with some positive probability. To investigate how varying shares of
high-skilled experts as well as price competition affect economic outcome, we use a classic
2x2 design. Notice that we keep the advantage of high-skilled experts in providing a correct
recommendation constant by having a 50% probability of providing a correct diagnosis even
with low effort. Consequently, we focus on the effects of different market compositions and
their interactions with competition. In Low treatments we implement a relatively low share of
high-skilled experts in contrast to a relatively high share in High treatments. Moreover, in Fix
treatments, the price for diagnosis and service is given while in Flex treatments, this can be
chosen freely by experts in each period.
We find experts adapting their investment decisions to their individual skills, although
qualification is not necessarily a Sisyphean task. It appears that markets for credence goods
with experts having a moral hazard problem in providing truthful diagnoses are more efficient
than theory predicts. Experts invest on average more in their diagnosis, which increases the
probability of consumers to get having problems identified correctly. As expected, high-skilled
experts invest significantly less in their diagnoses than low-skilled experts, while both types
invest more than their best response would be. However, consumers act quite risk averse.
They seldom buy after a single diagnosis, frequently leave the market without any action and
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predominately opting for confirming diagnoses with other diagnoses before buying a service.
While this causes higher transaction costs with more visited experts and a welfare loss on
the one side, experts’ high-effort investments and consumers’ frequent verification lead to a
much smaller proportion of wrong services than we expected. This overcompensates welfare
losses from higher transaction costs and leads to a significantly higher market efficiency than
predicted. By increasing the share of high-skilled experts in the market - to which we refer
as expert qualification - market efficiency increases with fixed prices but appears to remain
unaffected or even decline with price competition. In both cases, consumers act more rationally
and leave less often without any action, which might be an indication of increased trust.
However, according to high-skilled experts investing comparable less effort, this only weakly
increases the probability of a correct diagnosis by expert qualification and only in a market
without price competition. Looking at the effect of price competition in a high- or low-qualified
market - i.e. with a high or a low share of high-skilled experts - the influence seems to be
positive in a low-qualified market but rather negative in a high-qualified one. In a low-qualified
market, while experts invest less effort and the probability of a correct signals decreases,
consumers appear more trusting in term of buying more often after only one diagnosis. This
increases the market efficiency, albeit not significantly. In a high-qualified market, the effect of
price competition reduces market efficiency with significantly fewer solved problems and more
wrong services, even while consumers appear to act less risk averse. Across all treatments,
consumers’ risk aversion as well as experts’ general over-investments with fixed prices prevail.
By letting experts set prices on their own, we observe an increase in diagnosis prices and a
decrease in service prices compared with fixed prices. Again, experts do not act according
to their best response with high-skilled experts investing too much and low-skilled experts
investing too little effort. By contrast, consumers would be expected not to participate in
markets with average diagnosis prices above their critical threshold for positive expected payoff,
which is crossed with flexible prices. However, as already mentioned, they appear to act less
risk averse in such markets, which we explain by the perceived higher degree of freedom that
experts have by setting prices freely, thus increasing consumers’ trust as they might interpret
this as higher attachments to ones duties.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section two reviews the related literature,
before section three presents our experimental design. Section four offers a summary of the




In this section, we will review the most relevant literature. According to the information
asymmetry, consumers need to contact experts for advice. In the literature for Judge-Adviser
Systems (JAS), in general a judge (consumer) makes decisions based on formerly-acquired
information from an adviser (expert) (Bonaccio, Dalal, 2006). By applying this scheme to our
setup, two factors appear decisive: (1) what affects consumers’ decisions whether to follow
experts’ messages, and (2) what affects experts’ degree of sincerity in communication with the
consumer. Previous research indicates that consumers adjust their willingness to follow advice
to the type of source and its identifiable characteristics (Bonaccio, Dalal, 2006; Eckerd, Hill,
2012; Mortimer, Pressey, 2013; Schotter, 2003; White, 2005), thereby discounting experts’
advice to different degrees, which is decisively influenced by whether advice has been liable
to costs and when it was paid (Angelova, Regner, 2013; Gino, 2008). In general, consumers
react by higher discounting rates when experts’ interests are divergent from their own and if
advice is imposed on them rather than solicited, seemingly whereby more degrees of freedom
increase trust. The way in which advice is given also matters with most following in face-to-face
situations (Bonaccio, Dalal, 2006). Regarding experts’ willingness for sincere communication,
Crawford, Sobel (1982) show that noisy signaling prevails until interests perfectly coincide.
Rode (2010) indicates that experts’ propensity to tell the truth is thus independent of the
competitive context. By contrast, Sakamoto et al. (2013) show experimentally that experts
are sensitive to context, i.e. to the likelihood of detection and whether a situation is framed
as a potential win or loss. Angelova, Regner (2013) find that the frequency of truthful advice
can be increased by payments in general but particularly with voluntary payments to advisers.
Instead of purely objective considerations, consumers seem to rely on heuristics and subjective
measurements concerning whether to trust experts.
While consumers appear to respond to experts’ identifiable characteristics, is it questionable
whether they are actually able to distinguish experts of different kinds in markets for credence
goods. In Schneider, Bizer (2017) we describe that in such markets consumers should easily
identify someone as being an expert because they usually act in regulated markets with entry
barriers. However, determining an expert’s actual level of skill is rather complicated. In
most cases, a consumer is not aware of an expert’s individual talent, years of experience,
additional training or specializations. The literature assumes that in markets for credence goods,
consumers cannot differentiate between experts of a different kind (Emons, 2001; Pesendorfer,
Wolinsky, 2003; Feser, Runst, 2015). Consequently, consumers cannot adapt their strategy to
individual experts but have to choose a uniform procedure. In a model with second opinions
and price competition, Pesendorfer, Wolinsky (2003) let experts’ skill levels directly determine
their ability to recommend an appropriate treatment. By contrast, in Schneider, Bizer (2017) we
argue that the assumption of low skilled experts unanimously providing low quality in diagnosis
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does not capture real life circumstances. Thereby, market efficiency should not increase with
more qualified experts in a market, as high-skilled experts are expected to reduce their effort
in diagnosis to balance the overall probability of consumers receiving a correct diagnosis.
However, suitable results from (field) experiments to verify these theoretical results are missing
to date.
The introduction of price competition might be a solution to the credence dilemma. Huck
et al. (2012) show in an experiment that in a market for experience goods, competition has
striking effects by increasing trust rates in a trust game by 36% points, the efficiency rate by
43% points and consequently overall welfare significantly. Dulleck et al. (2011) show that
when experts compete for consumers through price setting, this drives down overall prices
and increases the volume of trade. Mimra et al. (2016a) confirm in their experiment the
price-reducing effect and show that price competition significantly drives down experts’ profits
by shifting surplus to consumers. However, with price competition, experts seem to show
higher rates of undertreatment and overcharging. In Schneider, Bizer (2017), we derive the
conclusion that potential efficiency increases due to price competition crucially depend on
market circumstances and could also prove negative.
Another strategy to solve the credence dilemma lies in allowing consumers to search for second
or even more opinions. Wolinsky (1993) shows that the transaction costs for visiting multiple
experts are crucial but this can lead to an overall welfare increase. This is in line with the
results of Mimra et al. (2016b), showing that with the possibility for second opinions the rate of
overtreatment significantly decreases and absolute market efficiency increases depending on the
search costs. Nevertheless, in Mimra et al.’s experiment, the willingness to search for second
opinions was significantly lower than theory had predicted. They attribute this to consumers
possibly thinking that honest expert types were prevailing in the market. Therefore, it seems,
that the threat of second opinions might already make experts less fraudulent. However, in a
model with experts deciding on their effort in diagnosis, Pesendorfer, Wolinsky (2003) show
that the possibility for second opinions neither lead to Pareto optimal outcomes - as this is not
incentive compatible - nor to second-best outcomes, since experts’ effort levels remain too low
without fixing prices.
3 Experimental Design
Our experimental design builds on our theoretical model from Schneider, Bizer (2017), briefly
outlined in the next section and applies some structures from Dulleck et al. (2011), Mimra
et al. (2016a) and Mimra et al. (2016b). In each session, we have up to five markets, each
comprising eight subjects. Within each market, subjects are randomly allocated to the role of
consumer or expert, with N = 4 consumers and M = 4 experts. The allocation remains constant
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throughout all fifteen periods and no interaction takes place between the markets. Earned
payoffs are denominated in ECU, accumulated over all periods and paid at the end of the
experiment, where ECU 1 converts to EUR 0.05. The complete course of the game inclusive
of the payoff structure is common knowledge to all subjects, as we use role-independent
instructions that subjects have to read completely before the actual role allocation.1 Notice
that we use neutral language throughout the instructions as well as during the experiment to
avoid framing. However, in our following description, we will apply the common terminologies.
In each period, every consumer has a new problem that is randomly determined by a numeric
value between 0 and 1 with two decimal places, e.g. 0.12. Consumers are never directly
informed about the actual value of their problem. To solve their problems, consumers have to
visit experts to receive signals and buy a service based on a signal that they have received before
in a given period. Like consumer problems, signals are presented as numeric values between 0
and 1 with two decimal places. A signal can be either correct or wrong for a given consumer.
For a correct signal, the numeric value corresponds to the numeric value of this consumer’s
problem. In case the signal is wrong, the numeric value will differ from the problem’s value.
Whether a signal is correct or wrong is determined by the effort choice of a sending expert
as well as his individual qualification. To model endogenous verifiability for consumers, they
can visit multiple experts for a signal. While each expert can only be visited once, consumers
can receive up to four signals per period. Like in Schneider, Bizer (2017), we exclude the
improbable case that two matching signals can both be wrong. Therefore, in the program we
implemented the notion that two matching signals reveal correctness with certainty. Subjects
are informed about this instance in the instructions. In sum, consumers have to decide in each
period whether and how many experts they want to visit for a signal and whether they want to
buy a service based on a signal. Consumers can choose freely between all available experts in
their market. Notice that a service can only be bought from an expert who formerly has sent
a signal. If a consumer buys a service based on a correct signal, she gains a payoff V = 13
ECU and ECU 0 if the signal is wrong. To receive a signal or service, consumers have to pay a
price that is either fixed or chosen individually by the experts in each period. In Fix treatments,
consumers have to pay d = 2.20 ECU for a signal, including a fee modeling real life transaction
costs of s = 0.20 ECU2, and p = 5 ECU for a service. In Flex treatments, experts decide freely
on their prices for a signal and a service in each period. At any time, consumers have the
option to leave the market but have to bear the incurred costs up to that point. In order to allow
for appropriate earnings by subjects, we give each consumer an endowment of ECU 12 per
1The translated instructions can be found in the appendix. Original instructions in German are available on
request.
2Notice that in Flex treatments consumers also have to pay the transaction costs s = 0.20 ECU per received
signal on top of the price demanded by an expert.
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period. All incurred costs and earned profits during a period are added to or subtracted from
this endowment. While making their decisions, consumers are informed about the prices and
their costs incurred so far in the actual period. The consumers’ decision screen is displayed in
Figure 1.
Figure 1: Consumers’ decision screen.
Subjects allocated to the role of experts have to decide how much effort they want to invest in
their diagnosis for the case that they are visited by consumers. Experts have the choice to invest
either high or low effort. With their effort choices being unobservable to consumers and high
effort being costly with c = 1 ECU, experts have a moral hazard problem. For simplification,
we assume that low effort is free. We use the strategy method for effort decisions, implying
that each expert decides in advance about how he wants to treat each single consumer in his
market in case that she visits him for a signal. Therefore, in each period, all experts make four
effort choices concerning whether they want to invest high or low effort in their diagnoses. If an
expert decides to invest high effort, he will send a correct signal to this consumer with certainty.
If an expert opts for low effort, the consequences depend on his individual skill level: at the
beginning of the experiment, each subject who is allocated to the role of an expert receives the
attribute of being either high or low skilled. The allocation is random and the proportions of
high- and low-skilled experts depend on the underlying treatment. In low treatments, the share
of high-skilled experts is given by a = 0.25. In high treatments, the share of high-skilled experts
amounts to a = 0.75. If an expert is low skilled and chooses low effort, he will send a wrong
signal with certainty. By contrast, if an expert is high skilled and chooses low effort, he will
send a correct signal to this consumer with probability y = 0.50. The experts’ effort decision
screen is shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Experts’ effort decision screen.
While in Fix treatments prices for signals and services are given with d = 2 and p = 5, in Flex
treatments, experts can decide freely what they want to charge in each period. By allowing
experts to choose prices on their own and consumers to freely choose between all experts in
a market, we allow for price competition like in Dulleck et al. (2011). For setting prices, all
positive values between 0 and 15 ECU with one decimal place are allowed.3 In Flex treatments,
prior to their effort decisions each expert chooses his prices for the given period. The experts’
price decision screen is displayed in Figure 3. In order to allow experts to adapt their prices
to the market, all prices of the actual period are displayed to all experts while consumers make
their decisions.
To avoid consumers and experts identifying each other in the repeated interactions, i.e. avoiding
individual reputations, we apply the random matching protocol by Dulleck et al. (2011). The
presentation of consumers and experts on all screens is randomly determined in each period,
which we outlined in the instructions and on the screens.
The experiment comprises fifteen periods with an identical course:
1. Nature determines the actual problem for each consumer through numeric value between
0.00 and 1.00, to two decimal places.
2. In Flex treatments, each expert sets his prices for a signal and a service.
3. Each expert decides upfront whether he will invest high or low effort in his diagnoses for
each of the N = 4 consumers in his market.
3Notice that while the amount of 15 ECU is arbitrarily chosen as an upper boundary, it is strictly irrational for
consumers to accept any price above 13 ECU.
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4. Consumers decide how many experts they want to visit for a signal and whether they want
to buy a service based on any received signal. Meanwhile, experts are informed about the
other experts’ prices in their market.
5. Decisions are implemented and each subject receives a summary of the results. 4
Figure 3: Experts’ price decision screen.
3.1 Treatment conditions
We implement four experimental treatment conditions, using a standard 2x2 design, in which
we vary the share of high-skilled experts and whether price competition exists.
FixLow Prices for signals and service are fixed. In each market there is a share of a = 0.25 of
high-skilled experts.
FlexLow: Experts set their own prices for signals and service in each period. In each market
there is a share of a = 0.25 of high-skilled experts.
FixHigh Prices for signals and service are fixed. In each market there is a share of a = 0.75 of
high-skilled experts.
FlexHigh: Experts set their own prices for signals and service in each period. In each market
there is a share of a = 0.75 of high-skilled experts.
4Consumers receive a summary of how many experts they have visited, whether they have bought a service
and their payoff from a potentially-bought service inclusive of their endowment of 12 ECU. Experts are informed
about which prices they chose, how many consumers visited them, how many times they decided for high and low
effort for their visitors and how many of them bought their service. Additionally, all subjects are informed of how
much they have earned in the current period, as well as over all periods thus far.
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3.2 Procedure
For FixLow / FlexLow / FixHigh / FlexHigh, altogether 88/88/88/96 subjects took part in
the experiment, in sum 360. Consequently, we receive 11/11/11/12 independent markets per
treatment which we will use as independent observation in the results section. Experiments
were conducted with a standard subject pool across disciplines in the KD2 Lab at the Karlsruher
Institute for Technology (KIT). Subjects were recruited by using HROOT (Bock et al.,
2014) and the experiment was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). All subjects
participated only in one session which lasted approximately 60 minutes, whereby subjects
earned 11.33 EUR on average. This included a show-up fee for subjects allocated to the
role of experts (the counterpart of consumers’ endowment) of 7.00 EUR. According to the
relative complexity of our design and the written instructions, we let all subjects answer a set
of control questions to ensure understanding. At the end of the experiment, we used a standard
questionnaire to control for subjects’ demographics.
4 Theoretical Analysis and Hypothesis
In the following, we derive our hypotheses for consumer and expert behavior and effects
on market efficiency. We start with a brief summary of the underlying theoretical model
from Schneider, Bizer (2017), as we will derive our hypothesis from it. We subdivide our
hypothesis in three parts: (i) the expected outcome regarding experts’ moral hazard problem in
a market with credence goods and heterogeneously-qualified experts; (ii) the effects of expert
qualification, i.e. an increased share of high-skilled experts in a market; and (iii) the introduction
of price competition.
4.1 Theoretical Model
Assume a market with N experts and M symmetric consumers. The game has n ≥ 1 periods. In
each period, all consumers have a new problem given by i ∈ [0,1]. To solve their problem and
receive a positive payoff V > 0, consumers have to buy a service b ∈ [0,1] based on a correct
and formerly-received signal. Each consumer can visit up to n = N experts to receive such a
signal. We exclude individual reputation building by assuming that consumers cannot identify
individual experts. Additionally, experts cannot observe consumers’ histories, i.e. whether one
has visited another expert before. Experts offer a contract (d, p) to consumers with d as the
price for a signal and p as the price for a service. When a consumer decides to visit an expert
for a signal, she has to bear the costs d and transaction costs s. The visited expert decides how
much effort he wants to invest in sending his signal. He can invest either high effort for costs
c > 0 or low effort for free. If an expert invests high effort, he will send a correct signal to
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the consumer with certainty. By contrast, if he invests only low effort, the consequences will
depend on this expert’s attribute t ∈ {h, l}. Each expert receives with probability a ∈ (0,1] the
attribute high-skilled, i.e. t = h, and with probability 1− a the attribute low-skilled, i.e. t = l.
If a low-skilled expert invests low effort in sending a signal, he will send a wrong signal with
certainty. If a high-skilled expert invests low effort, he has a chance y ∈ (0,1] that he will
nevertheless send a correct signal. Let xl [xh] be the probability that an expert with low [high]
skill chooses high effort. As consumers are unable to observe neither experts’ effort choices
nor their individual skills, they react to the expected probability z = axh+(1−a)xl +a(1−xh)y
that a randomly visited expert sends a correct signal. In the following, we describe the possible
equilibria that will be repeatedly played over all fifteen periods of the game.
Lemma 1: A consumers’ best response to (d, p,z) is given by: (i) receive one signal and buy
the corresponding service; (ii) receive signals until two of them match, then buy the service
from one of the two experts with matching signals; and (iii) leave the market without any action.
Proof of Lemma 1: See Schneider, Bizer (2017).

Let a consumer’s probability of buying after her first signal be given by f ∈ [0,1], if she enters
the market. A consumer’s probability of searching for matching signals is given by 1 − f .
Consumers’ expected duration of search, i.e. how many experts they will visit, is thus given by
S = f +(1− f ) 2
xha+(1−a)xl +(1− xh)ay
.
Experts will choose xt in reaction to f and their individual attribute. Let f
∗
t be the critical value








with qh = 1 and ql = 0. To make high-skilled experts indifferent, consumers need to search for
matching signals more often. Experts’ reaction function is given by
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Lemma 2: Every equilibrium in pure strategies is a degenerate equilibrium, i.e. with experts
choosing xl,xh = 0 and consumers leaving the market without any action.
Proof of Lemma 2: Assume that consumers never search for matching signals, i.e. f = 1.
Experts have an incentive to never invest high effort in their diagnosis, since every consumer
who is on a visit will buy his service instantly. Anticipating this, experts will never invest
in high effort and consumers will leave the market. By contrast, assume that consumers are
always searching for matching signals, i.e. f = 0. Experts only have a chance to sell a service
at price p if they send a correct signal, as consumers always opt for a verification. With p
being sufficiently high and c being relatively low in comparison, experts will always choose
x,l ,xh = 1. With experts always investing in high effort, there is no longer a need for consumers
to search for matching opinions and they will switch to f = 1. Now, experts no longer have
any incentive to invest in high effort and will always choose low effort. This leads consumers
again to leave the market. Following Pesendorfer, Wolinsky (2003), we will call this kind
of equilibrium a degenerate equilibrium, as experts never invest in high effort and consumers
always leave the market without any action.5

Lemma 3: If xh = 0, low-skilled experts will balance z that z ∈ [z,z]6, as long as a(1−y)≤ 1−z
and y ≤ z
a
. If xl = 1, high-skilled experts will balance z that z ∈ [z,z], as long as a(1−y)≥ 1−z.
5Notice that there is a theoretical possibility with high-skilled experts in the market that consumers have an
incentive to enter even with experts restraining from high effort. If the share of high-skilled experts in the market
in combination with their degree of qualification is relatively high and z exceeds a necessary threshold, consumers
will enter the market regardless. For more details, see Schneider, Bizer (2017). However, we will exclude this case
here as it is not relevant given our experimental set-up.
6Notice that z and z are the roots of the quadratic equation for making consumers indifferent between buying
after one signal and searching for matching signals. To enable a mixed strategy equilibrium, z needs to lie within
this interval.
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Proof of Lemma 3: See Schneider, Bizer (2017).

Through the introduction of heterogeneous experts, consumers are no longer able to choose
a uniform value f that makes all experts indifferent. Assuming that market participation
is worthwhile, consumers will apply a strategy to make either high- or low-skilled experts
indifferent. According to their reaction function, the other expert type will choose a pure
strategy, i.e. xh = 0 or xl = 1. To enable a mixed strategy equilibrium, experts need to make
consumers indifferent between buying after one signal and searching for matching signals,
which implies that the probability of receiving a correct signal needs to remain within the given
interval z ∈ [z,z]. With one expert type choosing a pure strategy, the other type needs to balance
z, with its possibility depending on the market composition. According to Lemma 3, we can
define the following adaptation conditions
a(1− y)≤ 1− z, (1)
ay ≤ z, (2)
a(1− y)≥ 1− z. (3)
For low-skilled experts being able to balance z, (1) and (2) needs to be fulfilled. We will refer
to this as a low-skill equilibrium. For high-skilled experts to balance z, (3) needs to hold. We
will refer to this as a high-skill equilibrium. We will exclude the case that a(1− y) = 1− z.
Therefore, only (1) or (3) can hold and there is only the possibility of either high-skill or
low-skill equilibria. According to the defined interval for z, both types of equilibria have a
corresponding interval for f ∗t that makes the balancing expert type indifferent.
Whether a mixed strategy equilibrium is possible depends on the market composition, i.e. the
share of high-skilled experts a, their degree of qualification y and the overall number of experts
N, as well as the market circumstances, i.e. the service price p, the diagnosis costs d, the
transaction costs s and consumers’ payoff for a solved problem V . Assuming fixed prices in the
first step, we derive the following equilibrium behavior:
Lemma 4: Depending on the fixed price ratio 2c/p there exist several types of non-degenerate
equilibria with the fixed profile (d, p,z, f ), assuming all necessary conditions7 are fulfilled:
(i) With 2c ≤ p, consumers will choose f = f ∗l , if the first (1) and second (2) adaptation
7For more details on these conditions see Schneider, Bizer (2017).
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condition hold. Low-skilled experts will choose either xl ∈ {x∗l ,x∗l } if p = 2c, or xl ∈ [x∗l ,x∗l ] if
p > 2c, while high-skilled experts always choose xh = 0; (ii) with 2c/(1− y) ≤ p, if the third
adaptation conditions(3) holds, consumers will choose f = f ∗h . There high skilled experts will
choose either xh ∈ {x∗h,x∗h} if p = 2c/(1−y), or xh ∈ [x∗h,x∗h] if p > 2c/(1−y), while low-skilled
experts will always choose xl = 1.
Proof of Lemma 4: See Schneider, Bizer (2017).

Letting experts choose their prices freely, we will derive different kinds of non-degenerate
equilibria.
Lemma 5: For the profile (d, p,z, f ) being a non-degenerate flexible price equilibrium, similar
market conditions as for fixed price equilibria must hold. All experts offer identical contracts










f = f ∗t = 1− 2cp(1−qty)/1+
c(z−2)
p(1−qty) . According to the market composition, there are two possible
outcomes: (i) with ay ≤ z and a(1− y)< 1− z, there will be xh = 0, xl = x∗l = (z−ay)/(1−a)
and f = f ∗l , with the possible price range given by p∈ [2c,V − 2cz ]; and (ii) with a(1−y)≥ 1−z
there will be xl = 1, xh = x
∗
h = (z− 1+ a(1− y))/(1− a) and f = f ∗h , with the possible price
range given by p ∈ [ 2c
1−y ,V − 2cz ]
Proof of Lemma 5: See Schneider, Bizer (2017).

Notice that with flexible prices, z ∈ {z,z}. As there is no possibility for z to lie within the








], only z can be a flexible price equilibrium.8 In terms
of welfare, degenerate equilibria are inferior, as no trade takes place with experts not making
any profits and consumer problems remaining unsolved. In this case, consumers and experts
will earn a profit of zero or rather their outside option. In a non-degenerate equilibrium, a
consumer’s expected payoff is given by




with f = f ∗t = 1 − 2cp(1−qty)/1 +
c(z−2)
p(1−qty) and z = axh + (1 − a)xl + (1 − xh)ay ∈ [z,z]. An
individual expert’s expected payoff, depending on his attribute t, is given by
π
t
e(xt ,qt , f ) =
M
N








with f B = f ∗t B = 1/(1+
2c
p(1−qty)−2c), St = f
∗
t +2(1− f ∗t )/z, N as the total number of experts
and M as the total number of consumers in the market. Combining the welfare functions, overall
welfare is given by
π( f ∗t ,z,a,y,k) = k[ f
∗






4.2 Predictions and Hypothesis
We define parameters from our theoretical model as described in our experimental design. Table
1 presents fixed parameters across all treatments. Let a [a] be the value of a that defines the
critical value at which a(1− y) = 1− z, given z [z].9
Table 1: Fixed parameters across treatments
Parameters V s c y a a
13 0.2 1 0.50 0.72 0.95
Table 2 provides an overview of our treatment variables and the expected expert/consumer
behavior, as well as the expected market efficiency. In FixLow we predict consumers to
play their strategy for a low-skill equilibrium, while in FixHigh they will switch to the
high-skill equilibrium. With consumers’ expected payoff becoming negative with z and
fixed prices, z is the only feasible equilibrium. In both treatments with price competition,
we predict a market breakdown. Since only z can be a flexible price equilibrium, in
combination with stricter requirements for maximum transaction and signal costs, i.e.
s + d < V (2
√
5 − 2)/8 + 4
√
5 ≈ 1.89, a non-degenerate equilibrium becomes impossible.
Consequently, we expect consumers to always leave without any action and all experts to
choose strictly low effort.
Baseline Market and General Predictions
As we choose parameter values whereby consumers and experts can expect a positive payoff
from trade, we predict all subjects to play their mixed strategy equilibrium. Consumers will
choose the mixed strategy that makes the type of experts indifferent between high and low
effort, who are able to balance z. As we assume FixLow as our baseline treatment, this implies
that f = f ∗l , as outlined by the adaptation conditions. Experts will choose their effort according
to their reaction function and balance z = z: high-skilled experts will always choose low effort
with xh = 0 and low-skilled experts will play their mixed strategy with xl = x
∗
l .
In addition to our prediction for the baseline market, we expect some behavioral patterns across
all treatments. High-skilled experts are always expected to invest less effort than low-skilled
9We do not display the second adaptation condition, as we chose parameter values whereby it is always fulfilled.
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Table 2: Theoretical predictions
FixLow FlexLow FixHigh FlexHigh
Treatment variables
a: Share high skilled experts 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.75
d: Average signal price 2.00 0.00 2.00 0.00
p: Average service price 5.00 [2.00,6.65] 5.00 [4.00,8.15]
Expert behavior
z/z: Prob. correct signal - / 0.64 0.00 (0.03) / - - / 0.64 0.00 (0.03) / -
xh: High effort high skilled 0.00 0.00 0.05 x
∗
h/0.00






f : Buy after first signal 0.82 0.00 0.44 0.00
1− f : Matching signals 0.18 0.00 0.54 0.00
Leaving instantly 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 100.00%
S: Visited experts 1.37 0.00 2.19 0.00
Market efficiency
πc: Consumer welfare 197.25 180.00 197.25 180.00
π
h
e : High skilled’ profits 93.75 0.00 94.80 0.00
π
l
e: Low skilled’ profits 82.35 0.00 77.85 0.00
π: Overall welfare 285.30 180.00 283.58 180.00
Solved problems 70.48% 0.00% 82.16% 0.00%
Efficiency rate 76.61% 48.39% 76.23% 48.39%
Trade volume 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
Wrong Services 29.52% 0.00% 15.84% 0.00%
experts. This derives from high-skilled experts needing a higher rate of consumers searching
for matching opinions to become indifferent. Referring to other experiments, we do not expect
subjects to start by playing their mixed strategies unanimously. It seems more plausible that
subjects tend to adapt their behavior by individual experiences with learning effects over
periods. We expect that consumers will show strong reactions to the prevalent probability for
receiving a correct signal, i.e. z, and experts will adapt their effort investments according to
consumers’ search behavior, i.e. f .
Hypothesis 1 (”General Predictions”)
H1a) In our baseline market, experts will balance z that z = z.
H1b) In our baseline market, consumer will choose f = f ∗l .
H1c) In our baseline market, experts will choose xt ∈ {xh = 0,x∗l }.
H1d) In our baseline market, consumers will never leave the market without buying a service.
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H1e) High skilled experts will invest less effort than low-skilled experts.
H1f) Subjects will show learning effects according to their opponents’ average behavior
within their market.
Effects of Expert Qualification
By increasing the share of high-skilled experts in the market, low-skilled experts are no longer
able to balance z in FixHigh. In anticipation, consumers are expected to change their search
behavior by increasing the probability of searching for matching opinions. This should make
high-skilled experts indifferent regarding who will choose xh = x
∗
h to balance z. With consumers
searching for matching opinions more often, the duration of search S increases, implying a
welfare loss by higher transaction costs. At the same time, the share of solved problems
will increase while the share of wrong treatments will decreases resulting in an increase of
overall welfare. In sum, these effects will almost counterbalance each other which leaves the
expected efficiency rate unchanged. However, with low-skilled experts being forced to invest
more high effort to attract a comparable share of consumers, their profits will decrease. With
flexible prices, there is theoretically no possibility for a non-degenerate equilibrium. Assuming
that consumers will nevertheless participate, we expect the range of possible service prices to
decrease if consumers choose the high-skilled equilibrium, because high-skilled experts need a
higher minimum service price to invest in high effort.
Hypothesis 2 (”Effects of Expert Qualification”)
H2a) With fixed prices, the effort choice of all experts increases, i.e. xh = x
∗
h and xl = 1.
H2b) With fixed prices, consumers will choose the high skill equilibrium with f = f ∗h < f
∗
l
and the duration of search S will increase.
H2c) With fixed prices, there is no effect on the market efficiency rate but more consumer
problems are solved and fewer wrong services are conducted.
H2d) There is no ceteris paribus effect on z by increasing the share of high skilled experts in
the market.
H2e) With price competition, there is no effect of expert qualification.
Effects of Price Competition
By letting experts choose their contracts (d, p) on their own, we allow for flexible prices in Flex
treatments. Regarding the price for signals, the only possible equilibrium in theory is d = 0,
independent of the share of high-skilled experts in the market. Experts are unable to signal
their attribute, since consumers cannot identify neither individual experts nor their degree of
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qualification. With the costs d being sunk the moment when an expert decides on his effort,
they do not affect this decision. Consequently, consumers will strictly prefer a lower d and
experts will undercut any d′ > 0 to attract more consumers. With d = 0, there is no possibility
for a mixed strategy equilibrium with flexible prices, as only z could be stable. Consequently,
consumers are expected to prefer leaving the market without any action and experts will always
choose low effort. Assuming that consumers will not leave the market instantly, we would
expect no differences in experts’ price setting behavior according to their attribute, since they
cannot credibly signal their type, even by price setting. With consumers participating, there is
a broad range of possible prices for a service. This derives from f and p counterbalancing each
other in equilibrium: the higher the price for a service, the more often consumers buy after
their first recommendation. Therefore, we expect a strong correlation between the factors.
Hypothesis 3 (”Effects of Price Competition”)
H3a) The price for signals will be zero, i.e. d = 0.
H3b) Experts’ effort choices are independent of d.
H3c) The price for services will lie strictly above its defined minimum.
H3d) There will be no different price setting by high- and low-skilled experts.
H3e) There will be a market breakdown with consumers leaving instantly.
H3f) If markets do not break down, service price p is correlated with f .
5 Results
In this chapter, we will present our experimental results. In the first section, we outline our
methodology for analyzing our data. The subsequent structure is according to our hypotheses.
We start by investigating the general behavior in our baseline market, i.e. FixLow. Subsequently,
we will look at the effects of expert qualification and by introducing price competition.
5.1 Methodology
With subjects interacting in the same market over all fifteen periods, market reputation will
arise even though we excluded reputation building at the individual level by the random
presentation protocol. Therefore, we use market averages (a market comprises of four experts
and four consumers) as independent observations. In accordance, we will analyze prices in Flex
treatments at the group level. To determine market efficiency, we will use four indicators: (i)
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the share of solved problems; (ii) the volume of trade, given by the share of consumers buying
a service; (iii) the efficiency rate, given by the share of welfare actually realized in relation to
the maximum possible welfare10; and (iv) the share of services based on a wrong signal.
In general, we apply non-parametric tests, i.e. the Wilcoxon signed-rank test (WSR) and the
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (MWU), to identify differences regarding our predictions and
between our treatments. To show the effect of expert qualification, we will compare FixLow
with FixHigh, and FlexLow with FlexHigh. To show the influence of price competition, we
will compare FixLow with FlexLow, and FixHigh with FlexHigh. This enables us to show the
influence of these effects in distinct markets. In order to test for learning effects, we subdivide
our data for experts’ effort choices and consumers’ search behavior in thirds, whereby each
third comprises five periods.
We will complement our non-parametric tests with parametric tests. In accordance with Dulleck
et al. (2011) and Mimra et al. (2016a), we will use random-effects panel tobit and probit
regressions. This takes care of our challenging data structure with: (i) repetitions over fifteen
periods of our game impose serial correlations between individual’s decisions; (ii) with eight
individuals interacting over fifteen periods within a single market, which potentially leads to
correlated observations within the market. We use a probit regression for consumers’ decision
concerning whether to buy a service after they have received only one signal in a period and tobit
regressions to determine the effects on experts’ share of high-effort choices within a period, as
well as the probability of a consumer receiving a correct signal from a random expert, experts’
individual profits and consumers’ individual welfare in a period.
5.2 Baseline Market
Result 1 (Behavior and Efficiency with Experts’ Moral Hazard Problem):
Experts: High- and low-skilled experts invest significantly more effort in their signals
than theory predict for equilibrium behavior, resulting in a significantly higher-than-expected
probability of consumers receiving a correct signal. High-skilled experts invest significantly
less effort in comparison to low-skilled experts. In sum, experts invest less effort than would be
optimal for them, given consumer behavior.
Consumers: Consumers behave risk averse, buying significantly less often than predicted
after one signal and searching predominately for matching signals. They buy on average
significantly more signals and apply non-rational strategies, i.e. leaving without any action
and buying after non-matching signals.
Market Efficiency: Our baseline market is significantly more efficient than predicted with
10The maximum welfare per period in our market is given by ECU 24.80 and is realized when consumers receive
one single correct signal and buy the corresponding service. The maximum welfare over all fifteen periods is thus
given by ECU 372.
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higher overall welfare. This is driven by higher low-skilled experts’ profits. While many
consumers leave the market without buying a service, thus reducing the volume of trade,
this does not undermine the expected share of solved problems, as the services bought are
predominantly based on correct signals.
In Table 3, we present an overview of the results in FixLow in comparison with our predictions.
We use this treatment as the baseline condition and compare the results according to our
predictions.
Table 3: Overview of Results in Baseline (FixLow)
FixLow Predictions
Expert behavior
z: Prob. correct signal 73.75% (.068)* 64.00%
xh: High effort high skilled 44.55% (.263)
* 0.00%
xl: High effort low skilled 74.24% (.061)
* 68.95%
Consumer behavior
f : Buy after first signal 13.79% (.134)* 82.00%
1− f : Matching signals 67.88% (.175)* 18.00%
Rational strategies 81.67% (.154)* 100.00%
Leaving instantly 10.60% (.122)* 0.00%
S: Visited experts 2.04 (.46)* 1.37
Market efficiency
πc: Consumer welfare 199.57 (24.15) 197.25
π
h
e : High skilled’ profits 99.27 (30.60) 93.75
π
l
e: Low skilled’ profits 103.00 (17.84)
* 82.35
π: Overall welfare 301.64 (24.13) 285.30
Solved problems 76.06% (.145)* 70.48%
Efficiency rate 81.01% (.065)* 76.61%
Trade volume 81.67% (.154)* 100.00%
Wrong Services 6.74% (.046)* 47.52%
Number of Subjects 88
All given values are market averages across periods with clustered
standard deviations in parentheses.
* Significant differences to our predictions (p < 0.10).
Expert Behavior
According to Hypothesis 1a, we predicted experts to balance their high-effort investments
at z = 0.64. Our results show that the actual probability of consumers receiving a correct
diagnosis from a random expert lies at 73.75%, significantly above this value (WSR: z = 2.670,
p < 0.01). By looking at the different types of experts, it shows that both invest significantly
more than the predicted, with 44.45% for high-skilled experts (WSR: z = 2.937, p < 0.01) and
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74.24% for low-skilled experts (WSR: 2.134, p < 0.05), which contradicts Hypothesis 1c. By
comparing the different investment behavior of high- and low-skilled experts, we can confirm
Hypothesis 1e in the baseline market, since experts significantly differ in their investments
according to their type, with higher investments of low-skilled experts (WSR: z = −2.667,
p < 0.01). In Figure 4 we provide an overview of expert and consumer behavior in our baseline
market. By testing for learning effects, we observe a significant increase of high effort choices
from the first to the second third for high-skilled experts (WSR: z = −1.739, p < 0.10) and a
significant decrease from the second to the last third (WSR: z = 2.101, p < 0.05). Low-skilled
experts show no signs of adapting their high effort choices over periods (WSRs: p > 0.44).
Even though high-skilled experts’ increase in investments from the first to the second third is
according to our predictions, as consumers mainly search for matching opinions and investing
more effort increases experts’ expected profits, the subsequent decline and low-skilled experts’
absence of learning effects lead to a rejection of Hypothesis 1 f for experts in our baseline
market.
Consumer Behavior
According to experts’ higher-than-expected investment rates and the resulting higher rate of z,
it would be rational for consumers to increase their purchases after receiving only one signal
above the predicted rate of f = 0.82. By contrast, with 13.79% f even lies significantly below
our predictions (WSR: z = −2.941, p < 0.01). Additionally, with 67.88% consumers search
significantly more often than predicted for matching signals (WSR: z = 2.936, p < 0.01).
Figure 4 displays that these patterns are consistent between all thirds of the experiment
(WSR: p > 0.58), contradicting Hypothesis 1 f , as we expected an adaptation to experts’ high
effort investments. With with 81.67% the volume of trade lies below the predicted rate of
100% (WSR: z = −2.937, p < 0.01). In sum, this contradicts Hypothesis 1b and leads to a
significantly higher number of consulted experts with S = 2.04 on average (WSR: z = 2.847,
p < 0.01). A considerable share of consumers restrain from defined rational strategies with
only 81.67% choosing to purchase either after one signal or after matching signals. For
example, according to the prevalent prices and the higher probability of a correct signal,
consumers should never abstain from trade. Nevertheless, 10.60% of consumers leave the
market without any action and 7.27% buy a service based on non-matching signals, thus
contradicting Hypothesis 1d.
Market Efficiency
With 76.06% of consumer problems solved, this share is according to our expectations of
70.48% (WSR: z = 1.245, p > 0.21). This is surprising upon first glance because 10.60% of
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Figure 4: Expert and Consumer Behavior in Baseline (FixLow)
Consequently, 18.33% of problems remain unsolved according to not even having been
attempted to be solved. However, with only 6.73% of bought services being based on a wrong
signal, this share is significantly lower than the expected share of 29.52% (WSR: z = −2.936,
p < 0.01). The efficiency rate of 81.01% is weakly significantly higher than the predicted
rate of 76.61% (WSR: z = 1.867, p < 0.10). This effect is mainly driven by low-skilled
experts’ average profits being π le = 103.00, namely significantly above our predictions (WSR:
z = 2.580, p < 0.01). By contrast, consumers’ high share of irrational strategies and their risk
averse behavior does not significantly reduce their welfare but lies at πc = 199.57, which is
close to our expectations (WSR: p > 0.47). This also accounts for high-skilled experts’ profits
with πhe = 99.27 (WSR: p > 0.53).
Remarks: In sum, consumers behave risk averse in our market, although efficiency is
significantly higher than theory predicts. Consumers prefer to search for matching opinions
much more often than expected and restrain from buying after their first signal almost
completely. This leads to higher search rates and welfare losses according to higher transaction
costs on the one hand. Regarding expert behavior, our theory predicts that if consumers choose
f < f ∗t they will increase their effort choices to xt = 1. With f = 0.14 this is given for both
expert types. While we actually observe higher effort choices than predicted for equilibrium,
both types fall short of their best response. Across periods, high-skilled experts increase their
effort levels on average from about 30% to almost 70% in period 9 and 10. It is surprising
that their effort levels subsequently decrease again, while low-skilled experts’ levels are quite
stable across periods. However, since low-skilled experts choose high effort more often on
average, which even outbalances their disadvantage of having lower skill in diagnosis, they
profit disproportionately from consumers’ risk aversion as they provide a higher probability of a
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correct signal and thus sell more services. Nevertheless, it is surprising that while a considerable
share of subjects restrain from optimal behavior, the efficiency rate lies above our predictions.
This results from fewer wrong services being conducted, i.e. based on a wrong signal, in which
case consumers gain no positive payoff (except their remaining endowment). As a bought
service is only a shift in terms of welfare from consumers to experts, the pure number of
conducted treatments cannot account for an increase or decrease in overall welfare, but rather
its quality. Consequently, while higher search rates for matching signals induce welfare losses
in the form of higher transaction costs, these are overcompensated by higher efficiency rates
from services with higher quality.
5.3 Effects of Qualification
Result 2 (Behavior and Efficiency according to Expert Qualification):
Experts: We observe a significant increase in effort for low-skilled experts with fixed
prices, which also increases consumers’ probability of receiving a correct signal. With price
competition, high-skilled experts invest significantly more effort due to expert qualification.
With fixed prices, experts’ investments remain under their optimal response. With price
competition, high-skilled experts invest too much and low-skilled experts too little, given actual
prices and consumer behavior. Average prices remain unaffected by expert qualification.
Consumers: Consumers behave on average less risk averse than before, as they increase
their purchases after their first signal as well as the use of rational strategies, and leave the
market less often without any action. Only with fixed prices is the higher frequency of rational
strategies significant. Given experts’ actual behavior, consumers still act risk averse than would
be optimal.
Market Efficiency: With fixed prices, market efficiency significantly increases with more
solved problems, a higher volume of trade and a higher efficiency rate, with increased welfare
for consumers and profits for all expert types. With price competition, these effects vanish
with no significant changes to expert qualification, but high-skilled experts’ profits are weakly
reduced.
Table 4 provides an overview of our experimental results across all treatments. We state
different results concerning whether price competition is prevalent (FlexLow vs. FlexHigh) or
not (FixLow vs. FixHigh).
Expert Behavior
According to Hypothesis 2a, we expected that all experts’ effort choices should increase by
qualification. Indeed, average effort rates of all types increase. However, these increases are
only weakly significant for high-skilled experts in a market with price competition (MWU:
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z=−1.786, p< 0.10) and for low-skilled experts in a market without price competition (MWU:
z = −1.810, p < 0.10). This leads to a weakly significant increase for consumers to receive a
correct signal but only in a market without price competition (MWU: z = −1.676, p < 0.10).
With price competition, this probability also increases, albeit with no significance (MWU: p >
0.15).
Table 4: Overview results across treatments
FixLow FlexLow FixHigh FlexHigh
Expert behavior
z: Prob. correct signal 73.75% (.068)cq 66.78% (.085)c 78.90% (.071)q 72.74% (.111)
xh: High effort high skilled 44.55% (.263) 33.03 %(.330)
q 57.07% (.174) 50.37% (.201)q
xl: High effort low skilled 74.24% (.061)
cq 66.87% (.102)c 80.00% (.240)q 65.42% (.306)
d: Signal price 2 2.82 (.937) 2 2.96 (1.26)
p: Service price 5 4.03 (.557) 5 3.43 (1.39)
Consumer behavior
f : Buy after first signal 13.79% (.134) 23.33% (.239) 16.36% (.177) 29.86% (.209)
1− f : Matching signals 67.88% (.175) 66.67% (.231) 74.55% (.188) 63.19% (.183)
Rational strategies 81.67% (.154)q 90.00% (.096) 90.90% (.145)q 93.06% (.054)
Leaving instantly 10.60% (.122) 5.60% (.072) 6.82% (.142) 4.03% (.053)
S: Visited experts 2.04 (.46) 2.18 (.62) 2.10 (.50) 2.01 (.39)
Market efficiency
πc: Consumer welfare 199.57 (24.15) 208.42 (40.25) 211.11 (18.39) 221.45 (44.07)
π
h
e : High skilled’ profits 99.27 (30.60) 129.62 (52.92)
q 110.61 (21.28) 97.24 (26.99)q
π
l
e: Low skilled’ profits 103.00 (17.84) 97.33 (31.52) 113.36 (23.31)
c 84.94 (42.44)c
π: Overall welfare 301.64 (24.13)q 313.82 (23.04) 322.40 (23.99)q 315.61 (19.61)
Solved problems 76.06% (.145)q 81.67% (.133) 86.51% (.142)cq 80.56% (.114)c
Efficiency rate 81.01% (.065)q 84.36% (.062) 86.67% (.065)q 84.84% (.053)
Trade volume 81.67% (.154)q 90.15% (.097) 91.06% (.143)q 93.19% (.054)
Wrong Services 6.74% (.046) 9.88% (.075) 5.01% (.034)c 13.76% (.098)c
Number of Subjects 88 88 88 96
All given values are market averages across periods with clustered standard deviations in parentheses.
q Significant difference by qualification: Low vs. High(p < 0.10).
c Significant difference by price competition: Fix vs. Flex (p < 0.10).
In Figure 5, we display expert behavior across all treatments. Without price competition,
the expected increase in effort was 5%-points for high-skilled experts and 30% points for
low-skilled experts, see Table 2. The actual increases are with 12.52% points for high-skilled
experts significantly above (WSR: z = 2.780, p < 0.01) and with 5.76% points for low-skilled
experts significantly below our predictions (WSR: z =−4.211, p < 0.01). In sum, high-skilled
experts invest significantly more and low-skilled experts significantly less than we predicted in
equilibrium (WSR: p< 0.01). However, if we take consumers’ first-buy choices with f = 0.167
in FixHigh as given, experts’ best response would be again to uniformly choose high effort with
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xh = 1 and xl = 1. Consequently, experts would be better off if they increased their high-effort
choices even more. By testing for learning effects, it shows that low-skilled experts in FixHigh
have a significantly higher probability of high effort in the last third of the experiment compared
to the first third (WSR: z = −2.408, p < 0.05). By contrast, high-skilled experts show a
weakly significant increase in investments from the second to the last third (WSR: z =−1.824,
p< 0.10). We do not observe the former effect from our baseline market for high-skilled experts
of high effort rates rebounding.
With price competition, experts’ best response depends on actual price levels. With 2.82 [2.96],
the average price for a signal in FlexLow [FlexHigh] lies not only strictly above our prediction of
d = 0 but also above the price in our reference markets without price competition. It is surprising
that even though consumers would be strictly better off leaving the market without any action
with an average price above 2.01 for a signal, the number of consumers actually choosing this
strategy is the lowest with price competition. By contrast, with 4.03 [3.34], the average service
price in FlexLow [FlexHigh] lies below our reference markets. We analyze experts’ price setting
behavior and the incidence that markets do not break down as expected in further detail in the
next section and for now take it as given, since qualification has on average no significant effect
on price setting (MWU: p > 0.17). Moreover, we take consumer behavior with f = 0.233
[ f = 0.299] as given. In contrast to our treatments with fixed prices, with price competition the
average service price p can fall below the critical threshold for experts to invest in high effort.
This value is given by plmin = 2 for low-skilled experts and p
h
min = 4 for high-skilled experts.
With average service prices remaining above the critical value for low-skilled experts in all
periods, again they would be better off increasing their effort choices, given actual consumer
behavior. This changes for high-skilled experts the moment when the service price falls below
the critical value. From this point, it would be rational for high-skilled experts to always invest
low effort, independently of actual consumer behavior. Looking at learning effects in a low
qualified market, we observe a decrease in investments from the second to the last third for
both low-skilled experts (WSR: z = 2.405, p < 0.05) as well as high-skilled experts (WSR:
z = 1.742, p < 0.10). In a high-qualified market, we see a similar decrease in effort rates with
low-skilled experts showing a weakly significant decrease from the first to the second (WSR:
z = 1.667, p < 0.10) and high-skilled experts from the second to the last third (WSR: z = 2.119,
p < 0.05). The formerly-identified effect of low-skilled experts investing less effort in sending
their signals prevails in FixHigh and FlexLow but vanishes in FlexHigh (WSR: for FlexLow
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Figure 5: Expert Behavior across Treatments
Consumer Behavior
In Figure 6, we show consumer behavior in all treatments. Without price competition, in
FixHigh we predicted an almost 50% increase in consumers’ search for matching pinions.
While the actual increase is below our expectations, consumers still search more often for
matching opinions than before, namely 74.55% of the time (WSR: z = 2.046, p < 0.05).
The average share buying after their first signal remains almost unchanged with 16.36%, even
though we predicted an almost 50% reduction, with this share still lying below our predictions
(WSR: z = −2.669, p < 0.01). Nevertheless, the effect of expert qualification appears to
reduce consumers’ risk aversion, as they search less often for matching opinions and generally
apply rational strategies more often. However, only the increased use of rational strategies to
90.00% is significant (MWU: z =−2.127, p < 0.05). Thereby, the share of consumers leaving
without any action decreases to 6.82% and only 2.12% leave without buying a service. Again,
consumers show on average no adaptation of their strategy across periods, with no differences
between all thirds regarding f and 1− f (WSRs: p > 0.31).
With price competition, our predictions depend on the actual chosen prices. If we assume
the actual average prices as given, we would expect consumers to leave the market all the
time without any action because signal prices are above the critical value to receive a positive
expected payoff. Nevertheless, consumers still engage in trade. With expert qualification,
consumers also generally buy more often after their first signal, although with flexible prices
their share of searching for matching opinions is reduced. Additionally, the share of rational
strategies increases on average, while the instant leavings are reduced, as well as the number
of visited experts. However, these differences are not significant (MWUs: p > 0.40). In
a low-qualified market, we see a significant increase in first-buy choices from the first to
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Figure 6: Consumer behvaior across treatments
p < 0.05). In a high-qualified market, consumers show no learning effects (WSRs: p > 0.17).
Market Efficiency
Without price competition, the volume of trade significantly increases to 91.06% of consumers
buying a service (MWU: z = −2.397, p < 0.05). With a share of 86.51%, significantly more
consumer problems are solved (MWU: z =−2.007, p < 0.05). This results from: (i) consumers
reducing the use of non-rational strategies; (ii) the probability of a correct signal increasing;
and (iii) the share of wrong services decreasing to 5.01%. However, aside from the reduction in
non-rational strategies and the increase in the volume of trade, these changes are non-significant.
Regarding the efficiency rate, we observe a significant increase to 86.67% (MWU: z =−2.397,
p < 0.05), as consumers’ welfare as well as high- and low-skilled experts’ profits increase. This
leads to a rejection of Hypothesis 2c.
With price competition, while the volume of trade also increases to 93.19%, we see a reduction
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in the average number of solved problems to 80.56% which is mainly driven by an increase
in wrong services to 13.76%. The changes are all non-significant (MWUs: p > 0.24). The
efficiency rate remains almost unchanged at 80.56%. Regarding the individual welfare we see a
reduction in expert profits and an increase in consumer welfare. However, only the decrease in
high-skilled experts’ profits is weakly significant (MWU: z = 1.662, p < 0.10). This confirms
Hypothesis 2e which predicted no influence of expert qualification with price competition.
Remarks: In sum, we see clear differences of expert qualification in markets concerning
whether price competition exists or not. With fixed prices, expert qualification increases market
efficiency significantly by higher probabilities of consumers receiving a correct signal and it
also makes them less risk averse, as they apply rational strategies more often. Consequently,
it appears worthwhile to qualify experts in markets without price competition. By contrast,
with flexible prices the positive effects of expert qualification not only almost vanish but rather
makes things worse, as efficiency decreases, albeit not significantly. However, keeping in mind
that qualifying experts is expected to be costly, it seems unlikely that these investments would
pay off.
5.4 Effects of Price Competition
Result 3 (Behavior and Efficiency according to Price Competition):
Experts: Experts’ investments decrease while remaining below their best response with fixed
prices. With price competition, high-skilled experts invest too much and low-skilled experts too
little, given actual prices and consumer behavior. These differences are mainly non-significant.
The probability of a correct signal decreases in a low-qualified market but remains unaffected
in a high-qualified market. Average prices for signals and services constantly decline over
periods. While average signal prices are strictly above our predictions, service prices fall below
the critical threshold for high-skilled experts with them still willing to invest in high effort. We
observe no different average prices according to experts’ types.
Consumers: Markets do not break down and consumers even behave less risk averse with
price competition while we observe no significant effects on consumers’ search behavior and
their share of applying rational strategies. In a high-qualified market, consumers increase their
probability of buying after their first signal over time. On average, consumers do not adapt their
search behavior according to service prices but are influenced by signal prices, i.e. having more
trust in signals with higher prices.
Market Efficiency: In a low-qualified market, market efficiency increases non-significantly
with a higher efficiency rate, more solved problems and higher volume of trade. In a
high-qualified market, market efficiency decreases with a lower efficiency rate and significantly
fewer solved problems. In general, welfare is shifted from experts to consumers with a
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significant decrease for low-skilled experts. For both markets, the share of wrong services
increases.
We analyze the effects of price competition in either a Low or High market. We separate the
effects by comparing FixLow with FlexLow and FixHigh with FlexHigh.
Expert Behavior
We observe a decrease in experts’ effort choices when prices are flexible. In a low-qualified
market, low-skilled experts’ investments significantly decrease (MWU: z = 2.037, p < 0.05).
By contrast, high-skilled experts’ decreasing investments in a low-qualified market as well as
all experts’ investments in a high-qualified market are not significant (MWUs: p > 0.25). We
expected a decline in experts’ effort choices, as only z = 0.03 could be a potential equilibrium
with consumers entering the market. It shows that z lies above this value in both market
types (WSRs: p < 0.01). However, we observe a significant decrease in z by introducing
price competition in a low-qualified market (MWU: z = 1.972, p < 0.05) but no effect in
a high-qualified market (MWU: p > 0.15). We explain this by high-skilled experts in the
latter reducing their effort not more intensively than their higher share in the market and their
advantage in providing a correct diagnosis increasing the probability of a correct signal. In




















































Figure 7: Prices in Flex
We predicted that signal prices will be zero according to the standard Bertrand-argumentation.
The actual chosen average price is not only strictly above zero but with 2.82 [2.96] in FlexLow
[FlexHigh] it is also higher than with fixed prices. Consequently, we have to reject Hypothesis
3a. By contrast, with 4.03 [3.43] in FlexLow [FlexHigh], service prices are on average lower
than without price competition. However, we can observe a steady decline in prices for signals
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as well as services over time. Signal prices fall by approximately 21% [19%] on average in
the second half. The decline for service prices undergoes an even more drastic decline with
approximately 32% [32%] in the second half.
In both treatments with price competition the average service price falls below phmin = 4 while
high-skilled experts are still willing to choose xh > 0, i.e. with a share of 33.03% [50.37%].
Instead, it would be more profitable for them to reduce their share of high effort to zero.
Notice that this does not account for low-skilled experts, since over the whole course of our
experiment, the average service price remains above their minimum price level pmin = 2. For
low-skilled experts it would be more profitable to increase their effort investments also with
price competition, instead of reducing it, given actual consumer behavior.
By comparing the price setting by experts of different types, we can confirm Hypothesis
3d. We see almost no significant differences for service or signal prices in FlexLow (WSR:
p > 0.37) and only weakly significant results in a high-qualified market with high-skilled
experts choosing weakly higher signal prices than low-skilled experts (WSR: z = 1.647,
p = 0.0995).
Consumer Behavior
In sum, we see no significant differences in consumer behavior according to price competition
in a low- as well as a high-qualified market. While we observe an increase in consumers’ choice
for rational strategies by introducing flexible prices, these changes are not significant regarding
the probabilities of buying after one signal or after matching signals (MWUs: p > 0.13). In
line with this, the accumulated probability of rational strategies and the share of consumers
leaving without any action are not significantly different with flexible prices (MWUs: p> 0.14).
However, it appears that on average consumers behave less risk averse with flexible prices by
increasing their first-buy choices, their choices for rational strategies and reducing their leavings
without any actions.
According to the described learning effects in the former subsection, this contradicts Hypothesis
3 f , as we expected a strong correlation of f and p. While p is constantly falling on average, f
remains almost unchanged across periods, resulting in a correlation coefficient with p of 0.040
[-0.055] in FlexLow [FlexHigh]. Instead, we find that consumers are more influenced by signal
prices d with a correlation coefficient with f of -0.187 [-0.193] in FlexLow [FlexHigh]. We
will analyze this in further detail in the next section.
Market Efficiency
In the low-qualified market, consumer welfare and high-skilled experts’ profits increase but
low-skilled experts’ profits are reduced. Overall welfare increases as well as the share of
solved problems, the volume of trade and the efficiency rate. However, none of these effects is
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significant (MWUs: p > 0.17). In the high-qualified market, consumer welfare also increases,
while experts’ profits shrink independent of their type as well as overall welfare. Moreover, the
share of solved problem is reduced and the market arrives at a lower efficiency rate while the
volume of trade increases. The reduction in low-skilled experts’ profits and the share of solved
problems is weakly significant (MWUss: p < 0.10).
Remarks: Summing up the results, we can confirm the results of Dulleck et al. (2011), namely
that price competition reduces prices and increases the volume of trade, independent whether a
market is low or high qualified. In contrast to Huck et al. (2012), while also increasing it, this
has no significant effect on the market efficiency in our set-up. It appears that competition also
increases consumer trust in our experiment by price competition, as consumers buy more often
after their first signal. Additionally, while we can observe that welfare is redistributed from
experts to consumers, with consumer welfare increasing on average with price competition,
these effects are non-significant in contrast to Mimra et al. (2016a). In detail, we see different
effects of price competition in a high- and a low-qualified market. In a low-qualified market, we
observe a significant reduction in the probability of a correct signal, even though this does not
have a significant influence on market efficiency, prices and consumer behavior. By contrast,
these effects vanish in a high-qualified market but here consumers increase their probability of
buying after their first recommendation over time. In general, we observe consumers’ tendency
to trust more expensive signals, since they buy after their first signal more often if signal prices
are higher on average. This does not account for service prices, as we cannot find any relation
between p and f . Regarding subject behavior, we observe clear deviations from our theoretical
predictions and their best responses. Consumers participate in the market even though it would
be theoretically more profitable for them to leave without any action. However, while they
still act too risk averse given experts’ actual effort choices, high-skilled experts invest too
much effort given actual average service prices. By contrast, low-skilled experts invest less
effort than it would be optimal which counterbalances high-skilled experts’ low rates. While it
might be worthwhile introducing price competition in a low-qualified market according to its
efficiency-enhancing effect and particularly with its increasing effect on consumer welfare, our
results indicate a negative influence of price competition in a high-qualified market.
5.5 Estimating the Effects of Qualification and Competition
In this section, we use parametric tests to investigate subjects’ behavior in further detail.
In Table 5 we present the coefficients from our random-effects regressions. We use panel
tobit regressions to estimate the impact of competition, expert qualification, prices and
specific consumer and expert behavior traits on the share of high-effort choices for experts,
the probability to receive a correct signal from a random expert, the profits for experts and
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consumer welfare. Additionally, we use a panel probit regression to estimate the impact of the
independent variables on whether consumers buy after their first signal.
In the first two columns, we estimate the likelihood of experts investing in high effort and
providing a correct signal. Framing the probability for consumers to receive a correct signal
the other way around, we receive the probability of consumers being undertreated, as a wrong
signal cannot solve a problem if a service is conducted on it. Regarding our main treatment
effects, we can confirm the formerly-identified positive influence of expert qualification on
individual experts’ high-effort choices. Additionally, experts are significantly more likely to
invest in high effort the higher their individual chosen prices for signals and services. They are
positively influenced by service prices and the number of services sold in the former period. It
seems that experts experience some kind of obligation to invest more effort in their signals by
higher prices and when consumers trusted them before. We confirm that high qualification has
a strong negative effect on experts’ high-effort choices. Additionally, females are significantly
less likely to invest high effort.
At the market level, we can confirm the influence of our main treatment effects, with
competition significantly reducing the probability of consumers receiving a correct signal from
a random expert. By contrast, expert qualification and the interaction of qualification and
competition significantly increases this probability. In contrast to service prices, which have
a positive influence, average signal prices in a market have no effect on the probability of a
correct signal.
Aggregated expert profits are unaffected by our main treatment effects. However, the interaction
of competition and qualification has a weak negative effect on profits. Nonetheless, we observe
a strong influence of prices. While the prices set by individuals have a strong negative influence,
average prices in a market positively affect profits. This confirms the theoretical results
from (Pesendorfer, Wolinsky, 2003) with experts’ incentive to free-ride on others’ choices by
undercutting their prices. Experts profit from weak competition with high average prices in
a market, as they can stand out with slightly lower prices and attract more consumers. We
observe no significant influence of high-effort choices, which can be explained by contradicting
influences depending on expert types. In contrast to our theoretical predictions, we find no
differences according to experts’ skill on their profits.
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Table 5: Random Effects Panel Tobit/Probit Regressions using Data from all Treatments
Share high effort Prob. correct signal Expert Profits First signal buy Consumer welfare
Independent variables (Probit)
Competition -.191 -.067*** .415 .257 .849*
Expert Qualification .496** .052*** .295 -.120 .988**
Comp. x Qual. -.092 .007*** -.1229* .617 -.265
Own signal price .163*** -.881***
Own service price .075*** -.892***
Average signal price in t .002 1.262*** .281*** -.998***
Average service price in t .004*** 1.374*** -.012 -.637***
Average signal price in t−1 .026 .002 .092 .007 -.036
Average service price in t−1 .065* .005*** -.067 -.028 .321*
Number sent signals in t−1 -.034 .175*
Number provided services in t−1 .145*** .141
Wrong service in t−1 -.332** .034
High qualification -1.084*** .496
Share high effort .227
First signal buy 2.502***
Period .008 -.002*** -.030 .044*** .039
Female -.284* -.981*** -.236 -.549*
Constant .151 .701*** 3.455*** -2.388*** 16.508***
Observations 2,520 2,520 2,520 2,245 2,245
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.




In the forth column, we use a probit model to estimate the influence of our independent variables
on whether consumers buy after their first signal, which is an indicator of consumers’ risk
aversion. We cannot identify an influence of our main treatment effects with competition,
qualification as well as the interaction term being non-significant. Confirming our former
results, we see a strong positive influence of average signal prices on first-buy choices, which
appears irrational as there is no such effect on the probability of receiving a correct signal. In
case consumers have bought a service based on a wrong signal, this reduces their trust and their
first-buy choices. It is surprising that we see a significant positive effect of period. Our results
show that the probability to receive a correct signal from a random expert decreases with time
and makes it less worthwhile buying without confirmation. This can be explained by consumers
generally acting risk averse with first-buy-choices far below their best response, given expert
behavior. Over time, consumers appear to learn at the individual level about experts’ higher
than optimal investments in high effort and begin to trust more, even though we cannot not find
such an effect with our non-parametric tests. On the other hand, we observe no such learning
effects on the expert side, as prices decline over time. Decreasing prices on the one hand and
learning about consumers’ risk behavior on the other might counterbalance each other, driving
the effect of period to non-significance.
Finally, looking at consumer welfare, we observe a significant positive effect of competition
and expert qualification. Additionally, it is unsurprising that the average prices of signals and
services reduce consumer welfare. We can confirm our former statements of consumers buying
less often after their first signal compared with their optimal response, since their welfare
strongly increases with first-buy-choices. Again, we observe weakly significant less welfare
for females.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we have experimentally analyzed expert and consumer behavior in a market for
credence goods in which experts have a moral hazard problem in providing truthful diagnosis.
Experts have to invest in costly but unobservable diagnostic effort to send true signals to
consumers, which are necessary to solve consumer problems by an appropriate service. To
our best knowledge, we are the first to provide an experimental design to investigate moral
hazard in a market for credence goods. We built our four treatment conditions on our theoretical
model from Schneider, Bizer (2017) which expands the framework of Pesendorfer, Wolinsky
(2003). We introduced heterogeneously-qualified experts regarding their required effort to
provide correct diagnoses with high-skilled experts having an advantage, as they need less
effort to send a correct signal. We implemented a classical 2x2 design by varying the share
of high-skilled experts in the market and whether price competition existed. Besides looking
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at experts’ high-effort choices and consumers’ search behavior, we investigated how markets
reacted and used four indicators for efficiency, i.e. the volume of trade, share of at maximum
realized welfare, solved problems and the share of conducted wrong services.
In our baseline condition, the share of high-skilled experts was relatively low and prices
were fixed. We investigated average market behavior and market efficiency according to the
existing moral hazard problem in diagnosis and predicted the outcome based on our theory.
We observed a significantly higher investment rate in experts’ signals than we had expected,
resulting in a relatively high probability of consumers receiving a correct signal. However,
consumers acted risk averse by buying much less often after their first signal than expected
and they mainly relied on the strategy of searching for matching signals. Additionally, a
considerable share of consumers left the market without any action. Taking the actual results as
given rather than comparing them with theoretical predictions, both sides could have improved
their welfare, if they had adapted their strategies according to the other side’s actual behavior.
Given experts’ high-effort investments, consumers could have improved by buying more often
after their first signal, since the probability of receiving a correct signal was clearly above
our predictions. Given consumers’ risk aversion and their frequent search for matching
opinions, experts could have increased their profits by higher investments in high effort.
With low-skilled experts investing significantly more in high effort than high-skilled experts,
which even counterbalanced their disadvantage in providing a correct diagnosis, they profited
predominately from consumers’ higher search rates. To our surprise, the market efficiency was
significantly higher for all defined indicators than we had predicted. The higher search rates
imposed overall welfare losses from more transaction costs. This was counterbalanced by the
low share of wrong services, which was significantly below our prediction. According to our
design, a wrong service imposes a welfare loss several times higher than the search costs for
visiting another expert. We observed learning effects only for high-skilled experts with an
increase in investments from the first to the second third. However, these higher investments
rebounded in the last third almost back to the initial average. In sum, our baseline market was
much more efficient than our theory had predicted but with potential for improvements as a
considerable share of consumers distrusted the market and left without any action.
In the next step, we investigated how expert qualification affects outcomes in a market with or
without price competition. We defined expert qualification as an increased share of high-skilled
experts in the market. We observed a clear difference when experts were able to choose
their prices on their own. Without price competition, experts’ investments in their signals
increased as theory predicted. This raised the probability of consumers receiving a correct
signal. Consumers reacted by applying rational strategies, i.e. buying after their first signal
and searching for matching opinions, more often and they left the market less often without
any action. We saw a significantly positive effect on all efficiency indicators except for the
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share of wrong services, whereby this share even decreased. It is noteworthy that all experts’
profits as well as consumer welfare increased on average by expert qualification and fixed
prices. Nevertheless, the formerly-identified patterns prevailed, with consumers acting more
risk averse than their best response would be given expert behavior, and experts investing
too little effort given that consumers predominately search for matching opinions. With price
competition, the positive effects of expert qualification not only almost disappeared but seemed
to become negative. The only significant effect was for high-skilled experts, as they invested
more effort, which reduced their profits, since they would do best with zero investments.
While this appears to contradict our former descriptions of experts investing less effort than
their best response would be, given consumer behavior, with flexible prices this turns around
for high-skilled experts. Price competition constantly drives down prices for signals and
services. For high-skilled experts, this becomes critical, as service prices quickly fell below
their minimum price at which they should rationally invest in high effort. By increasing their
high effort rates according to expert qualification while prices were falling, high-skilled experts
profits were reduced. Despite being non-significant, expert qualification with flexible prices
seems to have a positive impact for consumers. They behaved less risk averse with higher
purchasing rates after their first signal and the lowest leaving rates without any action across all
treatments. Moreover, welfare was redistributed from the expert side to consumers, whereby
even the share of wrong treatments increased. In sum, expert qualification appears to have
fundamentally different effects concerning whether price competition exists in a market. With
fixed prices, efficiency was increased while qualification seems to have had rather negative
impacts with flexible prices.
Finally, we isolated the influence of price competition in either a low- or a high-qualified market
regarding the existing share of high-skilled experts. Most notably, in contrast to our predictions,
markets did not break down by consumers leaving without any action all of the time. Price
competition reduced experts’ investments in both markets. This reduced the average probability
of a correct signal. At the same time, consumers appeared to trust more with a higher probability
of buying after their first signal and less leavings without any action, which seems to confirm the
results of Huck et al. (2012). This is also in line with the presented JAS-literature, since flexible
prices imply higher degrees of freedom, which seems to be interpreted by consumer as being
more trustworthy. However, according to the tendency of consumers to trust high costly signals
more, higher trust rates might have simply resulted from higher signal prices with flexible prices
rather than the effect of competition between experts per se. It seems that price competition had
positive effects on the market efficiency, albeit only in a low-qualified market, with higher
welfare for consumers and high-skilled experts, more solved problems and a higher volume
of trade. However, all of these effects were non-significant. In a high-qualified market, price
competition shifted experts profits to consumers but reduced market efficiency with significantly
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fewer solved problems and a higher share of wrong services. In line with the existing literature,
e.g. Dulleck et al. (2011) and (Mimra et al., 2016a), prices for signals and services declined
over periods in both markets and the volume of trade increased. However, it is surprising that
signal prices were on average strictly above not only our prediction of being zero but also
above our reference values with fixed prices. By contrast, service prices quickly fell below the
reference value and even under the critical threshold for high skilled experts while they were still
willing to invest in high effort. We did not identify any real differences in price setting neither
concerning whether a market was high or low qualified nor for whether individual experts were
high or low skilled. In sum, we could not confirm the efficiency-increasing effect of price
competition from the literature, irrespective of whether we consider a low- or high-qualified
market.
Being the first to provide an experimental design investigating moral hazard in experts’
diagnosis in a market for credence goods, we provide a basis for further research. While
we have been able to investigate a variety of factors and their effects on expert and
consumer behavior as well as on market efficiency, our model and experimental design made
several restricting assumptions. We assumed that there is only one possible service that solves a
consumer’s problem. Regarding the existing literature, it would be more realistic to differentiate
between potential over- and undertreatment with varying payoff options. Furthermore, we
only examined how a varying share of high-skilled experts affects the outcome but let their
advantage in diagnosis remain fixed across treatments. It would be interesting how subjects
behave to different degrees of qualification and whether different investments of high- and
low-skilled experts prevail.
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Appendix A - Instructions
General Information to the Experiment
In this experiment, there will be groups of eight players with no interaction between different groups.
Each group comprises four players of type A and four players of type B. At the beginning of the
experiment, it will be randomly determined whether you are assigned the role of player A or player B.
Groups and role allocation will remain unchanged over the whole experiment. The experiment has 15
periods.
In the experiment, each player B has a problem. This will be presented as a numeric value between
0 and 1 (with two decimal places), e.g. 0.12. To solve a problem players B have to visit one or more
players A to receive signals about their problem and conduct a service. Each signal is also presented
as a numeric value between 0 and 1 (with two decimal places). A signal can be correct or wrong. If a
signal is correct, its value and the value of the corresponding problem are identical. If a signal is wrong,
the two values differ. The players B cannot identify whether a signal is correct or wrong. Each player
B can receive up to four signals (maximal one from each player A). To solve their problems, players B
have to purchase a service from a player A that is based on a correct signal.
Each player A decides [T1/T3: which prices he demands for sending a signal and for a service in this
period and] how he wants to treat each single player B in case she visits him. The players A can always
choose between two actions which automatically result in either a correct or a wrong signal is being
sent to a player B.
Your income in this game depends on your decisions and those of the other players in your group. You
income will be calculated in coins with 1 coin = 5 cent. At the end of each period, you will be informed
about your income for the current period and how much you have earned across all periods. At the
end of the game, your payoff will be transferred from coins into Euros (rounded up to one decimal place).
The Course of the Game
The experiment has 15 periods. Each period has an identical course:
1. [T1/T3: Each player A decides which prices he demands in this period for sending a signal and a
service.]
2. Each player A decides for each single player B which action he wants to carry out in case this
player visits him.
3. Each player B decides whether and how many players A she wants to visit for a signal and whether
she wants to purchase a service. [T1/T3: During this stage, each player A observe which prices
have been chosen by the other players A in this period.]
4. Decisions are implemented.
5. All players are informed about their decisions and their payoff in the current period.
In the following, the course and the different options for each player will be explained in detail.
The Role of Player A
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[T1/T3: At the beginning of each period as a player A, you decide which price (from 0 to 15) you
demand from the players B for sending a signal and a service. The players B have to pay an additional
fee of 0.2 coins on top of your price for sending a signal. For conducting a treatment there will be no fee.]
At the beginning of the experiment, each player A receives either the attribute 1 or the attribute 2. The
allocated attribute influences the consequences of your actions as a player A (see below) and does not
change during the experiment. In each group, 1 player receives the attribute 1 and 3 players receives
the attribute 2. [T2/T3: In each group, 3 players receive the attribute 1 and 1 player receives
the attribute 2. At the beginning of the experiment, all players A are informed about their individual
attribute.
In each period, you decide as a player A how you want to treat each single player B. You decide upfront
for the case that a player B actually visits you for a signal. In sum, you have to make four decisions in
each period at this stage. A decision will only be implemented, if the corresponding player B actually
visits you.
For each player B, you always have two actions to choose from:
• If you choose action 1, this will cost you 1 coin and you will send the correct value of this player
B’s problem to her.
• If you choose action 2, this will cost you 0 coins. The consequences in this case will depend on
your attribute:
o With attribute 1 you will send with 50% probability the correct value and with 50%
probability a wrong value to this player B (see first table).
o With attribute 2 you will send a wrong value to this player B (see second table).
Actions and consequences as player A with attribute 1 (3 [1] player[s] from each group receive
this attribute)
Selection Consequences
Action 1 Choosing action 1 will cost you 1 coin. You will send the correct value to this player B,
if she visits you.
Action 2 Choosing action 2 will cost you 0 coins. You will send with 50% probability the correct
value, and with 50% probability a wrong value to this player B, if she visits you.
Actions and consequences as player A with attribute 2 (1 [3] player[s] from each group receive
this attribute)
Selection Consequences
Action 1 Choosing action 1 will cost you 1 coin. You will send the correct value to this player B,
if she visits you.
Action 2 Choosing action 2 will cost you 1 coin. You will send a wrong value to this player B,
if she visits you.
For each player B who visits you for a signal, you receive the payment of 2 coins [T1/T3: your
determined price for sending a signal.] If you have chosen action 1 for this player B, 1 coin will
be subtracted from this. Notice that your decisions are only implemented, if a corresponding player B
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actually visits you. Consequently, you will only have the 1 coin subtracted by the choice of action 1, if a
player B actually visits you.
Example: In a given period, a player B has the problem with the value 0.12. Assuming that you are
player A with attribute 2 [T1/T3: , have chosen the price of 2 coins for sending a signal] and this player
B is going to visit you. If you choose action 1, you receive 1 coin (2 coins - 1 coin) and send the signal
0.12 to this player B. If you choose action 2, you receive 2 coins (2 coins - 0 coins) and send a random
but definitely wrong value, e.g. 0.76, to this player B.
The players B cannot identify which player A sends them a signal, which attribute a player A was
allocated and whether the sent signal is correct or wrong.
After player B receives a signal from you, she can purchase a service for the price of 5 coins
[T1/T3: for the price you have determined at the beginning of the period]. Notice that sending a
signal does not imply the automatic purchase of a service. Each player B can choose freely between
all players A who she has visited for a signal in a given period (see The Role of Player B for more details).
Subsequently, we present the decision screen for player A. Notice that the presentation of the players
B in the columns will be randomly determined in each period. Consequently, you do not know
which player B is presented in which column.
[Decision Screen players A]
Summary payoff options for player A:
The following payoffs refer to a single player B. You payoff in a given period is the sum of payoffs
from all four players B
• For each player B who visits you and purchases a service, you receive:
Payoff = 5 coins (price service) + 2 coins (price signal) - 1 coin (if you have chosen action 1)
[T1/T3: Payoff = price service + price sending signal - 1 coin (if you have chosen action 1)
• For each player B who visits you but does not purchases a service, you receive:
Payoff = 2 coins (price signal) - 1 coin (if you have chosen action 1) [T1/T3: Payoff = price
sending signal - 1 coin (if you have chosen action 1)
• If a player B does not visit you, you do not receive any payoff from her in this period, but
you also do not have any subtractions by choosing action 1 for her.
At the end of the experiment, each player A receives a show-up fee of 7 Euro. This will be added to
your payoff on the final screen.
Example of player A’s payoff in a given period:
You are player A and [T1/T3: decides to set the price for sending a signal at 2 coins and for conducting
a service at 5 coins. You] choose the following actions for the players B in your market:
Assuming that the first, third and fourth player B visit you for a signal and that the first player B purchases
a service from you. You receive a payoff of 9 coins in this period. This results as follows:
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Player Your decision as player A
First player B Action 1
Second player B Action 1
Third player B Action 2
Fourth player B Action 1
Player Payoff from this player in this period
First player B 6 coins = 5 coins (service) + 2 coins (signal) - 1 coin (action 1)
Second player B 0 coins (no visit; therefore no subtraction from choosing action 1)
Third player B 2 coins (signal)
Fourth player B 1 coin = 2 coins (signal) - 1 coin (action 1)
Final profit this period 9 coins = 6 coins + 0 coins + 2 coins + 1 coin
The Role of Player B
In every period, each player B has a new problem which is presented as a random numeric value between
0 and 1 (with two decimal spots), e.g. 0.12. This is randomly determined in each period. You will
never be informed about the actual value of your problem. Your problem will be solved, if you purchase
a service that is based on a correct signal only. If your problem is solved, you receive an additional
payoff of 13 coins.
At the beginning of each period as a player B, you receive an endowment of 12 coins. You have to
decide whether and how many players A you want to visit for a signal. Additionally, you have to decide
whether you want to purchase a service from a player A that is based on a formerly received signal.
Each received signal from a player A is also presented as a numeric value between 0 and 1 (with two
decimal spots). This value only equals your problem’s value in a given period, if the signal is correct
(see The Role of Player A for more details). If you receive two signals with identical values you can
be sure that both signals are correct.
In each period, you can choose between the following actions:
• Visit a (new) player A (costs 2,2 coins [T1/T3: costs depending on chosen prices]):
You can visit a (new) player A to receive a signal. This will cost you 2,2 coins. [T1/T3: The costs
depend on the prices chosen by the different players A in this period.] You can visit each player
A only once. Notice that the presentation of the players A on your screen is randomly determined
in each period. Consequently, you cannot identify which player A is presented in which column.
• Purchase a service (costs 5 coins [T1/T3: costs depending on chosen prices]; ends the period):
Based on a formerly-received signal, you can purchase a service from this player A. This costs you
5 coins. [T1/T3: The costs depend on the price chosen by the different players A in this period.]
This action ends the period. You can choose freely from all signals that you have received in this
period. This action is only available, if you have received at least one signal. If the signal on
which you purchase a service is correct, you receive an additional payoff of 13 coins. If the signal
is wrong, you receive no additional coins.
• End the period (ends the period, all incurred costs remain valid):
You can end a period without receiving a signal and/or purchasing a service. All incurred costs
will remain valid (e.g. if you have visited three players A for a signal for the price of 2,2 coins
each, and you end the period without purchasing a service, you have 6.6 coins deducted from your
endowment).
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Subsequently, we present the decision screen of player B:
[Decision Screen players B]
Summary payoff options for player B:
• If you purchase a service and the corresponding signal has been correct:
Payoff = 13 coins (solved problem) + 12 coins (endowment) - 5 coins (price service) - 2.2 ∗
number visited player A [T1/T3: Payoff = 13 coins (solved problem) + 12 coins (endowment) -
price service - costs of all received signals]
• If you purchase a service and the corresponding signal has not been correct:
Payoff = 12 coins (endowment) - 5 coins (price service) - 2.2 ∗ number visited player A [T1/T3:
Payoff = 12 coins (endowment) - price service - costs of all received signals]
• If you do not purchase a service:
Payoff = 12 coins (endowment) - 2.2 ∗ number visited player A [T1/T3: Payoff = 12 coins
(endowment) - costs of all received signals]
Example: You are player B and visit two players A for a signal. [T1/T3: Assuming that both players
A have chosen identical prices for sending a signal (2 coins) and for a service (5 coins).] Notice that
as a player B you have to pay an additional fee of 0.2 per received signal. Assuming that you decide to
purchase a service from one of the visited players A:
• If this player A’s signal was correct, you receive a payoff of 15.6 coins (= 13 coins + 12 coins - 5
coins - 2.2 coins ∗ 2).
• If this player A’s signal was not correct, you receive a payoff of 2.6 coins (= 12 coins - 5 coins -
2.2 ∗ 2).
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